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Abstract 
This thesis is a pioneering analysis of the intermarriage and spouse import of immigrants and 
their descendants in Norway, combining multivariate statistical techniques and mechanism-
based theoretical explanations. Using register data on the complete stock of immigrants and 
descendants who have married in Norway in the period of 1973-2002 (N=55,293), I explore 
the degree to which national-origin groups differ in their spouse selection, and I model the 
influence of other individual-level characteristics such as educational level, generation, 
gender, and age at marriage (and control for place of residence and length of stay before 
marriage) on both intermarriage and spouse import. Regressions are run for the whole 
immigrant population, separately for men and women of both generations, and for a subset of 
national-origin groups: Moroccans, Turks, Indians, Pakistanis and Vietnamese (and for the 
intermarriage analyses, Danes). 
First, I present contingency tables of national-origin and spouse selection outcome. Among 
both generations, the national-origin groups of Western Europe and North America have the 
highest intermarriage rates, and Middle Eastern and South Asian groups display the lowest 
mean intermarriage rates and the highest spouse import rates. In general, men are 
considerably more prone to spouse import than women. Among immigrants marrying in 
Norway, women tend to intermarry more than men, but among descendants, men intermarry 
more than women. Male descendants intermarry more than male immigrants, while female 
immigrants intermarry more than female descendants. 
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Second, I report multinomial logit models for intermarriage. The analyses show that the 
positive relationship between educational level and intermarriage is much lower than that 
indicated by models from previous research treating the immigrant population as one group, 
and without controlling for age at marriage. Educational level increases descendants‟ 
probability of intermarriage more than that of immigrants (and particularly for women). 
Higher age at marriage increases the chances of intermarriage for both immigrants and 
descendants, to the extent that controlling for age at marriage makes both male and female 
descendants more likely to intermarry than immigrants. While education has a clear positive 
bearing on the intermarriage rates of individuals from Vietnam, Turkey and India, and a 
minimal increase for Pakistanis and Moroccans, the same relationship is negative for Danes. 
Similarly, while descendants from Vietnam are more prone to marry a majority Norwegian 
than Vietnamese immigrants, the opposite is seen in the case of Moroccans and Indians. 
Third, I report binomial logit models for spouse import among the endogamous. Again, the 
importance of controlling for age at marriage and national-origin group variation is 
confirmed. Still, higher educational attainment and age at marriage both decrease the 
probability of spouse import. On average, descendants are more likely to import spouses than 
immigrants. Moroccans and Vietnamese are less likely to import spouses the higher their 
educational level, while Pakistanis, Turks and Indians displayed no significant differences 
according to educational attainment. However, while descendants from Vietnam and 
Morocco are more likely to import than immigrants from the same countries, those with 
Turkish and Pakistani background display less propensity of finding a spouse in their country 
of origin than women from their parental generation. 
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1. Introduction 
Relationships are at the core of our existence as human beings. Among the many kinds of 
relations we depend on, the type established by romantic love and attraction is arguably the 
most powerful and fundamental of them all. Despite cultural and demographic changes 
during the last decades (i.e., the growth of unmarried cohabitation and divorce)
1
, marriage is 
still the most common public expression of this relationship. Although the role of love and 
romance varies greatly between couples and cultures, choosing and being chosen as a spouse 
is a central life-event for people across the planet. However, attraction, love and other 
influences of spouse selection do not operate arbitrarily. Indeed, if weddings in Norway 
flourished randomly, most immigrants would marry Norwegians, most Muslims would 
marry Christians and atheists, and university graduates would be mixed in matrimonies with 
high school dropouts. From a scientific point of view, there are many aspects of this 
phenomenon that can be studied. One may investigate the fact that some unions endure and 
even become permanent, while others crumble at the first quarrel. Thus, many social 
scientists today study the exit aspect of couples: who is more likely to split up, and why?
2
 
One may also do research pertaining to the entrance aspect: who is more likely to get 
together?
3
 Developing this project, some have focused on trends in spouse selection through 
                                                          
1 The changes are part of what demographers call “the second demographic transition”, which involves an increase in age at 
first marriage, more divorce, increase in remarriages and the spreading of unmarried cohabitation (Van De Kaa 1987; Wiik 
2010). 
2 For a pertinent example of this research, see Kalmijn et al. (2005). Lyngstad and Jalovaara (2010) review the field.  
3 For a comprehensive review of this field, see Kalmijn (1998). 
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examining temporal changes in mating patterns (e.g. Mare 1991; Schwartz and Mare 2005), 
while others have emphasized the international variation, through cross-sectional 
comparisons (e.g. Jacobson and Heaton 2008). However, in the last decade, scholars have 
increasingly concentrated on the input of union formation: what influences the choice of a 
spouse?  
This thesis asks questions of the latter type, focusing on immigrants and their descendants in 
Norway. Put simply, the study aims at three distinct goals of discovery. First, to uncover the 
degree to which national-origin groups vary with respect to their rates of intermarriage 
(exogamy), inmarriage (endogamy) and spouse import. Second, to test the general impact of 
individual characteristics shown to be correlated with these spouse selection outcomes in 
other national contexts: educational level, place of residence, generation, sex, age at marriage 
and length of stay. Third, the study discusses some explanatory mechanisms that might 
underpin the social processes generating the empirical patterns of the statistical analyses. 
Relying on population data from administrative registers (N=55,293), the analyses employ 
both descriptive statistics and logistic regression procedures. 
The introductory chapter is a guide to this thesis. First, I present my research theme, and the 
questions guiding the study. Second, a scientific and societal justification is forwarded. 
Third, the limitations of the study are explicated. Fourth, a few words on frequently used 
notions and how they are defined. Finally, I round up this introduction by outlining the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
1.1 Research questions 
For the sake of brevity, it is possible to condense my agenda into two main research 
questions: How do endogamy, exogamy and spouse import rates differ between national-
origin groups in the immigrant population of Norway? What influence do individual 
characteristics of immigrants and descendants have on these spouse selection rates? As 
mentioned above, in addition to national-origin group the list of independent variables 
(measuring these characteristics) includes educational level, place of residence, generation, 
sex, age at marriage and length of stay. In essence, I seek an assessment of the degree to 
which these factors influence intermarriage and spouse import. To learn more specifically 
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about the research interests behind this thesis, the following paragraphs unpack a more 
precise set of questions.  
People‟s partner choices are significantly influenced by their education. Although this thesis 
is not about educational homogamy, previous research has shown that level of education 
positively influences the likelihood of marrying someone from outside ones group, and 
negatively influences the likelihood of spouse import (although the evidence of this is mixed, 
see Lievens [1999] and Gonzalez-Ferrer [2006]). There is also some evidence suggesting that 
educational level influences spouse selection among immigrants and descendants in Norway 
(Daugstad 2009: 29). Hence, I ask:  
1. What is the impact of educational level on the intermarriage and spouse import of 
immigrants and descendants?  
There are internationally consistent findings of across-group and within-group differences 
between men and women in the propensity to intermarry (e.g. Jacobs and Labov 2002; 
Yancey 2002; Lie 2004; Okamoto 2007). While most groups display more male exogamy, in 
some Asian groups the women are more likely to marry out (Hwang et al 1997). This study 
seeks to establish both bivariate and multivariate assessment of these sex differences, both in 
intermarriage, spouse import and the impact of educational level on these outcomes:  
2. Are there differences in the intermarriage and spouse import between men and 
women? Is educational level less important for the spouse selection of men than for 
women? 
International research and assimilation theory (Gordon 1964) both indicate that being a 
descendant raises the likelihood that you enter an exogamous union. Descendants have been 
exposed to the majority throughout their upbringing, and their adult behavior is often 
considered a litmus test of social integration. Because of this, it is interesting to uncover both 
whether they intermarry and import differently from their parental generation, and whether 
the impact of education on these outcomes differs. Thus, I inquire:  
3. Are descendants more prone to intermarriage (and less prone to spouse import) than 
immigrants? Is education less important for the spouse selection of descendants than 
for immigrants? 
15 
There is some evidence that age at marriage may influence intermarriage rates (Kulzycki and 
Lobo 2002; Hwang et al. 1997; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010). There is also reason to 
think that age at marriage varies according to national-origin belonging and educational 
level. Thus, I ask: 
4. What is the impact of marital age on the probability of intermarriage and spouse 
import?  
Not all of the independent variables are represented by these research questions. Because of 
both the spatial and temporal limitations given when writing a master‟s thesis, some of the 
relevant independent variables of this study will function merely as statistical controls, and 
are thus not discussed thoroughly in the theoretical or the final chapter. However, the 
estimates of these variables will be commented on pertinent occasions, and the rationale for 
including them is briefly given below. 
Previous research finds that time spent in the country has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of entering an exogamous marital union for immigrants (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006; 
Dribe and Lundh 2008; Trilla et al. 2008), possibly because of increased language 
proficiency, cultural assimilation and simply more exposure to natives. Thus, the role of 
length of stay before marriage is controlled in the analyses of immigrants. Former studies 
(Blau et al. 1982 & 1984; Heaton and Jacobson 2000; Van Tubergen and Maas 2007) have 
documented that the spatial concentration of groups influence intermarriage patterns. In 
2001, 55% of all non-western immigrants resided in the Oslo-area (Pettersen 2003: 9). Thus, 
the simple control for this phenomenon in my analyses is a dummy measuring whether the 
person lives in Oslo.  
This study concerns the behavior of immigrants and descendants in the “domestic marriage 
market” of Norway. Thus, I exclude all immigrants married abroad, all immigrants imported 
by a Norwegian spouse, and no majority Norwegians are included in the analyses except as a 
characteristic of their spouse in the immigrant population. All research questions are 
investigated separately for the whole immigrant population, and for a subset of the national-
origin groups selected because they consist of a significant number of both immigrants and 
descendants: Morocco, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Vietnam. For the intermarriage analyses, 
Denmark is included to achieve a sense of perspective – but a similar move was not pertinent 
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in the import analyses because of the required number of observations to run logistic 
regressions. The remainder of this introduction puts the research questions in scientific and 
societal context, before outlining the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Relevance and context 
1.2.1 Scientific rationale: new knowledge about an old topic 
The process of matching and mating is a crucial part of human society. In fact, the latter 
fundamentally depends on it. Studying partner choices, it could be argued, is inherently 
interesting because most people engage in courtship or enter a marital union (or several) 
during a life-course. The act of entering a marriage, it could be argued, is among the most 
important of all social actions. Social actions are often conceived to constitute the subject-
matter of sociology, by an influential definition (Weber 1962). Hence, studying the 
conditions of this particular type of choice is attractive from a social scientific perspective. 
However, social scientists are also interested in spouse selection because it can be interpreted 
as an indicator of larger social processes (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010: 459). First, the 
degree of intermarriage between national-origin groups signals the amount of between-group 
tolerance in a society, as the intimacy between spouses points to an acceptance of each other 
as being on an equal footing (Fryer 2007). Second, such interaction involves not only the 
spouses, but their families, relatives, friends and wider networks – generating intergroup 
contact on a larger scale (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010: 459). Third, it also indicates the 
future of prejudice, as the children of exogamous unions are unlikely to identify with only 
one group (Xie and Goyette 1997).  
A common way to validate a project is to stress its unprecedented contribution. Apart from a 
few reports of descriptive statistics produced by Statistics Norway (Lie 2004; Daugstad 2008 
& 2009; Henriksen 2010)
4
, there is presently little research on my selected topic within the 
Norwegian context. In a sense, it is therefore meaningful to call this study exploratory. 
Through fleshing out social mechanisms which might explain the observed spouse choices, 
                                                          
4 Although Daugstad (2009) investigates the importance of education and parents‟ socioeconomic status, her analyses are 
limited to bivariate comparisons in tables, with no tests of significance and low numbers in most decompositions. In several 
instances, she recommends further register-based analyses.  
17 
and modeling the statistical influence of several characteristics, I intend to demonstrate that 
the sociological perspective is different from psychological and economic alternatives (cf. 
Kalmijn 1998: 398). As I am directly inspired by similar research conducted in other 
countries (e.g. Dribe and Lundh 2008; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2007, 2010; Van 
Tubergen and Maas 2007; Kulczycki and Lobo 2002), I hope to insert a few pieces of a 
larger theoretical and empirical puzzle. 
1.2.2 Societal rationale: integration and group boundaries 
Although social research can be corroborated by the progress of human knowledge itself, 
most non-scientists (i.e. most citizens) confront research efforts with the legitimate question 
“what is the use of this information”? While this pragmatic query of science can occasionally 
be validly rejected, as “human interest and scientific relevance do not invariably coincide” 
(Merton 1964: 128), this is not the case here.  
First, the tendency that certain particularly visible national-origin groups display very little 
intermarriage with the majority is often cited as a sign of failed integration. Indeed, the link 
between intermarriage and integration constitutes a widespread assumption among both 
laymen and researchers (Huntington 2004: 37; Song 2009; Lucassen and Laarman 2009: 54; 
Bean and Stevens 3002: 109). A classical sociological perspective suggests that the isolation 
of groups in the same society over time constitutes “social closure” (Weber 1978: 43). 
Accordingly, endogamous patterns may be considered a measure of a particular type of social 
closure: the degree to which immigrant or minority ethnic groups are integrated in society. 
High levels of endogamy indicate a lack of intimate relations between national-origin groups 
almost by definition (Birkelund & Heldal 2003: 2). Correspondingly, high levels of exogamy 
may indicate frequent social interactions and strong social acceptance between groups 
(Kalmijn 1998). This is reinforced by the fact that a marital union connects not only the two 
spouses, but also the families and networks to which they belong (Kalmijn and Tubergen 
2010: 459). 
However, how one conceives of the relationship between intermarriage and integration 
depends on how on understands integration (Song 2009). In a re-conceptualization of the 
distinction between natives and „foreign‟ residents of a society by the invocation of boundary 
processes, Richard Alba (2005: 21) suggests that „parity of life chances‟ between these 
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groups constitutes assimilation. Noting that others might prefer to call this integration, he 
argues that immigrant groups are more likely to attain this parity with the majority if they 
change their “ethnic, cultural or communal attachments” (Alba 2005: 43) – and thus that the 
notion of assimilation suits the definition better. Commenting on Alba‟s (neo-)assimilation 
theory, Bean and Stevens (2003:  94) elaborate on this understanding as one that emphasizes 
a convergence between majority and minority, and not clean cut absorption of the 
newcomers in the dominant‟s society. Although I am sympathetic to attempts at reviving the 
notion of assimilation, I choose the conventional concept of integration as it is largely used 
in Norway, which involves emphasis on the free choice of immigrants of whether to adapt 
culturally to the majority or not (Brochmann and Kjelstadli 2008: 18).  
If socioeconomic parity is a measure of successful integration, how does spouse selection 
relate to this? Some have suggested a link between intermarriage and economic assimilation, 
largely based on the idea of “human capital spillover” from the majority spouse to the 
minority spouse (Dribe and Lundh 2008: 333). In Norway, Østby (2004: 77) displays higher 
levels of employment and higher wages for immigrants with spouse from the majority 
population than those married endogamously. He also finds that immigrants married 
exogamously to another immigrant have higher average wages than endogamous couples 
(Østby 2004: 73). However, throughout Europe there are several national-origin groups 
displaying low rates of intermarriage and high rates of labor market integration (Lucassen 
and Laarman 2009: 54). Depending on one‟s conception of integration, one can also think of 
inmarriage as socially desirable: it promotes the integration of the ethnic group, underlining 
its boundaries and protecting its cultural legacy from the melting pot. In this sense, thus, the 
selection of a spouse from one‟s own group – whether from the homeland or country of 
residence – contributes to the tight-knit feature of ethnic groups.  
Second, there are the cross-generational consequences of inmarriage. As suggested above, 
marital patterns may have decisive consequences for the demographic development of 
human societies. In the case of my theme, the social and genetic components of this process 
are intertwined. Marriages often carry the potential of offspring. As mentioned above, one 
does not need to be well-versed in biology to understand that assortative mating influences 
the genetic composition of society‟s toddlers. However, the social and cultural features of 
mixing and the lack of it are more prominent in the debate. On the one hand, children of 
endogamous unions are likely to identify with their parents‟ common cultural heritage, and 
19 
thus may consider themselves as “foreigners” or “immigrants” notwithstanding their 
Norwegian birth-certificate and citizenship (Øia and Vestel 2007). On the other hand, 
children of mixed marriages tend to have less negative attitudes towards other groups 
(Tubergen & Maas 2007: 1066), and less rigid ethnic identification (Kulczycki and Lobo 
2002: 209). Thus, intermarriage will most likely contribute to the “blurring” of group 
boundaries (Alba 2005).  
Third, the more endogamous immigrant groups are, the more attention is directed towards 
their unfamiliar marital practices. Throughout the last decades in Norway, there has been 
considerable focus on the cultural practice of parent-arranged marriages (frequently 
confused/conflated with forced marriages), and its disparate impact on women and men 
(Bredal 2005). Also, medical researchers have voiced concerns for disproportionate rates of 
consanguineous marriages, involving higher risks of health problems for their offspring 
(Surén et al. 2007).
5
 The phenomenon of spouse import is another example of criticised 
marital practices, and received increasing attention during the 1990s, when politicians and 
public became aware of the unprecedented growth in the immigrant population not only 
through family reunification but also through “fresh spouses” (Brochmann and Kjelstadli 
2008: 207). Regarding the issue of integration, choosing to import a spouse has the added 
feature that Norway receives another foreign adult, often with relatively low chances of 
adapting to “our” culture and economy. Also, this phenomenon is possibly an even more 
group-isolating choice than “domestic endogamy” – as the group‟s particularity is “fueled” 
by input from the country of origin (Gonzalez-Ferrer 2006: 172). Indeed, there is a 
widespread worry in Norway that imported spouses are less likely to learn the language 
properly, interact with people from the majority population, and thus that they will not be 
able to teach their children the language and ways of the society in which they live (Lie 2004: 
100). 
6
 
                                                          
5 As of 2005, Norwegian statistics show the rate of children born from consanguineous mating between cousins to be 
particularly widespread among immigrants of Pakistani (43,9%), Moroccan (17,3%) and Turkish (17,1%) background. 
Descendants of Pakistani and Turkish national-origin display lower, but still alarmingly high rates (respectively 
35,1%/11,7% , while for children of Moroccan immigrants the rate has diminished significantly, to 3% (Suren et al 2007: 
4). 
6 The latest widely publicized voicing of these concerns came at a debate between right-wing populist Christian Tybring-
Gjedde (FrP) and foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre (Ap), in which the former pressed the issue that unlike Norwegian 
immigrants to the US a century ago, “our” immigrants do not marry with the majority, but display “uncultural” actions such 
as spouse import, arranged marriage and forced marriage (National Broadcasting Corporation 2010). 
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A crucial qualification of scientific practice is in my view the effort of value-free reasoning. 
Thus, this thesis simply assumes the role of providing knowledge about the statistical 
patterns and influences of spouse selection, so that future debates and political decisions 
touching upon this subject is better informed empirically.
 7
  
1.3 Limitations  
An overarching scientific goal of this study is obviously to learn more about why immigrants 
and descendants choose spouses of their own or different national background. However, 
there are several caveats concerning the impact of this study on our understanding of these 
dynamics in general.  
First, the register data available to me do not contain any information on the partners of those 
registered as cohabiters. While it remains true that “marriage is undoubtedly the most 
profound and lasting human relation of all those established (in modern society)” (Blau et al. 
1984: 591), unmarried cohabitation has become a form of union formation very similar to 
marriage both legally (Noack 2001: 115) in numbers (there are currently about 600,000 
cohabiters in Norway) and demographic quality (the mean duration of such unions is 
increasing, and Norway displays a very high proportion of births – about half – to cohabiting 
couples) (Wiik 2010: 8, 33). However, only 3% of immigrants from Asia and 4% of 
immigrants from Africa were cohabiting in 2001 (Lie 2004: 28). A total of 4% of all 
immigrants were shown to be cohabiting in a survey from 2005-2006 (Blom 2008: 47). Still, 
there is undoubtedly variation between both individuals and national-origin groups with 
respect to their cohabitation rates, and thus the possibility that cohabiters may display 
different spouse selection patterns (Trilla et al. 2008; Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2010) 
introduces this admonition to my conclusions. 
Second, there is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity, or omitted variable bias. Although 
there are many other properties hypothesized to co-vary with endogamous and exogamous 
partner choices, most of these are either unfeasible to test with my empirical material – or 
                                                          
7 Expanding this statement, I acknowledge that there is no “view from nowhere”. Still, I subscribe to the observation that 
the open exchange of arguments and evidence idealized in the scientific community is a forceful barrier against scientific 
conclusions being drawn on purely “subjective” and value-specific grounds.  
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fall outside the scope of a master thesis. Because of the former restriction, “subjective” 
matters such as religion, language skills, cultural distance and phenotype appearance are not 
directly accounted for in the analyses. Because of the latter restriction, I also choose not to 
take account of group level determinants (Heaton and Jacobson 2000; Blau et al. 1984). 
These factors, which include both structural (group demographics such as sex ratio and size) 
and cultural (marriage customs, ethnic diversity, dominant religion) types, have recently been 
shown to influence spouse selection patterns significantly (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2010). 
In this thesis, they may have a confounding impact on the accuracy of estimates.  
Third, a few words must be said about the limitations connected to time. The most 
conspicuous caution is the fact that my data are relatively outdated, as the latest registration 
of marriages is the last day of 2002 (December 31
st
). Among the most important change to 
note is the growth of certain descendant groups pertinent to include in these analyses. 
Daugstad (2009: 3) argues that the children of immigrants involved in an established 
relationship are non-representative for the descendant population as a whole; they have 
married early, display lower rates of education and their parents score lower on 
socioeconomic status.  
 
This study utilizes so-called stock data, compiling all marriages during a period to analyze 
their characteristics. As such, it assumes (rather unrealistically) that the importance of 
independent variables is constant throughout the period (1973-2002). Figure 1.1 displays the 
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distribution of the entire population of immigrants and descendants analyzed in this thesis 
(N= 55293), and illustrates that the majority of individuals included in my analyses have 
married during the last two decades (more specifically: 25% have married in 2000 or later, 
50% have married in 1997 or later, while 75% have married in 1992 or later).  
A problem related to this is the validity of intermarriage rates as measure of inter-group 
integration, if the continuity of such unions is left unchecked. Because exogamous unions 
have been shown to be less stable than endogamous unions (Lie 2004: 91; Kalmijn et al. 
2005), these stock data could misrepresent the degree to which inter-group relations actually 
prevail in the marriage market. However, this signals both that more exogamous couples 
marrying within the last decades are not included in my analyses – and that more exogamous 
unions than endogamous unions among those analyzed here will be divorced in a decade. 
Finally, two caveats related to the spatial limitations of a master‟s thesis. The first is 
connected to my helplessness in discussing the overall variation between national-origin 
groups in spouse selection patterns. As suggested in the last chapter, accounting for this 
variation may be approached, but through a slightly different design (including more 
variables on group level etc.). This thesis does concern these differences, but focuses more 
specifically on the role played by particular factors in addition to specifics of national-origin 
groups. Second, I estimate the chances of minority exogamy, i.e. choosing a spouse from 
another national-origin group in the immigrant population of Norway. However, although its 
variation between national-origin groups is large, this outcome is not discussed – and largely 
commented upon only in the cases in which its independent variable estimates deviate from 
that seen for majority exogamy.  
1.4 Definitions 
To many outsiders, sociologists often appear to be toying with words more than actually 
finding out stuff. Indeed, as argued by Lyngstad (2009), there seems to be a widespread 
conviction within the discipline that new words themselves contribute to an explanation of 
something. Still, it is appropriate to clarify the intended meaning of frequently used words. 
Unfortunately, the public debate on integration and immigration is a conceptual ordeal. 
Although unable to avoid the fact that most notions are muted by discussions both in media 
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and academia, I have opted for simplicity rather than elaboration in this arena. There are 
immigrants (people who have actually immigrated), descendants (children of two immigrant 
parents), and both groups are part of the immigrant population. Further, I occasionally utilize 
the shorthand of “non-western” versus “western”, mainly because the novel substitutions 
provided by Statistics Norway are too long, and the alternative shorts “Regional-group 1 or 
2” is devoid of meaning to most readers.8 When talking about the population with 
Norwegian ancestors, I use the notions of “majority Norwegian” or simply “the majority 
population” – the members of which are different from minority groups (i.e. immigrants and 
descendants) simply in that they are demographically the overwhelmingly dominant national-
origin group in Norway. Talk of the differences between men and women is no less a 
minefield.  Although the notion of gender is more widespread among sociologists, in this 
thesis I interchangeably use the words “sex” and “gender” when referring to the differences 
between men and women. 
An influential definition of exogamy is that the spouses come from different groups “which 
are culturally conceived as relevant to the choice of a spouse” (Merton 1964: 130).  A human 
being often belongs to many groups. When I use the notions of endogamy (intermarriage) 
and exogamy (inmarriage) in this thesis, reference is made not to the “culturally relevant” 
background forwarded by Merton, but simply to whether the spouses share national origin or 
not.
9
 In media and colloquial terminology, differences between national-origin groups are 
often conflated with ethnic dissimilarity. Here, notions of interethnic unions, ethnic 
intermarriage, and other references to race and ethnicity widespread in anglophone social 
science have been avoided – except for a few passages in Chapter 3 where these notions 
display the logic of certain mechanisms. Following Daugstad (2008: 8) my notion of spouse 
import includes all cases where a Norwegian resident (of immigrant background) marries a 
non-resident, or marries a newcomer within the year of migration. 
                                                          
8 However, adhering to the fact that these notions are imprecise remnants of the past, with undesirable normative 
connotations (Fangen and Mohn 2010: 145), I insert them in quotation marks.  
9 Some of the marriages I label endogamous may thus be exogamous according to ethnicity (as some national backgrounds 
conceal many ethnic groups), as well as other social dimensions (Merton 1964: 130).   
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1.5 Structure 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters, three of which presents empirical results of the 
statistical analyses. Following a common research strategy, the next step of this thesis is to 
establish what knowledge previous investigations have produced. Chapter 2 thus provides a 
concise account of empirical research on the spouse selection of immigrant groups and ethnic 
minorities.  
All research is governed by a philosophy of science, i.e. ideas about the logic of science, 
valid explanations, the role of theory and the relationship between science and the reality it is 
supposed to depict (Holst 2009). Following the train of thought labeled analytical sociology 
(Hedström 2005), theories are tools of empirical research, meant to single out the 
mechanisms responsible for generating the patterns observed. In addition to suggesting a 
cluster of mechanisms, Chapter 3 presents their empirical expectations.  
A key principle of all sciences is that every step in the process of discovery is transparent and 
accessible to those seeking to review its validity and reliability. This study relies on 
quantitative data, and utilizes regression techniques to process this information. Although all 
calculations are performed by the SPSS and Excel software, Chapter 4 describes the register-
based dataset, how variables are operationalized, and the logic and application of two types 
of logistic regression models (bi- and multinomial).  
Chapter 5 first presents bivariate contingency tables of national-origin and spouse selection 
outcome for two response variables. The first (A) measures the degree of intermarriage as 
three outcomes: endogamy (in-group marriage), exogamy (intermarriage) with majority and 
exogamy with other minority. The second response variable (B) measures whether the 
endogamous have imported their spouse or not, as a dichotomous outcome.  
Results of the multivariate analyses are reported in two chapters, providing tests of how 
national origin, educational level, generation, gender, residence, age at marriage and length 
of stay influences spouse selection. Chapter 6 reports the results of multinomial logistic 
regressions of the impact of these regressors on intermarriage outcomes. Then, Chapter 7 
reports binomial logistic models analyzing the impact of the same regressors on the spouse 
import probability of the endogamous. Both chapters include models comprising all 
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independent variables, as well as separate analyses ran for men, women, descendants and 
immigrants. 
Finally, chapter eight provides a discussion of the results in the light of the theoretical 
mechanisms and hypotheses forwarded, and an attempt at pointing the way forward for 
further research in this field.  
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2. Previous research 
This chapter presents relevant research conducted on the spouse selection of immigrant 
groups (and to some extent ethnic and racial minorities in the US). Its rationale is not only 
showing what I relied on when developing this study, but developing an argument as to 
where my own contribution fits in. While the Norwegian research is currently limited to 
documentation of spouse selection patterns among the immigrant population,
10
 many non-
Norwegian studies aim specifically to analyze the factors influencing spouse choice. 
2.1 Norwegian patterns 
Statistics Norway is an invaluable source of reliable, extensive and accessible quantitative 
knowledge about the population residing in Norway. My subject is not an exception: through 
several reports during the last decade, the spouse selection of immigrants and descendants 
has been mapped.  
                                                          
10 Having said this, the existence of sociological studies of other types of assortative marriage (especially educational 
homogamy and class endogamy) in Norway must be noted (Hansen 1995; Hansen 2002; Birkelund and Heldal 2003; 
Birkelund and Goodman 1997; Wiik 2009).  
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2.1.1 The immigrant population  
In an extensive register-based report, Lie (2004) depicted the stock of marriages involving at 
minimum one person from the immigrant population in 2002.
11
 Among married men in the 
“western” immigrant population, 72% have a majority Norwegian spouse, 19% have a 
spouse from their own region of origin, and 5% have engaged in transregional unions (i.e. 
roughly equivalent to what I call minority exogamy in this thesis). Among married men from 
“non-western” countries, 13% are married to a majority Norwegian woman, 70% have 
spouses from the same region and 2.5% are married transregionally (Lie 2004: 43). When it 
comes to the female immigrant population, those of “western” background marry with the 
majority population at 78%, while the corresponding figure for “non-western” women is 
28% – a great deal more than men of the same origin (Lie 2004: 44).  
Table 2.1. Marriage by the national-origin group of spouse, female 
residents (male national-origin in italic). Count. 1.1.2002 
     
 
Sum Norway 
Nordic 
Countries 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe Africa 
Asia w/ 
Turkey 
Northern 
America 
S- and C- 
America Oceania Missing 
Sum 843 929 780 769 9 439 8 782 9 062 4 765 22 564 2 153 1 788 261 4 346 
Norway 772 590 749 314 6 960 6 676 1 616 1 388 2 215 1 757 754 210 1 700 
Nordic 
Countries 12 214 9 582 2 049 172 55 48 77 47 20 5 159 
Western 
Europe 7 959 5 898 107 1 538 57 53 126 50 27 9 94 
Eastern 
Europe 12 912 4 827 94 116 7 261 35 179 17 20 1 362 
Africa 5 058 740 20 52 4 3 146 96 4 5 0 991 
Asia w/ 
Turkey 27 681 6 486 131 132 48 78 19 831 18 7 6 944 
Northern 
America 2 524 2 133 34 43 8 7 13 247 7 3 29 
S- and C-
America 2 747 1 601 36 44 11 10 24 8 948 0 65 
Oceania 244 188 8 9 2 0 3 5 0 27 2 
            
            Adapted from Lie (2004: 44) 
On the whole, the stock of marriages in Norway as of 01.01. 2002 displays large differences 
between groups and sexes. While men with Scandinavian background marry majority 
                                                          
11 There are two pivotal differences between these data and those used in this thesis. First, the prevalence data used by Lie 
are updated 1.1.2002, meaning that one year of marriages divide this empirical material from mine. As shown by Figure 
1.1, around 4500 marriages took place during 2002, possibly encompassing around 10% of the marriages analyzed here. 
Second, and most importantly, Lie‟s analyses encompasses immigrants married abroad (Lie 2004: 53), and hence the 
estimates of endogamy and exogamy are heavily biased by the variance between groups as to whether a large proportion 
migrated as couples or not.  
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Norwegian women at a 75% rate, the following country backgrounds display very low 
intermarriage rates with female natives: Afghanistan (1%), Somalia, Vietnam, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Iraq, Pakistan (3%), Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and China (9%). Although no 
statistical control for this was provided, Lie speculates that for some of these groups a recent 
arrival to Norway impacts on these rates (Lie 2004: 47).
12
 Some groups of men have high 
rates of intermarriage with other non-Norwegians (Croatia 19%, Ethiopia 23%, France 13%) 
– but these are often from neighboring countries or other parts of the same, historically 
disintegrated country (e.g. Yugoslavia). In sum, “non-western” groups of men with recent 
arrival are most endogamous. 
Table 2.2. Marriage by the national-origin group of spouse, male residents 
(female national-origin in italic). Count. 1.1.2002 
     
 
Sum Norway 
Nordic 
Countries 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe Africa 
Asia w/ 
Turkey 
Northern 
America 
S- and C- 
America Oceania Missing 
Sum 847 933 770 096 12 185 7 990 12 460 4 129 26 803 2 580 2 731 251 8 768 
Norway 781 958 748 868 9 652 5 968 4 759 748 6 461 2 210 1616 196 1 480 
Nordic 
Countries 9 732 6 910 2 085 110 94 20 131 35 36 8 303 
Western 
Europe 9 114 6 505 183 1 579 115 50 132 46 44 9 451 
Eastern 
Europe 9 566 1 609 58 58 7 241 4 50 9 11 2 524 
Africa 6 482 1 369 50 55 35 3 203 76 6 9 0 1 679 
Asia w/ 
Turkey 26 799 2 193 84 130 177 95 19 924 13 25 3 4 155 
Northern 
America 2 128 1 695 49 50 18 4 17 252 7 5 31 
S- and C-
America 1 956 743 19 30 20 5 7 6 982 0 144 
Oceania 258 204 5 10 1 0 5 3 1 28 1 
Adapted from Lie (2004: 42) 
Some groups of non-western women have very high rates of intermarriage with Norwegian 
men (Thailand 93%, Russia 79%). In most of these cases, the marriage itself is the reason for 
migration. In the other end, the most endogamous groups of women are those from Iraq (0% 
intermarriage) Pakistan (1%), Somali, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Turkey (4%), Iran, 
Vietnam, Ethiopia and Morocco (9%) (Lie 2004: 49). The picture of transnational unions 
excluding Norwegians is similar to that depicted of men above. 
                                                          
12 Because of the recent arrival of some groups, there are significant rates of missing information on spouses for some 
groups (especially Somalis, Iraqis and Afghans). As described in chapter 4, my analyses are run without those missing 
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The most vivid example of endogamy is the Pakistani rate, especially because this national-
origin group is relatively old compared to the rest of the immigrant population. The absolute 
number of Pakistani men married to Norwegian women dropped from 1990 to 2002, while 
there are hardly any (35 individuals, 0.7%) Pakistani women married to Norwegian men as 
of 2002 (Lie 2004: 55). One reason is probably the large degree of family reunions and 
spouse import, excluding them from the domestic marriage market.  
Based on Statistics Norway‟s survey LKI (“Living conditions among immigrants”) from 
2006, a more probing analysis shows that those with higher education are more likely to 
intermarry with a majority Norwegian among Turkish, Pakistani and Vietnamese immigrants 
(Daugstad 2009: 29). As described below, a similar pattern appears to be at work for 
descendants of immigrants. However, the low count of these surveys points to a need for 
register-based analyses. 
2.1.2 Non-western descendants  
The social performance of immigrants‟ descendants is often conceived to be the real litmus 
test of integration. Whether they reach the average educational and occupational levels of 
their majority Norwegian peers is of crucial interest to social scientists and policy makers 
(Birkelund and Mastekaasa 2009: 11). There is also anticipation as to whether they will 
display a pattern of spouse selection different from that of their immigrant parents.  
Following this rationale, Daugstad (2009) portrays the partner choices of immigrants‟ 
children, based on a survey (“LKI-U”) sampling 870 (only 126 of which are married or 
cohabitating) Pakistani, Turkish and Vietnamese descendants and early immigrants (migrated 
under the age of 6) aged 16-25.
13
 Roughly, Daugstad‟s results match the patterns of the 
immigrant population at large. Men are much more exogamous than women (about 1/3 vs. 
1/5) in general. Those of Pakistani origins are most endogamous, at a 7% rate. Turkish 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
information on time of marriage, as these are very likely to be married abroad. 
13 Resulting numbers are small, especially in decompositions, and there are no tests of significance provided in the analysis. 
Scientifically, it is unfortunate that this group counts few reaching adulthood – making it difficult to perform reliable 
statistical analyses. Regrettably, this is exacerbated by Daugstad‟s use of survey data (see the last segment of this chapter). 
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descendants follow closely at 11%, but the Vietnamese descendants are unusually 
exogamous at 60%. The cross-tabulations show that there is less education among the 
married/cohabiting, and that there is more intermarriage among those with higher education 
(as seen above for immigrants). Among women in particular, there is less activity (labor and 
education) among those married or cohabiting, vs. the singles. The survey data allow 
Daugstad to investigate the importance of “informal” aspects for partner choice. In this 
survey, those reporting to have majority Norwegian friends are more exogamous than those 
lacking such contacts (Daugstad 2009: 35). She also finds that those reporting religion as a 
highly important factor in their lives more frequently agree with the claim that one should 
marry endogamously – and this effect is strongest for Pakistani descendants, whose degree of 
religiosity is also the highest (Daugstad 2009: 51). Unsurprisingly, the survey also showed 
that those reporting positive attitudes towards interethnic intimacy are more likely to be 
exogamous.   
2.1.3 Spouse import 
As seen in the introduction, spouse import is often considered a motor and indicator of failed 
incorporation processes. Daugstad (2008) depicts spouse import (defined as all marriages 
including a Norwegian resident and a non-resident [Daugstad 2008: 8]) in the period of 1990 
to 2007. Although the majority of such transnational unions are engaged in by ethnic 
Norwegians (mainly men marrying women from Thailand, Brazil, Russia and the 
Philippines) (Henriksen 2010: 9; Daugstad 2008: 82), the share of such unions among 
marriages is larger among immigrants and descendants. Among immigrants, the gender 
differences are significant: while 30% of nonwestern female immigrants marry 
transnationally, 61% of their male peers do so (Daugstad 2008: 51). Among “non-western” 
descendants, the pattern is less gendered: in 2007, 54% of female marriages and 57% of male 
marriages were transnational unions. Daugstad reports that there are great differences 
between immigrant groups. Around 75% of both male and female Pakistani and Turkish 
immigrants married transnationally, and 67% of Indian and Moroccan men found a spouse 
transnationally. On the other hand, the predominantly refugee group of Vietnamese 
immigrants displayed a 60% rate for men and 31% for women, while Chileans (50/40%), 
Serbs (64/51%) Iraqis (64/51%) and Iranians (60/37%) also had relatively low rates 
(Daugstad 2008: 53). 
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In general, most groups of descendants seem to be following the pattern displayed by their 
parents. In the period 2002-2007, shares of transnational marriages for different descendant 
groups were: Pakistani (70/70%), Turkish (63/68%), Moroccan (55/56%), Indian (67/46%) 
and Vietnamese (50/20%). However, in the time-span of 1990-2008 very few of those 
imported establish relations with residents below 23 years, and less than 100 yearly are 
imported to marriage with someone below 21 years (Henriksen, 2010: 20). Although 
Pakistani spouses are disproportionately imported by younger residents (of Pakistani 
background), the numbers have dropped during the latest decade. The same holds for Turkish 
descendants and immigrants. The main reason for this seems to be that these groups 
increasingly postpone the decision to get married (Henriksen, 2010: 26). 
2.2 Partner choice “determinants” 
Close to the end of the last century, Kalmijn (1998) summed up the state of research on 
intermarriage – and concluded that although an important job had been done in describing 
marriage patterns, future research should focus more on their explanation. In accordance 
with this, all the works presented in the following are attempts at closing in on explanations 
of partner choice. 
Quantitative sociology flourished in postwar USA. Modeling different aspects of society 
through multivariate statistical data analysis became possible through the advent of high-
speed computers, pioneered by ingenious sociologists such as Peter Blau, James Coleman, 
Otis Duncan and Paul Lazarsfeld (Sørensen 1998: 240-42). The bulk of empirical research 
on intermarriage patterns both in Europe and the US stems from the tradition generated in 
this era. Largely because of this, the dominant conception of explanation in this field is 
evaluating the statistical strength of intermarriage “determinants”.  
2.2.1 Structures and opportunities 
Throughout all types of more or less intimate relationships, we are more likely to interact 
with people who are close to us in geographic space (McPherson et al. 2001: 429). Blau and 
his colleagues (Blau, Blum and Schwartz 1982; Blau, Beeker and Fitzpatrick 1984) were 
interested in so-called opportunity structure influences on intermarriage propensities. They 
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tested intermarriage according to several dimensions: race, national origins, mother tongue, 
ethnicity, birth region, occupation etc. In one article (Blau, Blum and Schwartz 1982: 46) it 
was shown that group size is negatively (inversely) related to outmarriage, while 
heterogeneity is positively related to outmarriage. The logic is straightforward: a relatively 
large group increases the chances of mating with someone from this group – and great 
variation according to other social characteristics generates possibilities of mating 
homogamously with someone from outside the group, according to another characteristic. In 
another article (Blau, Beeker and Fitzpatrick 1984), it was proposed that the degree of 
overlap between social characteristics is negatively related to the degree of intermarriage.  
A benefit of Blau‟s work was the ability to explain exogamous partner choices on the basis 
of a sociological theory, without speculating about people‟s preferences. Some American 
researchers have focused distinctively on the opportunity structure aspect of partner choice. 
Jacobson and Heaton (2000) perform tests of the influence of military service, college 
attendance, metropolitan residence and geographic region of residence. Their results display 
the necessity of contextualizing group differences. While college attendance promotes 
exogamy for blacks and Hispanics, it is negatively related to exogamy for white females. 
Metropolitan residence promotes general exogamy for whites, and increases chances of 
intermarriage to other minorities for blacks and Hispanics. Living in the Southern region is a 
barrier to exogamy for blacks and Hispanics, while living in the Pacific region is a barrier to 
exogamy for Asians. These regions have population distributions which enhance the 
opportunity of the respective groups to find a partner inside their own group. The only 
univocal effect is that of military service: it promotes exogamy for all groups.  
In a similar vein, Okamoto (2007) aims to understand the role of structural conditions in 
unions involving at least one partner from the largest Asian groups in the US: Indians, 
Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese.
14
 For the analyses of intermarriage-
influencing factors, she argues that not only does structural and demographic factors 
influence the opportunity of meeting and mating – but they also cultivate different 
environments for group solidarity and identity formation (Okamoto 2007: 1397). Her results 
                                                          
14 Okamoto‟s regressions are estimated with „robust standard errors‟ to deal with clustering/autocorrelation (because 
variables are measured both at individual and metropolitan area levels). This can be interpreted as an alternative to using 
multilevel modeling techniques.  
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show that all group level predictions are supported according to a group‟s relative size, sex 
ratio, heterogeneity, residential and occupational segregation and status inequality (overlap 
between racial and socioeconomic groupings)(Okamoto 2007: 1409).  
2.2.2 Individuals and assimilation 
Many US analyses of partner choice have focused exclusively on one or a few major ethnic 
or racial groups. Several of these studies emphasize partner choice as indicating the degree of 
cultural assimilation achieved (see the European section below). Illustrative of this is 
Kulczycki and Lobo‟s (2002) study of intermarriage among Arab Americans. Apart from 
displaying astonishingly high exogamy rates for the Arab American population (79% of 
males and 73% of females), their results show that being part Arab, native born, proficient in 
English, a man, having higher education and being Lebanese all increase the chances of 
being exogamous.
15
 While skewed sex ratio increases the intermarriage rates for men 
(because there are much fewer women than men), the acculturation variables (hybridity, birth 
place and language skills) are more important predictors for women (Kulczycki and Lobo 
2002: 209).  
Assimilation perspectives are frequently concerned with the effect of generational 
differences. A sophisticated study from Israel (Gshur and Okun 2003) singles out the 
independent effect of generational belonging in patterns of endogamy and exogamy. 
Controlling for generational endogamy, this analysis shows that increased exogamy over 
time is not a result of changes in the generational composition of immigrant groups (more 2
nd
 
generation, more exogamy) – but an actual increase in the ethnic exogamy among native-
born Israelis with immigrant ancestors. In an exploratory analysis of cohabitation and 
intermarriage rates among the foreign-born in Spain, Trilla, Esteve and Domingo (2008) 
show that increased duration of stay and decreased age at arrival are both positively 
correlated to higher probability of intermarriage (Trilla et al. 2008: 881). According to the 
authors, there is also evidence of status exchange in their analyses – in that individuals with 
higher level education have high levels of intermixing with Spanish citizens. However, 
                                                          
15 Unfortunately, census data does not contain information on religion, which the authors stress would be an interesting 
variable to include in these analyses (because a large bulk of this population consists of Christians from Lebanon and Syria, 
and there are reasons to believe that their Muslim counterparts behave differently in the multicultural marriage market). 
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significant differences between country groups do not disappear when controlling for these 
variables (Trilla et al. 2008: 898). Their conclusion is that contextual/structural elements 
should be included in such multivariate analyses, as they seem to play a significant role in 
influencing patterns of partner choice. 
2.2.3 Incorporating individuals and structures 
In an early study of both individual and structural determinants of partner choice, Hwang et 
al. (1997) provided the first US-wide assessment of the intermarriage of Asian Americans 
(Hwang et al. 1997: 767). Apart from displaying the unique tendency of Asian women to 
marry out more than their male counterparts, this analysis confirmed the role of several 
individual and structural factors. It was found that high levels on “acculturation” (immigrant 
status, language proficiency) variables correlate with high levels of exogamy. Also, most of 
the structural variables included (group size, sex ratio, internal diversity and residential 
segregation) included have a significant and expected effect. However, level of education 
was unexpectedly found to be negatively correlated with exogamy. The proposed explanation 
for this is that Asian Americans with low levels of education are undesired as partners within 
their own group, and thus forced to seek out – while highly educated Asian Americans are in 
addition more conscious of their ethnic group membership. 
The design advocated by Hwang and his colleagues has been put to use in several recent 
European studies. Based on 5 surveys which over-sampled the minority population in the 
Netherlands from 1988 to 2002, Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2006) seek to assess whether 
findings of determinants in the US and elsewhere are transferable to the Netherlands. The 
results are largely in accordance with previously accumulated knowledge. Having been born 
in the country, or migrated at a low age, increases the chances of exogamy. Similarly does 
higher education and being cohabiter, a skewed sex ratio and a large share of second 
generation immigrants in ones ethnic population. Contrary to expectations, Kalmijn and Van 
Tubergen do not find significant gender differences, they do not detect a relative group size 
effect and their hypothesis on race is completely off the mark: the two groups counted as 
“black” (Antilleans and Surinamese) are much more exogamous than Turks and Moroccans. 
This seemingly points to culture as being more important than skin color in the European 
context.  
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A study done in the same vein is that of Van Tubergen and Maas (2007: 1072).
16
 The results 
of their analyses are mostly in line with expectations. Among the context variables, small 
relative group size, skewed sex ratio, residential integration and religious heterogeneity are 
all affiliated with increased chance of exogamy. Of individual level determinants, being non-
religious, coming from a group in which Dutch language is commonly known, being 
“white”, having high levels of education and being a man are all positively related to being 
exogamous.  
In a geographically and empirically proximate study
17
, Dribe and Lundh (2008) explore the 
effects of certain determinants of intermarriage in Sweden. The results of their regression 
analyses show expected variation between national groups, controlled for various other 
factors. This variation corroborates segmented assimilation theory. Of the tested 
determinants, length of adaptation, age at migration and education (except for Asian women) 
are all positively related to intermarriage. Residential segregation and living in metropolitan 
areas both decrease exogamy with Swedish-born, but the latter increases chances of 
intermarrying with someone from another immigrant group.  
The Dutch duo Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2010) were motivated by trying to apply theories 
of intermarriage to all groups.
18
 Using data on 94 different immigrant groups in the US, 
exclusively 2
nd
 generation and all those immigrated before the age of 16 (generation 1.5: a 
measure taken to exclude all immigrants married abroad) Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 
estimate multilevel
19
 regressions showing that group-level variables explain appreciably 
                                                          
16 Tubergen and Maas estimate four models, to separate effects of local vs. national marriage markets, the stock of those 
married outside current place of living, and time of marriage. The methodological lesson is twofold: timing of marriage and 
level of measuring contextual variables have virtually no effect. However, including immigrants married abroad (or outside 
current place of living) systematically leads to overestimating some effects while underestimating others (Tubergen and 
Maas 2007: 1082). 
17 Notwithstanding a sound empirical foundation of Swedish register data, Dribe and Lundh do not have information on 
generation among the immigrant respondents – hence, children of immigrants are counted as natives. This obviously 
misconstrues patterns of endogamy and exogamy, in that e.g. Iranian immigrants marrying Iranian descendants are 
calculated as exogamous couples.  
18 By the same logic, one would think that international data provide the strongest test of explanatory theories. Jacobson 
and Heaton (2008) pursue the structural determinants of partner choice cross-nationally. Based on Kalmijn‟s (1998) and 
Blau‟s (1988) theoretical work, they show that Xingjian (China) actually has 30 times more endogamous marriage patterns 
than New Zealand, the least endogamous of all national contexts examined (Jacobson and Heaton 2008: 143).  
19 Although many studies test both individual and contextual/structural determinants of intermarriage, few utilize multilevel 
modeling (Lievens 1998), which ensures that predictions of each variable are controlled for effects predicted by the other 
level factors. The results of Lievens (1998) confirm the importance of both levels of analysis.  
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more of the partner choice variation than individual-level variables. Among the former, 
“cultural” factors seem to be more important than “structural”.  
2.2.4 “Determinants” of spouse import 
The last decade has seen a multiplication of “explanatory” studies on partner choice in the 
wake of Kalmijn‟s (1998) plea. However, few explanatory studies have concerned spouse 
import. A recent analysis of Germany (Gonzalez-Ferrer 2006) conveys that middle (early 
immigrants) and second generation are more likely to import spouses than actual immigrants, 
and even sex ratio lowers the chance of import. Unexpectedly, the chance of importing 
spouse increases with the size of ones community in Germany – and while male importers 
seem to be the least educated in their ethnic group, female importers are not. In Belgium, 
Lievens (1999) finds that higher age and education at marriage decreases the chances of 
spouse import for Turkish men – but surprisingly increases its chances among Turkish and 
Moroccan women. He suggests that spouse import may less of a “traditional” behavior than 
often supposed, and that it might serve more “modern” goals (such as achieving 
independence from one‟s in-laws) (Lievens 1999: 140). 
2.3 The contribution of this study 
My investigation is modeled in accordance to an international research field, which focuses 
on providing statistical correlations of intergroup spouse selection. Considering previous 
research both internationally and in Norway, what is the scientific contribution of this study? 
I suggest it lies in the combination of four key elements. 
First, this thesis provides the first multivariate description of immigrant partner choices in 
Norway. As shown above, the extent to which individuals in the immigrant population of 
Norway have married within or outside of their national group has been mapped reliably. 
However, the co-variation of other social factors with the choice of spouse is largely 
unexplored.  
Second, the extensive and reliable register data not only circumvent the problem of non-
representative sample selection (Røed and Raaum 2003: 261), but the numerical volume of 
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these data makes it possible to analyze differences between national-origin groups (Daugstad 
2009: 59).  
Third, I map more spouse selection categories than most other international studies, with the 
inclusion of two dependent variables. Few studies have included “spouse import” as a 
category, and I consider this a comparable strength.   
Finally, emphasizing theoretical mechanisms as my basic explanatory tool sets this study off 
from the international literature on intermarriage presented in this chapter. Admittedly, the 
regressions run in this thesis are equally subject to the criticism that coefficients of a 
statistical model quantify at best the effects of a mechanism (Manzo 2010: 143).
 20
  However, 
although the analyses provide estimates of “determinants” in the manner of earlier studies, 
the next chapter aims at a more fundamental understanding of the “nuts and bolts” (Elster 
1989) of spouse import and endogamous/exogamous spouse selection. 
                                                          
20 Many previous studies draw data from the stock of marriages, and utilize multinomial logistic regression. In this, my 
study is highly conventional – and “paradigmatic”.  
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3. Theoretical mechanisms 
It has been said that what sociologists call theory is often what philosophers would consider 
second-rate philosophy (Pawson 1989: 16). In this chapter I try to use theory as a tool for 
analyzing spouse selection patterns so that their causal features are better understood. The 
first section describes how the “analytical” approach to sociological theory is adapted to my 
research purposes. Then, I outline explanatory mechanisms for how the factors of national 
background, gender, education, generation, and age at marriage can influence endogamy, 
exogamy and spouse import. The empirical expectations of the sum of theoretical 
mechanisms discussed are presented at the end of the chapter, and specified in testable 
hypotheses.  
3.1 Implementing analytical sociology 
3.1.1 Social processes unpacked 
The advent of contemporary analytical sociology was due to a widening gap between 
sociological theory and quantitative sociology. In an influential examination of the historical 
roots of this disengagement, Sørensen (1998: 241) argues that the high-speed computer is 
responsible for making quantitative sociologists “applied statisticians”. One result of this 
technological revolution was an isolation of these researchers from those concerned with 
theories of social phenomena, making them develop a conception of theory as “sums of 
variables” (Sørensen 1998: 247). In essence, the shift from sociological to statistical models 
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and the conflation of theory with variables both contributed to an impoverished 
understanding of social processes (Sørensen 1998: 254). 
Responding to this divide between empirical research and theoretical sociology, the 
programmatic aim of analytical sociology is to advocate mechanism-based explanations 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 24).
21
 Although more precise delineations of this concept 
have been suggested by analytical sociologists (see Hedström [2005: 25] for several 
proposals), I adopt Elster‟s (2007: 37) definition of mechanism as “a frequently occurring 
and easily recognizable causal pattern”. In the social sciences, causal patterns are mediated 
by agents‟ desires and beliefs – the mental states causing their actions (Davidson 2001: 3). 
This involves a commitment to methodological individualism, the view that “a satisfactory 
explanation must ultimately be anchored in hypotheses about individual behavior” (Elster 
2007: 36). The “weak” form of methodological individualism adopted here recognizes that 
norms and relations between individuals are actively influencing the social patterns to be 
explained (Manzo 2010: 141), and has also been called “structural individualism” (Hedström 
and Bearman 2009: 5). However, individuals‟ actions are always also influenced by 
something else than their desires and beliefs, namely their opportunities. Thus, a person‟s 
desires, beliefs and opportunities together cause this person‟s actions (Hedström 2005: 38).22 
This conception of agency is called the DBO-model.  
Although sociologists are often concerned with the impact of societal phenomena such as 
culture, class or other structural and contextual aspects of social life – the DBO-model calls 
for recognition of the fact that these concepts can be unpacked into more concrete, agent-
based occurrences. As such, mechanism-based explanations give specific content to 
Merton‟s idea of middle-range theories (Manzo 2010: 139). Analytical sociology provides “a 
syntax of explanation; that is to say, a set of constraints on how an explanation should be 
constructed and empirically tested.” (Manzo 2010: 131, italic added).  As foreshadowed in 
Chapter 2, the empirical analyses of this thesis are basically of the same kind as those 
                                                          
21 For an account of the origins of contemporary analytical sociology, see Manzo (2010).  
22 When it comes to this view of the agent, Hedström (and others proponents, e.g. Skog [2005: 32] and Elster [2007]) relies 
on the philosopher Donald Davidson (2001), who clarified the relationship between reasons (composed of desires and 
beliefs) and causes. Against a widespread philosophical dogma at the time (1980), Davidson argued that reasons are causes, 
and that we mistakenly confuse them for two different phenomena because they belong to two different vocabularies: the 
mental and the physical (see Davidson [2001: ch.11] for a thorough discussion).  
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fundamentally criticized by analytical sociologists, because they enable only detection of 
statistical relationships between variables. However, although this thesis does not advance 
the testing part of Manzo‟s “syntax”, on the conceptual level and in its suggestions of 
theoretical explanations it is fundamentally inspired by analytical sociology. 
3.1.2 Explanandum and explanans 
Previous research on endogamy and exogamy often subscribes to the “theory” that spouse 
selection is the product of three factors: the mate preferences involved, the (real and 
perceived) opportunities present and the impulses from third parties (Kalmijn 1998: 
398).
23
 In my view, this trichotomy of notions can hardly be called a theory (thus the 
quotation marks), as the claims involved are neither contentious nor specific enough to 
increase our understanding of spouse selection processes. This is partly due to the fact that 
the explanandum – i.e. the phenomenon to be explained – is defined too broadly. Explaining 
why some people select spouses endogamously and others exogamously is more suited to a 
research career than a thesis, and pretending to explain spouse selection in general (as the 
“theory” above pretends) is scientific hubris. 
This thesis investigates whether national (or regional) background, gender, education, 
generation, and age at marriage influences the propensity of marrying endogamously or 
exogamously, or importing a spouse. Thus, the following part of this chapter proposes 
mechanisms for all these relationships. In this way, the explanans – i.e. the explanatory 
mechanisms – follows the independent variables in this study. The explanandum is 
constituted by the existence – or lack of – statistical correlations between these variables and 
the two spouse selection variables. In a manner akin to the hypothetico-deductive method, 
the theoretical explanations are presented prior to the empirical investigation in this thesis, 
and the final chapter evaluates the hypotheses generated from these – but each mechanism‟s 
validity in itself cannot be tested (i.e. falsified) here. It should be noted that while hypotheses 
are largely derived from the mechanisms suggested, they are occasionally also based on 
expectations from previous research. 
                                                          
23 It should be noted that this conceptual triangle coheres well with Hedström‟s (2005) DBO-model, and is thus better 
understood as a model of agency underpinning most of the spouse selection research depicted in this thesis.  
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3.2 Mechanisms of intermarriage and spouse import 
The presentation of spouse selection mechanics is divided into subsections organized around 
the independent variables of this study. Each mechanism proposed draws on Hedström‟s 
(2005) division between desire-mediated, belief-mediated and opportunity-mediated 
interactions, highlighting the principal logic of the mechanism.
 24
 Although the proximate 
cause of spouse selection often entangles all three of these (as suggested by the 
preferences/opportunities/third parties-trichotomy), the explanatory mechanisms suggested 
below are for the most part mediated by one of these basic composites of actions.  
3.2.1 National (and regional) background 
The Likeness-Breeds-Liking Mechanism 
A proverb of European-American culture claims that birds of a feather flock together. This 
statement from folk social science can be restated less metaphorically as the mechanism that 
likeness leads to liking. Although the saying is contradicted by the equally widespread belief 
that “opposites attract”, psychological experiments have confirmed the likeness-leads-to-
liking effect across the spectrum of human relationships (Myers 2008: 399). People simply 
tend to prefer those who appear similar to themselves, and the desire for mates is no 
exception.
25
 
The desire-mediated likeness-breeds-liking mechanism operates in several domains of 
human characteristics. However, some qualities are more important than others when people 
search for similarities in potential partners: “sociocultural” characteristics are more important 
than psychological traits (Epstein and Guttman 1984: 273). Research has exposed that 
similarity of values leads to mutual confirmation; similarity of taste enlarges opportunities to 
participate in joint activity; and similarity of knowledge enhances mutual understanding 
(Kalmijn 1998: 399). Although people with the same national origin do not necessarily share 
                                                          
24 I thank Rannveig Vittersø Kaldager for consenting to this strongly inspired structure for presenting mechanisms. 
Fortuitously, the topics of our respective theses are different enough to make further plagiarism unlikely. 
25 What, then, about the idea that opposites attract? Counter to intuition and cultural tales, science has been unable to 
provide any support for this idea. Through a large set of hypothetically complementary qualities, spouses continue to 
display astonishing similarity. Thus, the hypothesis of a complementary mate pattern has been unequivocally rejected by 
psychologists (Myers 2008: 402). 
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ethnic group membership or even language, they often share both these and other traits. They 
often share moral values, sometimes because they identify with a religion predominant in 
their country of origin, sometimes simply because they have experienced similar cultural 
influences throughout their lives. They often share taste for food, music, literature and other 
cultural artifacts and practices. And they often have knowledge concerning their country‟s 
culture, society and history – a knowledge possessed by few others but their fellow group 
members in Norway.  
Judging by the reasoning so far, there is thus substantial reason to expect endogamous 
patterns according to national background. And this hypothesis would probably be valid for 
all groups if nation states were isolated containers of people. This has never been the case. In 
our time, this is less the case than ever before. However, the tendency that some nation states 
are more similar than others in terms of the cultural traits discussed here, remains (Pedersen 
et al. 2006: 66). Thus, a significant variation between national origins in their propensity to 
marry majority Norwegians is expected. 
The Dissimilarity-Breeds-Dislike Mechanism 
Now, the fact that birds of a feather flock together informs us that spouse seeking individuals 
are most likely to search within the extended group of possible partners whose cultural 
background mirrors their own. However, the opposite mechanism is also at work: through 
the dissimilarity-breeds-dislike mechanism, people from different regions are prone not to 
like each other in so far as they perceive each other as having diverging attitudes, values and 
behavior (Myers 2008: 401). The following puts emphasis on the exclusionary effect of this 
mechanism for the integration of minority groups in national marriage markets. By this logic, 
I treat the Dissimilarity-Breeds-Dislike mechanism as opportunity-mediated here. 
As shown in Chapter 2, much earlier research on intermarriage is done in the context of US 
society, where “race” is particularly salient as principle of social division. Evidently, both the 
Likeness-Breeds-Liking and the Dissimilarity-Breeds-Dislike mechanism is transferable to 
the social scientific notion of race, conceived of as perceived physical differences which 
acquire social meaning through the beliefs and actions of individuals (American Sociological 
Association 2003). This perspective draws on the fact that our skin color, facial features and 
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bodily differences matter, often with the result of racial discrimination.
26
 The process does 
not have to be conscious. Psychological research using so-called Implicit Association Tests 
consistently displays a bias against blacks (Petersen 2006: 233) and a preference for light 
skin color.
27
 How are these unconscious biases likely to affect Norwegian marriage markets? 
Although most majority Norwegians would vehemently reject racism, the physical 
differences may serve as an indicator of cultural difference. Indeed, this is statistically true: 
when encountering an individual of non-European looks in Oslo, it is probably a valid 
induction that you have encountered a “foreign-cultural”. “Cultural racism” denotes the view 
that prejudice has increasingly become a problem of culture more than a problem of skin 
color. In sum, being a visible minority (Rogstad 2000: 27) is probably a drawback in 
Norwegian marriage markets.  
Both the Likeness-Breeds-Liking and the Dissimilarity-Breeds-Dislike mechanism have a 
desire-mediated and an opportunity-mediated interpretation, from the perspective of the 
immigrant population in Norway. Thus, whether because majority Norwegians reject 
foreigners on grounds of “race” and/or “culture”, or because of the preferences of people 
with immigrant background, these two mechanisms suggest that the probability of exogamy 
is negatively related to the difference (measured by national background) between each 
individual of immigrant background and majority Norwegians.  
Third Parties and Reference Group Theory 
As suggested by Kalmijn (1998), family members or others within the ethnic or national-
origin group can occasionally significantly influence spouse selection. Albeit this can lead to 
the choice being less voluntary (Bredal 2005, and see the parental influence mechanism 
below), it can also influence voluntary spouse selections. I suggest that reference group 
theory (basically, the mechanism that choices and evaluations are relative to a group of 
reference, see Merton [1968]) can explain the transference of both the likeness- and the 
                                                          
26 As noted by the American Sociological Association (2003): “"Race" shapes the way that some people relate to each 
other, based on their belief that it reflects physical, intellectual, moral, or spiritual superiority or inferiority.” 
27 A sample of tests developed by Harvard psychologists are available at: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/Study?tid=. 
Although this attitudinal pattern is displayed most forcefully for whites, blacks actually also tend to have a preference for 
light skin color (Petersen 2006: 233). This probably reflects the degree to which predominantly negative images of this 
minority are diffused throughout US society. A similar situation may be at display in Norway, where the immigration-crime 
link is widespread in media (Eide and Simonsen 2007).  
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dissimilarity mechanism from third parties to the individuals choosing a spouse. Likeness-
Breeds-Liking will mirror the belief that marriages between members of the same national-
origin group are considered agathogamy (i.e. conforming to social norms) (Merton 1964: 
130). If in-marriage is considered as conforming to social norms, Dissimilarity-Breeds-
Dislike will instigate that third-parties perceive intermarriage as cacogamy, i.e. marriages 
that are taboo or deviant from norms (Merton 1964: 130). The point here is not simply that 
third parties exert direct influence on the spouse selection, but also that the beliefs connected 
to the predominant spouse selection patterns within the group will lead individuals to 
evaluate their choices according to the conceived values of the group (Merton 1968: 386). 
Crucially, individuals will primarily use their own national-origin group as point of reference 
for the choice of a spouse, and as such the probability of intermarrying will depend on the 
degree to which group members have intermarried before, which again will be signalled 
through the established norms of spouse selection within the group.  
Keeping the Homeland Connection  
We have seen that individuals are likely to prefer spouses to come from the same national 
and/or cultural group as themselves. Sometimes, the best way to achieve this is to find a 
spouse in your country of origin. Judging by the simple variation in group size (see below) 
and similarity to the majority population in Norway, one would expect significant variation 
in spouse import rates. This particular mechanism suggests that the latter more than the 
former factor plays into whether groups tend to import spouses or not. If differences between 
a group and the majority are at a maximum, it is not only reasonable that individuals will 
seek “input” from the homeland because they prefer them as spouses, but the third parties 
around the spouse-to-be might also have an interest in maximizing the probability that their 
future in-law will carry the right values, taste and knowledge and reinvigorate the 
relationship to the “homeland”. Here, I suggest that the best way to secure this goal is 
importing a spouse from your country of origin, in particular if the distance to the majority 
population in practices and values is great. 
The Vertical Mosaic Mechanism 
It has been argued that receiving societies in the south-north global migration patterns have 
become “vertical mosaics”, in that cultural, ethnic and racial diversity overlaps with 
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socioeconomic disparities (Porter 1965). Indeed, although Norway boasts high rates of 
employment and low rates of socioeconomic inequality, previous research has documented 
that immigrants from developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin-America to a 
disproportionate degree have low level jobs, low income and receive more social security 
transfers than the Norwegian majority (Hansen 2000; Barth, Bratsberg and Raaum 2004; 
Brekke and Mastekaasa 2008). As in many other post-industrial countries, Norway displays 
significant rates of assortative mating sorted by education, income and occupation (Kravdal 
and Noack 1989; Birkelund and Goodman 1997; Hansen 2002; Wiik 2010). To the extent 
that the immigrant population is different from the majority group in terms of income, 
education and occupation, these other forms of assortative mating can work against their 
possibility of exogamous relations with the majority. The opportunity-mediated Vertical 
Mosaic mechanism predicts that some of the differences between groups are linked to their 
varying degrees of economic, occupational and educational assimilation in Norway. This 
mechanism also suggests that the across-group effect of educational level will be related to 
between-group differences in educational level – and these differences will probably be 
related to the variation in intermarriage among national-origin groups. 
The Logic of Numbers  
The most blatant source of opportunity structure variation is demographics. The plainest 
example of an opportunity-mediated mechanism is what I call the logic of numbers, i.e. 
group size (Blau et al. 1982). This mechanism pertains to the brute availability of eligible 
spouses. In the case that there are few viable candidates in the national group (because the 
group is small, there is a shortage of men, or those available do not match your preferences 
otherwise), one option is to import a spouse. Another is to find someone whose background 
is almost the same. Evidently, the possibility of this is connected to the existence of potential 
spouses from the same region. This again depends on the size of groups originating from a 
country proximate to your own. However, the lack of available spouses in one‟s own group 
can provide a stimulus to search for a spouse in the vast stock of individuals with majority 
background. In this thesis, the distinct effects of group size are not directly analyzed. 
However, where relative size is unambiguously at variance between national-origin groups 
whose differences in spouse selection are unaccounted for, this mechanism might be at work. 
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3.2.2 Level of education 
The Status Exchange Mechanism 
Above, we saw that cultural resources are judged by the rule of similarity: attraction is 
considered inversely related to difference (Byrne 1971). Conversely, however, researchers 
contend that socioeconomic resources are judged by the rule of quantity: attraction is 
considered positively related to the amount of money, education and status possessed 
(Kalmijn 1998: 398). Following this logic, the so-called status exchange hypothesis was first 
proposed by Merton (1941). He started with the assumption that there is a status hierarchy in 
which immigrants and minorities are considered lower than the majority. However, Merton 
insisted that there is still a scenario in which minorities may intermarry with the majority: the 
minority may compensate by possessing other desired resources of a mate, e.g. higher 
income, higher education or high status occupation (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2007: 378). 
This can be understood as an exchange of resources: although individuals of majority 
background might prefer mates from their own group, they are potentially charmed enough 
by an engineering degree or your success as a doctor to ignore your strange taste in food and 
odd religious rituals. Although there is empirical evidence of such status exchange from the 
US (Kalmijn 1993; Hwang et al. 1995, Qian 1997), the theme is not yet thoroughly 
investigated in Europe.
28
 However, a status order based on the occupational match of 
spouses has recently been empirically established in the context of Norway (Chan et al. 
2010). Although the association with education is moderate in this study (Kendall‟s Tau 
coefficient equals 0.33 for men and 0.41 for women), there is still a clear educational 
gradient in social status (Chan et al. 2010: 8-9) 
The Tolerance Mechanism 
An old cliché has it that education widens your horizon. One sense in which this seems to be 
true, is the strength of identification with ones own culture. According to several sociologists 
(Hwang et al. 1995; Kalmijn 1998: 401), higher education weakens the bonds people have to 
                                                          
28 Strictly speaking, the status exchange hypothesis assumes that the majority spouse systematically has lower educational 
(or other socioeconomic) credentials than the minority spouse (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006). This part of the 
hypothesis is untestable here, and I have thus chosen to focus on the idea that higher status increases the chances of getting 
a majority spouse.  
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their social and cultural roots. Another way of putting this is that they grow more tolerant 
vis-à-vis the foreign, the outlandish. Part of this is because they gain more knowledge and 
insight into other cultures and peoples. However, the decisive force behind this effect of 
education is probably the emphasis on individual achievement and universalism present in 
higher education (Kalmijn 1998: 401). Otherwise put, the organizational structure of a 
university may provide opportunities for intermarriage through promoting equality and 
diversity, thus blurring the cultural barriers against marrying out of ones group (Gonzalez-
Ferrer 2006: 172). Recently, the association between education and immigrant-friendliness 
has been documented for majority Norwegians (Chan et al. 2010: 14). This mechanism 
suggests the reverse logic: that education boosts Norwegian-friendliness. Although the 
foundation of this process is knowledge, the Tolerance mechanism is desire-mediated 
because its ultimate result is a modification of the preferential spouse hierarchy.
29
 
Universities as Marriage Markets 
Marriage markets necessitate physical locations where people are able to meet and mate. To 
a certain degree, some of these places or arenas may be considered local marriage markets in 
themselves, especially if a large proportion of people present are available for romantic 
engagement. An institution of higher education is exactly such a place (Blossfeld and Timm 
2003). Being a student involves meeting potential mates and spouses both day and night. A 
Norwegian illustration of this is the high rates at which doctors marry each other – boosted 
by the advent of female students in the medicine education (Hansen 2002). In the US 
context, Jacobson and Heaton (2000) found that while college attendance significantly 
promotes exogamy for blacks and Hispanics of both genders, it is negatively related to 
exogamy for white women. One explanation of this may be that white men flourish at 
universities, maybe even more so than in other societal arenas. However, this may also be 
related to the exchange mechanism, implying that highly educated majority women are less 
likely to marry minorities (because they need no exchange). Nonetheless, for young adults 
                                                          
29 In an influential study, Hernes and Knudsen (1992) found that the relationship between education and tolerance vis-à-vis 
immigrants could be due to a relative deprivation mechanism: while well-educated Norwegians are unconcerned by 
competition from immigrants, their low-educated peers are vulnerable (Hernes and Knudsen 1992: 125). Although a 
parallel logic for immigrants‟ attitudes towards Norwegians is implausible (well-educated immigrants do indeed compete 
with Norwegians!), it may be the case that immigrants mirror the out-group tolerance of those majority Norwegians they 
interact with in everyday life, e.g. at work, a group likely to have similar levels of education.  
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with immigrant background, attending a university in Norway is a bullet-proof way of 
meeting peers of majority background. Needless to say, this mechanism is opportunity-
mediated.  
The Composition Mechanism 
Despite the exchange mechanism, educational homogamy remains the dominant form of 
assortative mating, even in ethnically mixed marriages (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2007: 
378; Epstein and Guttman 1984: 250). What, then, happens if there are few within your 
national-origin “field of eligibles” who share your level of education? A situation arises 
where you have to choose between the preference for similar origins and similar rank in 
educational status. In Oslo, where a large proportion of Norway‟s immigrants reside, the 
share of people with higher education reached 37% as of 2001 (Statistics Norway 2002). 
Although there is considerable variation among the immigrant population, the comparable 
figure of several large non-western groups (e.g. Turkey, Somalia and Pakistan) is 10% 
(Statistics Norway 2001).
30
 An important caveat, however, is the fact that several descendant 
groups display significantly higher educational rates than their parents‟ generation. Thus, the 
discussed situation is most pertinent for designated groups of immigrants. However, the 
opposite demographic situation may apply for these groups of descendants: in higher-
educated national origin groups, having low education should increase the probability of 
marrying out (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2010: 463). In sum, this opportunity-mediated 
mechanism indicates that if educationally different from the dominant tendency in ones 
national-origin group, a person may opt for education rather than ethnicity as the dimension 
of homogenous matching, which increases the likelihood of intermarriage. 
3.2.3 Gender 
Gendered Status Exchange  
As depicted above, there is empirical support of Merton‟s (1941) hypothesis that low ethnic 
or racial status can be deflated by high socioeconomic status in intermarriages between 
                                                          
30 It should be noted that all estimates of immigrant groups‟ educational levels are very fragile, as much information is 
missing about any education completed abroad.  
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majority and minority. This leads us to expect higher intermarriage rates of the highly 
educated immigrants. However, this opportunity-based mechanism is also pertinent for 
gender differences because it is believed that such exchange processes largely take place 
between a male minority and a female majority spouse. Chiefly, this rests on the assumption 
that most marriages still display a traditional male breadwinner-female homemaker division 
of labor. Indeed, Brekke (2008: 61) argues that women with immigrant background in 
Norway prioritize child rearing at the cost of full-employment to a larger extent than those of 
majority background. Further support of this is found in Kavli (2004). Thus, researchers have 
argued that men are more likely to be able to “compensate” for their ethnic minority status, 
and that the opposite exchange is less attractive (Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2007: 378).  
The Patriarchal Mechanism 
Although many societies in the world have progressed beyond conscious differential 
treatment of women and men, and while most countries have removed any legal prohibition 
against intermarriage, both patriarchial cultures and norms against exogamy persist. Indeed, 
it has been repeatedly demonstrated that interracial marriages continue to evoke emotional 
response from members of both majority and minority communities (Jacobson and Heaton 
2008: 130). Within cultures adhering to a more traditional view of gender roles and norms, 
the sanctioning of intermarriage will most likely be directed more forcefully against women. 
The third parties of spouse-seeking females will thus disapprove of (or occasionally 
vehemently oppose) them choosing an out-group member. Rationalization of this often 
comes from the fact that women are primary caretakers of the children (Kalmijn and van 
Tubergen 2007: 378). Also, some authors have highlighted the fact that members of strongly 
religious groups generally do not accept that women find a spouse outside of her religious 
faith (van Tubergen and Maas 2007: 1071). According to a mainstream interpretation of 
Islamic law, Muslim women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims, because the 
children resulting from such unions are considered lost to Islam (Vogt 2005: 115; Kulczycki 
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and Lobo 2002: 209).
31
  Thus, less female exogamy among those of national-origin groups 
predominantly oriented towards the Muslim faith should be expected.
32
  
The Divergence in Freedom Mechanism 
We have seen that universities can function as marriage markets. Looking at this mechanism 
from the perspective of gender, however, suggests that this might be even more important for 
“non-western” women than for their male peers. The basic idea here is that young men are 
more likely to participate in organized sports and other activity outside of the group. That 
there are gender differences in sports and leisure among young immigrants and descendants 
has been documented in several reports (Løwe 2008; Vestel 2007: 151). Also, according to 
Hagelund and Loga (2009: 81), young women of immigrant background display 
disproportionately low levels of participation in civil society.  Thus, assuming the fact that in 
some of the large immigrant groups in Norway, the opportunities for meeting members of the 
majority population are lower for young women – institutions of higher education appears 
even more desirable as a site for contact. By the logic of this mechanism, educational level 
might mean more for the intermarriage of women than for men, and in particular so for 
descendants – whose education is most likely to occur within Norwegian universities. 
Sex Ratio 
Above, the logic of numbers argued that group size impacts on intermarriage tendencies, 
through giving different opportunities at finding a spouse within the same group. However, 
strictly speaking, what really matters when analysing marriages between men and women is 
the amount of opposite-sex members of the same group! Thus, many researchers control for 
the sex ratio in each group when assessing spouse selection determinants (e.g. Kalmijn and 
Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Maas 2007). Importantly, although some researchers 
have found that skewed sex ratios occasionally results in low marriage rates among some 
immigrant groups per se (Angrist 2002; Landale and Tolnay 1993), it is likely that it 
                                                          
31 Another important reason given for this is that the husband has authority over the wife, and non-Muslims cannot wield 
authority over Muslims. Thus, by logical extension, women cannot enter inter-religious marriages (Vogt 2005: 114).  
32 Some Islamic scholars give the advice that any Muslim, both male and female, should refrain from marrying a non-
Muslim (Vogt 2005:115). Indeed, the importance of religion for many Muslims and the widespread sanctioning of religious 
intermarriage for this group should make us expect low rates of majority intermarriage for both men and women originating 
in Islamic countries. 
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positively impacts both intermarriage and spouse import rates. By this logic, some groups are 
more likely than others to intermarry or to import a spouse, because the option of finding an 
endogamous spouse in Norway is limited by default. For some groups, the ratio is highly 
skewed in favour of women (e.g. Thailand, Philippines and Russia) – for others there are 
many men per woman (e.g. Iraq, Iran and Turkey) (Lie 2004: 21).  As mentioned above, this 
group characteristic is not measured in my analyses, but as it is likely to influence the gender 
differences in intermarriage and import, it is crucial to know of the mechanism when 
discussing the results at the end of this thesis.  
3.2.4 Generation 
The Convergence Mechanism 
Children of immigrants attend kindergartens, schools and tertiary education in the receiving 
society, with peers of majority background. They are (arguably to varying extents) socialized 
in the culture of the host society, watching the same television shows, doing sports and 
participating in many other leisure activities with majority Norwegians (Øia and Vestel 2007: 
172). Non-western descendants (aged 19 to 24) attain higher education at a 32% rate, which 
is equal to the level of the majority population (Støren 2005: 91). When it comes to 
employment, the rates of descendants are more similar to majority Norwegians than 
immigrants (Olsen 2008), and their income and occupational attainment is generally on a par 
with their peers (Hermansen 2009). By the logic of most mechanisms cited so far, 
descendants share more dimensions with the native majority – and is thus more likely to 
engage in assortative mating despite not having the majority Norwegian family background. 
This mechanism also involves the assumption that descendants are less committed to 
traditional norms and expectations originating in their country of origin. As spouse import is 
considered a traditional choice of spouse, this indicates a reason to suspect less of this among 
the endogamous descendants than among the endogamous immigrants. 
The Identity Mechanism 
The Convergence mechanism puts emphasis on the closing gap between ethnic groups when 
considering the children of immigrants. Descendants simply share much more with their 
majority peers than immigrants share with their potential majority mates. One important 
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effect of this is that they feel more Norwegian than their parents, i.e. their national 
identification is not only that of their national-origin group. Among descendants, the share 
identifying as “Norwegian” in 2006 was 70.5 %. The corresponding figure for those born 
outside of Norway was 56.2 % (Øia and Vestel 2007: 44). Above and beyond the fact that 
they are objectively more similar, this should heighten the possibility that descendants 
actively desire a spouse with majority background. Although many descendants still identify 
as “foreigner” or “immigrant”, there is reason to believe that their self-reported higher degree 
of identification with being Norwegian can result in higher rates of intermarriage with the 
population of majority background. While the Convergence mechanism influences both the 
marriage market opportunity and spouse preferences of descendants, the Identity mechanism 
is desire-mediated, as the widened scope of “eligible partners” comes as a result of shifted 
desires.  
The Tipping Point Mechanism 
In combination, the fact that there is more convergence and identification between 
descendants and their peers in the majority population, vs. that of immigrants cannot only 
explain increased intermarriage among this group – it also suggests that educational level 
might be even more important for the intermarriage of descendants. The logic of this 
mechanism is that there is less difference towards the majority for the latter group while 
holding educational level constant. Thus, the match along some of the crucial variables 
predicting attraction (e.g. similarity of taste, language and values) is already more likely than 
for immigrants – and the gap between being unattractive and within the field of “eligibles” is 
almost closed. If the educational level then matches (and even more so if institution of higher 
education matches, see next mechanism), the probability of finding a spouse from the 
majority is higher than for immigrants at the same educational level. 
Universities as Marriage Markets 
As argued above, institutions of higher education can function as local marriage markets. 
However, as descendants following higher education tracks are more likely than immigrants 
to do this in Norway, this mechanism indicates that educational level might be more 
important for their intermarriage propensities than for that of immigrant groups.  
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3.2.5 Age at marriage 
The Parental Influence Mechanism 
Previous research (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010: 467) has shown that those coming from 
a country with tradition of early marriages are more likely to marry within their group. The 
Parental Influence mechanism suggests that parents have more influence on the decision of a 
spouse in such cases, and parents‟ preferences will tend to be endogamous (Kalmijn 1998). 
Although the degree to which individuals choose their spouse independently (without 
pressure from parents or other family members) is reported to be fairly high in a recent 
survey of Pakistani, Turkish and Indian descendants (Daugstad 2009), there is still reason to 
think that age at marriage signals maturity and autonomy vs. the parents – and that this 
influences the outcome of spouse selection. By this logic, the grip of third parties weakens if 
marital age is higher; this is likely to impact the degrees to which individuals import a spouse 
as well (Lievens 1999).  
3.3 Summary of empirical expectations 
Below, Figure 3.1 summarizes the expected empirical relationships between the independent 
variables and both types of spouse selection outcomes. This last section seeks to formulate 
empirical hypotheses on the basis of the mechanisms proposed above. In many cases, several 
mechanisms indicate the same hypothesis. 
Acting as a proxy for skin color, ethnicity, language and culture, national and regional 
background is expected to have significant impact on endogamy and exogamy. It is not 
feasible to detail expectations about the large set of national-origin groups included in my 
analyses. However, the following sketch should provide some idea of what groups are likely 
to be most endogamous and prone to spouse import.  
Although an accurate rating system of “cultural distance” is nonsensical, it is rather the 
perceived differences both from the perspective of majority Norwegians and the immigrant 
population that matters here. People originating in other countries in the Nordic region are 
culturally (and linguistically) very similar to Norwegians. People from the north-west of 
Europe, the US and Canada share significant amounts of culture (often referred to as 
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“western culture”) with majority Norwegians. As seen in Chapter 2, there are signs that being 
deeply religious often carries strong preferences of finding a spouse of the same faith. 
Several of the large national-origin groups of the immigrant population of Norway, such as 
Pakistanis, Turks, Iraqis, Somalis and Moroccans, are predominantly Muslim. Because 
African groups have particularly visible minority appearance (i.e. “racial” features) and 
display relatively low levels of socioeconomic performance, high levels of endogamy and 
spouse import is expected.   
Hypothesis 1a: Individuals from Asia and Africa are most likely to be endogamous and 
import spouses, while individuals from North America/Northern Europe and the Nordic 
countries are most likely to intermarry with the majority population. 
Hypothesis 1b: Differences in spouse selection patterns between national-origin and 
regional groups will largely prevail after controlling for the other independent variables 
included in this thesis. 
While common values, taste and knowledge are important for being within what sociologist 
Robert Winch called “the field of eligibles” (Epstein and Guttman 1984: 257), we have seen 
that having the same national background is not the only way of securing these 
denominators. The explanatory mechanisms suggested for education and spouse selection all 
point in the same direction: education influences the probability of exogamy positively and 
the probability of import negatively. According to the Status Exchange mechanism, we 
should see more reduction of the impact of national background for “non-western” 
immigrants and descendants than for “western” groups, when controlling for education.  
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the level of education, the more likely an individual is to 
intermarry (in general), and the less likely an endogamous individual is to import a spouse. 
Hypothesis 2b: Educational level impacts differently on the intermarriage rates of groups, 
depending on the perceived status attached to the group. 
According to the international literature, the degrees to which there are gender differences in 
intermarriage rates vary. For the most part, minority men display a higher probability of 
intermarriage than minority women, with the exception of some Asian groups (Jacobs and 
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Labov 2002). The mechanisms of patriarchal culture, divergence in freedom and sex ratio 
indicates the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Men are more likely to intermarry, except for Eastern Asian groups (where 
women are more likely to intermarry). 
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of educational level on the probability of intermarriage is more 
forceful for women than for men, in particular for descendants. 
Table 3.1 Summary of empirical expectations     
Variable Intermarriage Spouse import Intermarriage mechanisms Spouse import mechanisms 
National-origin group 
Asian and African groups more endogamous and 
more prone to spouse import, North European and 
American groups more prone to intermarriage 
Likeness 
/Dissimilarity/Reference 
Group 
Keeping the Homeland 
Connection/Reference 
Group 
xEducational level  + "Non-Western" groups   Status Exchange   
Educational level  +    - 
Status Exchange, Tolerance, 
Composition 
Universities as Marriage 
Markets 
Gender  + Men  + Men Status Exchange, Patriarchy Sex Ratio 
xEducational level  + Women  + Women Divergence in Freedom 
Generation  + Descendants  + Immigrants Convergence, Identity 
xEducational level  + Descendants  + Descendants 
Tipping Point, Universities 
as Marriage Markets 
Universities as Marriage 
Markets 
Age at marriage  +    - Parental Influence + Likeness-breeds-liking 
 
The behavior of immigrants‟ descendants (second-generation immigrants) has been 
considered crucial for the evaluation of how successful the receiving society manages to 
incorporate and integrate ethnic minorities. For many assimilation theorists (Gordon 1964; 
Lieberson and Waters 1988; Pagnini and Morgan 1990) intermarriage rates represent the 
ultimate litmus test of full incorporation. The convergence and identity mechanisms try to 
explicate the reasons why the spouse selection of descendants is expected to be dissimilar 
from that of immigrants, resulting in the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Descendants of both sexes are more likely to intermarry than immigrants, 
and less likely to import a spouse.  
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Hypothesis 4b: Educational level has greater impact on the intermarriage rates of 
descendants than those of immigrants.  
The parental influence mechanism suggests that the younger a person is at marriage, the 
more likely her parents are to influence the decision. The probability that parents will want 
their in-laws to be of their “kind” is high.  
Hypothesis 5: Age at marriage has a positive association with intermarriage, and a negative 
association with spouse import.  
While this chapter has presented the theoretical apparatus with which I intend to interpret the 
empirical results of this thesis, there is also a need to convey the empirical grounding and 
methodical tools utilized to discover these facts. Thus, the next chapter conveys the data, 
design and methods used in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
4. Data, design and methods 
This chapter depicts the empirical basis and the methodological tools utilized in the analyses.  
Opening with a description of the dataset, I subsequently offer a survey of 
operationalizations for all variables, including some descriptive statistics pertaining to these. 
Then, there is a brief section describing the rationale for my choice of methodological 
design. The final section provides an assessment of the statistical tool employed – logistic 
regression – and how this instrument helps me analyze the data.  
4.1 The data 
Based on a system developed in the early 1960s, the administrative records kept by 
population registry offices, educational institutions, tax registers etc. can be used to track 
each and every Norwegian resident‟s behavior longitudinally (Lyngstad & Engelhardt 2009: 
176). This thesis is based on such administrative registers, made available to students 
through the research project Educational Careers: Attainment, Qualifications, and 
Transition to Work.
33
 Information is pulled from the National Database of Education 
(NUDB) and the historical event database “FD-Trygd”. The data counted the complete stock 
                                                          
33 This project was led by Arne Mastekaasa, with Gunn E. Birkelund & Marianne N. Hansen as partners, all professors at 
the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo. For more information on the project: 
http://www.iss.uio.no/forskning/prosjekter/educational_careers/ 
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of all married couples involving at least one person from the immigrant population at the end 
of 2002.  
On the one hand, population-wide register data circumvent the problems of bias and non-
representative sample selection in regular survey designs (Hermansen 2009: 46; Røed and 
Raaum 2003: 261). Further, the numerical volume of such data provides a sounder basis for 
analyzing differences between subgroups (Daugstad 2009: 8, 59). Presently, the 
subpopulation consisting of immigrants‟ descendants who are registered in a marital union is 
too small to be analyzed properly using a survey design.  
On the other hand, the information retrieved from official records provides no direct access 
to people‟s attitudes, values, political or religious affinities (or other things deemed private 
or subjective). Although these characteristics probably co-vary with partner choice rates, 
these are thus outside the scope of my data.  
4.1.1 Preparation and selection 
My dataset contains information on the complete stock of marriages on December 31
st
 2002, 
and thus does not enlighten us on incident rates varying from period to period. The original 
file contained 188,522 individuals, representing the stock of marital unions (94,261 couples) 
involving at least one person from the immigrant population as of 2002. The first major 
exclusion was driven by missing information on a crucial identifying variable: time of 
marriage. A total of 18401 couples were deleted, most of whom were probably immigrants 
married abroad.
34
 Hwang and Saenz (1990) demonstrate that the inclusion of immigrants 
married abroad (IMAs) leads researchers to overestimate endogamy among minorities, as 
well as the endogamy of older cohorts among the immigrant group. Through the construction 
of a numerical variable depicting years married minus years of residence, all couples in 
which the “anchor” of the spouse import was Norwegian or where both spouses had married 
before being registered residents of Norway were deleted. The remaining couples were those 
                                                          
34 Prof. Arne Mastekaasa advised me of this. Appendix E displays a contingency table of couples‟ composition according to 
immigrant category, before and after the elimination. Out of 18,401 a total of 17,579 were immigrant-immigrant couples, 
760 were most likely cases of Norwegian import, leaving 62 immigrant-descendant pairs (in addition to 17 who were sorted 
out for missing value on immigrant category). The importance of the exclusion of this group is hard to evaluate – but the 
likelihood of them being cases of import is high, and they may thus involve a selection bias concerning the evaluation of 
descendants‟ import patterns.  
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in which the “anchor” was part of the immigrant population, as well as the clearly 
“domestically” married.35  
As reported in Table 4.1, my final dataset includes 55,293 individuals, representing 35,192 
couples. Converting the file unit from couples to individuals, a sum of 15,091 was excluded 
because they were imported to Norway as spouse, the vast majority (11,388) of which were 
women. Because of this, the sum of all numbers beneath the “original population” couples 
count will not cohere with this quantity. 
Table 4.1 The selection process      
Population Couples Individuals 
Original population 94,261 188,522 
Missing marriage date (IMAs) 18,401 36,802 
Registered foreign marriages 9,156 18,312 
Norwegian import 11,411 22,822 
Subpopulation analyzed 35,192 55,293 
- marital import 7,546 15,091 
- domestic marriage 20,101 40,202 
 
When analyzing the influence of various variables on partner choice as an outcome, it is 
crucial that the activity depicted by independent variables takes place before the marriage 
(Kalmijn 1998). Obviously, the spouse or the act of marriage itself may influence key 
characteristics of individuals in the proximate period after getting married. Technically, this 
was solved by including exclusively information registered prior to the marital date as it was 
recorded in the administrative registers.  
                                                          
35 For the specification of spouse import, see the pertinent subsection of operationalization below. As is described there, I 
treated all those married within the first year after migration as imported. To be consistent, I have thus also chosen to delete 
the cases in which a Norwegian has married someone who immigrated within the same year as the marriage – as these are 
equally likely to be cases of “Norwegian” import.  
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4.2 Operationalizations 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
Endogamy vs. exogamy 
The first dependent variable is a measure of endogamy and exogamy, and was constructed as 
a triple-outcome categorical variable at the nominal level of measurement. Following 
Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2010), the categories are  
(0) endogamy,  
(1) exogamy with member of majority population and  
(2) exogamy with member of immigrant population.  
Endogamy occurs when spouses come from the same national-origin group. Majority 
exogamy occurs when an individual from a foreign national-origin group is married to 
someone with Norwegian background. Minority occurs when an individual from a foreign 
national-origin group is married to someone from a different foreign national-origin group.  
Spouse import
36
 
The second dependent variable is a measure of spouse import, represented as a dummy 
variable. Measurement of the two outcome categories  
(0) domestic marriage and  
(1) spouse import  
was made possible by calculating difference between year of marriage and year of 
immigration. Those marrying a residing member of the same national-origin group before 
entering or within the same year as entering the country were deemed imported spouses. The 
                                                          
36 The operationalization of this variable was subject to several rounds of discussion and tentative analyses. In Appendix D, 
there are examples of results generated by another operationalization than that presented in this thesis, which excluded all 
immigrants whose marriage occurred within two years after being registered resident in Norway. This impacted both on 
intermarriage and import estimates.  
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inclusion of those marrying shortly after arriving is legitimated by the fact that these are very 
likely to be planning marriage before arriving – an hypothesis corroborated by the juridical 
arrangement of “engagement visa”.37 Like Gonzalez-Ferrer (2006: 174), I also include 
situations in which the actual migration occurs several years after marriage. The latter cases 
amount to 70% of the imported in total count.
38
  
Table 4.2 Description of data by dependent variable outcomes 
Population 
Endogamous immigrants and descendants Exogamous immigrants and descendants 
Domestically married Spouse import Married to Norwegian 
Married to other immigrant or 
descendant 
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
National-origin group 
I differentiate between groups in accordance to the measure of national ancestry provided by 
Statistics Norway (i.e. country of origin). The spouse selection rates of 43 immigrant groups 
(N=>80) are depicted in the next chapter. However, only 5 large “non-western” national 
groups are singled out in the multivariate analyses: Pakistanis (N=5080), Turks (N=2912), 
Vietnamese (N=3243), Moroccans (N=1649), and Indians (N=1608). The remaining national 
groups of the immigrant population are merged into regional categorizations. Following the 
official schema of Statistics Norway, the categories are: the Nordic countries, Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and South- and Central America (Lie 2004: 42) – 
while North America and Oceania were conflated because of their low count and similarity 
in spouse selection rate (see Table 5.1).  
                                                          
37 It should be mentioned that this arrangement carries rather strict requirements to be fulfilled. Information on this from the 
immigration authorities can be retrieved at: http://www.udi.no/Sentrale-tema/Familieinnvandring/Forlovelsestillatelse-
besok-for-a-gifte-seg-i-Norge/ 
38 Some publications on spouse import (e.g. Henriksen 2010) discuss both cases of family forming migration (i.e. spouse 
import as conceived here) and family reunification through immigration. The notion of “spouse import” is literally more 
accurate in the latter case than in cases where a couple is formed through spouse selection and subsequent immigration. 
Nonetheless, my concern here is the spouse selection of Norwegian residents while they reside in Norway, not their spouse 
selection behavior in their former country.  
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Generation 
As is customary in research on the immigrant population, the study differentiates between 
immigrants and their descendants (also called “first and second generation immigrants”).  
To boost the head count for the small group of immigrants‟ children, I included all early 
immigrants (beneath seven years of age at arrival) in the descendant category. This group 
numbered 872 men and 1166 women. The fact that these individuals are exposed to 
Norwegian primary education and other aspects of the receiving society from an early stage 
makes it reasonable to expect behavior more similar to descendants rather than those older at 
migration (Birkelund and Mastekaasa 2009). A recent systematic comparison between early 
immigrants and descendants concludes that these groups have much in common, compared 
to immigrants (Henriksen 2009: 28). In sum, the generation variable is thus coded 
(0) immigrant (aged >6 at immigration) 
(1) descendant (including immigrants aged <7) 
Length of stay before marriage 
For all immigrants, the time span between age at immigration and marital age was calculated 
in years, and this continuous variable was transformed into a categorical version with the 
following intervals: 
(0) 1-2 years 
(1) 3-5 years 
(2) 6-9 years  
(3) 10-15 years  
(2) 16-42 years  
As seen in the subsequent Figure (4.1), the distribution of this variable is heavily skewed 
towards residing only few years before marrying.  
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Age at marriage 
This variable is measured in years, and to ease interpretation and avoid collinearity between 
the variable and its quadratic term (which is included to detect curvilinearity) the variable is 
centered on its mean (i.e. the mean of each subgroup analyzed is subtracted from its value, 
making the value of the mean 0 in all groups) before included in the analyses. This makes the 
estimates appear in standard deviations from the mean. Beneath (Figure 4.2), the population 
distribution on this variable shows that the average marital age is 30 years.  
 
Gender 
The differences between men and women are captured in two different ways in this thesis. 
First, all models including the whole population and those separating national-origin groups 
include the dummy “male”, measuring the average effect of being a man vs. being a woman. 
Second, the rest of the regressions are run separately for men and women. 
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Educational level 
In studies of homogamy linked to social status, many researchers seem to agree that 
education is the best proxy measurement for socioeconomic differences between couples and 
individuals (Gardyn 2002: 34; Epstein and Guttman 1984: 255). It is more reliable than 
income or occupation, because it rarely changes throughout the life course (Hwang, Saenz, & 
Aguirre 1997). In this sense, educational level is more likely to have stabilized prior to union 
formation than other proxies for socioeconomic status.
39
 Additionally, it serves as an 
indication of earnings potential, without excluding all those without registered employment. 
Finally, education can have many distinct influences on spouse selection – several of which 
are disconnected from income and occupation at the level of action-based mechanisms.  
I us information on the highest education obtained by each individual, based on the National 
Database of Education‟s (NUDB) NUS-2000 code. Educational level was originally 
specified as a 9-point scale variable, which I have reduced through a re-categorization into 5 
levels:  
(1) primary school education 
(2) lower (uncompleted) secondary education   
(3) higher secondary education  .  
(4) lower tertiary education (BA degree)   
(5) higher tertiary education (MA degree) 
In the separate analyses of national-origin groups, the lower and higher levels of both 
secondary and higher education are conflated, making it a 3-levels variable.  
The group with missing information on the education variable (0) is included as a separate 
category, because of its size (20%). Students are included in the analyses, registered with 
                                                          
39 However, some groups display significant proportions of marriages entered before finished education – and here, this is 
particularly common among descendants.  
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their last known completed educational level. The distribution of the analyzed population on 
this variable is seen in Figure 4.3.  
 
Place of residence 
In most receiving countries, Norway included, immigrants and descendants 
disproportionately inhabit big cities. Thus, several authors (Dribe and Lundh 2008; Jacobson 
and Heaton 2000) have found that metropolitan residence particularly increases ones chances 
of intermarriage to other minorities. In Norway, immigration is not so much an urban 
phenomenon as an Oslo phenomenon. Not only does the capital have a percentage of 
inhabitants with immigrant background more than twice as high as the national average, but 
about half of all with “non-western” origins and even a larger share of those with African or 
Asian background lives in the Oslo area (Forgaard 2006). After running analyses with place 
of residence categorized by regional part of the country (Western, Northern, Southern, 
Eastern and Oslo) which yielded largely small and statistically non-significant differences 
between the regions, I settled for the simple dummy variant of Oslo vs. outside of Oslo.  
4.3 Statistical tools  
4.3.1 Choice of statistical design 
Many analyses of intermarriage and homogamy have applied log-linear models (Kalmijn 
1998). This approach treats couples as the unit of analysis, and allows one to analyze 
multivariate frequency tables of categorical variables while controlling for group size and sex 
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ratio (marginal distributions) as a default (Trilla et al. 2008: 881). Crucially, this is made 
possible by the aggregation of all units into categories (e.g. level of education). Design-wise, 
log-linear analysis boasts the advantage that the phenomenon of partner choice is examined 
from the perspective of both spouses. This phenomenon is two-sided through and through: 
one does not choose a partner in the way that one chooses a career, or a material acquisition 
such as a house or a car. The potential partner in question also has a saying. The two-way 
tables of log-linear models more accurately mirror this aspect of partner choice dynamics.  
However, there are important limitations with the log-linear approach, the most important of 
which is its inability to include many independent variables (Heaton & Jacobson 2000: 33). 
This is due to the reliance on the two-way aggregated cross-tabulations, which necessitates 
many observations on all combinations of the variables investigated. If many factors are put 
into the model, the cross-tabulation of log-linear analysis becomes too large – and a great 
number of variables in the tables results in many empty cells (Jacobs and Labov 2002: 628).  
Thus, the major argument favoring regressions over log-linear models is its overt strength in 
including many covariates to test various theoretical predictions (Kalmijn 1998: 418-419). 
The potency of regression analyses is linked to their capacity to provide a quantified 
expression of both the strength and direction of each factor‟s correlation with another, 
whether they interact statistically, and whether there are confounding relationships between 
any of the variables (Skog 2007: 214).  
Both dependent variables in this study are categorical. In such cases, the technique of logistic 
regression is apt, because the distribution of categorical outcome variables involves different 
technical assumptions than that of numerical ones (Skog 2007: 379). As described above, my 
analytical strategy involves two dependent variables: one specified as a three-outcome 
variable, requiring multinomial logistic regression, and one having two outcomes, requiring 
binomial logistic regression. 
4.3.2 Logistic regression 
Linear regression cannot be implemented on a categorical dependent variable, because 
several of its inbuilt assumptions are violated (Tufte 2000: 13-16). Most fundamentally, the 
assumption of linearity (implying that all changes in the outcome variable as an effect of one 
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unit increase in an explanatory variable are constant) is invalid.
40
 In logistic regression 
models, the linearity of the explanatory variables in relation to the dependent variable is 
made possible by a logarithmic transformation of each probability estimate of the dependent 
variable‟s categories (Andersen 1997: 157). This process includes two principal steps. First, 
one must recalculate the probability estimate into so-called odds, defined as the probability 
of an event divided by the probability of it not occurring (Skog 2007: 355):  
p
p
odds


1
 
The principal achievement gained by this recalculation is removing the upper barrier of the 
estimates as conceived in probabilities (from 0 to 1), because odds range from 0 to + . 
However, the values of dependent variables should also be able to climb beneath 0, to 
negative numbers. To address this, the odds is transformed into its natural logarithm, creating 
a mathematical expression known as the logit (Tufte 2000: 21): 
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lnlog  
Here, ln denotes the natural logarithm (the exponent of the natural number e [2,718] required 
to calculate the original number). Thus, the logit is nothing but a logarithmic expression of 
the odds (and consequently often goes by the name log odds). With this expression, the 
relationship between variables can be depicted as a linear function on the logit scale (Skog 
2007: 355). This wields the advantage of restoring linearity and symmetry to the model: a 
“logit” coefficient is either above 0 (in which case the relationship is positive, and the 
probability is >0.5) or below (in which case the relationship is negative, and the probability 
is <0.5) (Skog 2007: 357). The binomial logistic regression can be formulated in the 
following equation (Tufte 2000: 22): 
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40 Although there are more technical reasons for abandoning OLS when dealing with categorical variables (the 
heteroscedastic and non-normal distribution of residuals), it is the unacceptable assumption of linear probability which 
weighs in heaviest (Tufte 2000: 16). 
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Here, b0 denotes the regression intercept, i.e. the value of the logit when all independent 
variables have the value 0, b1 etc. are the regression coefficients of the independent variables 
denoted by x1 etc., and e represents the residual (i.e. the variance in the dependent variable 
not explained by the independent variables).  
Multinomial logistic regression is a technique suited for cases when the categorical 
dependent variable has more than two outcome values, but these are not ordered in any 
meaningful way.
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 In such cases, the dependent variable is decomposed into dummy 
variables, i.e. dichotomous variables which all have the same reference category (Tufte 2000: 
55). In my case, the multinomial regression is a simultaneous estimation of two binomial 
models, consistently calculated against a category chosen as reference (Cristophersen 2009: 
188). The equation for this regression model is 
1-J ., 1,J       
1
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where i represents individual observations and j represents the categories of the dependent 
variable. Thus, in my case J-1 (the number of intercepts) equals 2, because the dependent 
variable has three categories.  
Technically, the only divergence in interpretation from the binomial case is that the estimates 
can be compared to the reference category alone (Skog 2007: 314). Thus, Tufte (2000: 56) 
advices to pick a reference category that there is particular theoretical interest in comparing 
with the other outcomes. Diverging from Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2010), I elect the 
category of endogamy as reference for the dummies, thus contrasted with majority exogamy 
and minority exogamy. This choice is warranted by the fact that comparisons between 
endogamy and the two variants of exogamy are more interesting than pairing the two types of 
exogamy in a dichotomy. I believe the former is a more realistic representation of the 
selection patterns: for most individuals in my data set, endogamy seems to be the most liable 
                                                          
41 For the case in which the categorical dependent variable has ordered outcomes in plural, ordinal logistic regression is 
suited (Tufte 2000: 53).  
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option – compared to the less likely outcomes of those who (for reasons presented in the 
analyses) choose a spouse outside of the group.
42
  
Although the regression results in odds ratios (OR) are more accessible for interpretation 
than logits (Skog 2007: 364), coefficients in odds ratio have a less intuitive interpretation 
than predicted probabilities. Because my tables are overall big enough, I thus limit myself to 
reporting the parameter estimates in logits (which indicate the direction and relative strength 
of relationships) and select the most important outcomes for translation into predicted 
probabilities, as these are more feasible for the substantial understanding and illustration of 
my results (Skog 2005: 363).  
4.3.3 Model fit and significance testing 
A palpable strength of (much) quantitative research is the possibility of making generalized 
claims. In the statistical analysis of empirical relationships, this force is acquired through 
deductive hypothesis testing of the estimates (Ringdal 2001: 290). The existence of 
measurement errors even in register data makes statistical tests desirable, to have an idea 
about the precision of estimates. In addition, there is the argument that individual behavior is 
best viewed as stochastic processes subject to random variation (Hoem 2008: 439). Thus, 
when the goal of statistical analysis is not only to describe variation within the population, 
but also linking the findings to theories, the non-deterministic nature of human behavior 
warrants tests of the precision of each coefficient retrieved (Rubin 1985: 518).  
For all individual estimates in the logistic regression models, I report results of the Wald test 
statistic as measure of significance. The Wald test is calculated in the manner of a t-test in 
OLS regression, and is mathematically simply the squared version of the former formula 
(although it is a bit stricter in practice) (Skog 2007: 374): 
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42 Thus, the multinomial regression model will not inform us about the predicted probability of majority exogamy vs. non-
majority exogamy (the two non-referential categories). 
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With a high total count of observations, this test statistic has a probability distribution close 
to that of the Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom (df = 1), given the 
correctness of the null hypothesis (Skog 2007: 374). However, when numbers are small, the 
probability distribution may not approximate the Chi-square distribution, potentially leading 
to erroneous test results.  
Logistic regressions are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method. The “likelihood” 
function can also be used for testing of the model‟s improvement given inclusion of new 
independent variables. Using the –2LL statistic, SPSS compares a model matching the null 
hypothesis (–2LL0) and our model (–2LLA) with respect to whether our independent 
variables give a statistically significant improvement of fit to the data (Skog 2007: 375). The 
numerical difference between these is called the log likelihood ratio (LR). Crucially, the –
2LL decreases between the null hypothesis model and the alternative model if the model fit 
improves.  
In linear regression, the R 2 statistic (“explained variance”) is straightforwardly interpreted as 
the proportion of explained variance that all variables in the model are responsible for 
together (Ringdal 2001: 399). This statistic from linear regression does not have an accurate 
corresponding measure among logistic regression models. However, multiple procedures 
involved in the evaluation of logistic regression analyses attempt to mimic the properties of 
the R 2 statistic (Ringdal 2001: 436). I have opted to report the so-called Nagelkerke test 
statistic  NR2 . Nagelkerke‟s R 2 is based on the log likelihood function, and can obtain the 
maximum value of 1 (in which case the model fit is perfect) (Skog 2007: 419). 
43
 
 
                                                          
43 All of the measures reported are valid tests of significance and model fit both in the binomial and multinomial case, and 
the estimation methods and interpretation are analogous between these two types of regression (Tufte 2000: 56, 59).  
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5. Spouse selection patterns                           
and descriptive statistics 
This chapter seeks to establish the degrees to which individuals of different national-origin 
are intermarrying and importing a spouse. As such, it presents bivariate analyses of how 
groups are distributed according to the outcomes on both of my dependent variables. This is 
a crucial step before examining the factors influencing these spouse selection outcomes in 
the following chapters. First, contingency tables of endogamy and exogamy are presented. 
Second, we turn to the endogamous, reviewing their propensity to import a spouse from their 
country of origin. Lastly, we review some of the descriptive statistics of the other 
independent variables in our data. 
5.1 Endogamy and exogamy 
5.1.1 Immigrants 
In Table 5.1, the intermarriage percentages of immigrants coming from sixty-one different 
national-origin groups are depicted. First, the overall tendencies should be noted. On 
average, 42% of men and 36% of women who have married in Norway after immigrating are 
endogamous. While 38% of men and 45% of women married a person from the Norwegian 
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majority population, 20% of men and 19% of women found a spouse from another national-
origin group in the immigrant population.
44
 
Now, the conspicuous variation in rates of endogamy and exogamy should be noted. 
Although there is considerable variation within some of the regions categorized in table 5.1, 
the average tendencies of endogamy and exogamy between these regions form a gradient 
pattern. Individuals from Western Europe are least endogamous, and a relatively larger share 
of intermarriages than the population mean are with majority Norwegians. Next, the Eastern 
Europeans are significantly more inclined to choose a spouse from their own group – in 
terms of national origin, evidently, but possibly also by region, as their minority exogamy is 
on average higher than the population mean. For this group, women are on average more 
exogamous than men. However, the opposite holds for Africans, where men are significantly 
more majority exogamous than women, while the across-sex endogamy average visibly 
surpasses that of Eastern Europeans. The last step of this intermarriage continuum is 
represented by Asians, whose marital choices are pointedly more endogamous than Africans 
– particularly when leaving out the outliers of Israel, Thai and Filipino women. Among the 
Americas, USA, Canada and Mexico display a pattern akin to Western Europeans with low 
endogamy and high majority exogamy – while the miscellaneous “non-western” groups from 
South- and Central America are more endogamous. In general, there is more variation in the 
balance between endogamy and majority exogamy, while the mean for minority mixing is 
close to 20% for all regions.  
In comparison with previous Norwegian research (Lie 2004, see Chapter 2), the findings 
show that excluding immigrants married abroad and those imported by majority Norwegians 
lowers the intermarriage rates of Nordic and some other “western” groups, while it generally 
increases the intermarriage estimates of “non-western” groups (although obviously not for 
the groups from which many Norwegians import spouses). Thus, we can conclude that 
previous findings (including immigrants married abroad) miscalculate the “openness” of 
group relations between “non-western” and the majority population. 
                                                          
44 It should be remembered that the sample upon which these analyses are run is heavily unbalanced in terms of sex, 
because all those immigrants living in Norway as a result of being imported by a resident are excluded – and appears only 
as a characterization of the individuals analyzed here (i.e. their spouse). This group contains vastly more women than men, 
and this is displayed in the skewed number of observations reported at the end of all tables. 
Table 5.1 Intermarriage Percentages by Country of Origin, Immigrants in Norway as of 31.12.2002. 
 
 
MEN 
  
  WOMEN 
  
Region and country of origin 
 
% Within 
Group 
 
% With 
Majority 
% With 
Other  
 
N 
 
% Within 
Group 
 
% With 
Majority 
 
% With 
Other  
 
 
N 
Western Europe  
         
Denmark 17,6 68,6 13,8 1610 15,7 73,4 10,9 1792 
Finland 28,7 57,7 13,6 411 15,8 68,5 15,8 723 
Iceland 45,2 42,0 12,8 343 39,4 48,6 12,1 414 
Sweden 16,2 69,4 14,4 1786 11,8 76,6 11,7 2326 
Netherlands 22,6 59,6 17,8 394 22,5 61,6 15,9 289 
France 14,3 61,8 23,9 251 9,0 68,9 22,0 177 
Greece 4,3 80,9 14,8 115 13,3 80,0 6,7 15 
Great Britain 14,0 66,6 19,4 1257 13,6 69,8 16,6 616 
Spain 8,5 70,6 20,9 153 6,3 73,2 20,5 112 
Italy 13,6 64,4 22,0 118 9,1 75,8 15,2 66 
Switzerland 9,8 67,1 23,2 82 9,2 72,3 18,5 65 
Germany 18,3 61,2 20,6 618 15,5 67,4 17,1 619 
         
Eastern Europe 
        
Poland 62,8 27,4 9,8 368 19,2 65,4 15,4 751 
Portugal 8,2 61,2 30,6 85 4,7 65,6 29,7 64 
Romania 44,6 33,8 21,6 74 14,3 66,9 18,8 133 
Russia 47,1 37,3 15,7 102 6,8 77,3 15,9 453 
Hungary 19,9 55,9 24,3 136 3,5 77,2 19,3 171 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 74,0 11,1 14,9 651 76,5 10,4 13,1 520 
Macedonia 52,1 20,4 27,5 309 51,2 9,4 39,4 127 
Czech Republic 32,8 32,8 34,4 64 20,3 55,9 23,7 59 
Bulgaria 39,6 51,4 9,0 111 24,1 64,6 11,4 79 
Croatia 40,0 27,0 33,0 185 37,4 26,7 35,9 131 
Serbia and Montenegro 58,6 26,5 15,0 956 65,0 14,5 20,5 448 
         
Africa 
        
Algeria 36,7 52,9 10,4 240 43,9 24,4 31,7 41 
Eritrea 65,1 4,4 30,5 272 70,7 7,3 22,0 123 
Ethiopia 67,0 9,9 23,0 191 68,8 10,2 21,1 128 
Gambia 31,9 53,8 14,3 405 61,3 24,7 14,0 93 
Ghana 61,9 26,9 11,2 312 68,5 19,8 11,7 111 
Kenya 33,8 35,0 31,3 80 14,9 48,3 36,8 87 
Morocco 60,3 32,3 7,4 1223 77,0 11,3 11,7 426 
Nigeria 43,5 36,4 20,1 154 52,5 20,0 27,5 40 
Somalia 88,6 3,6 7,8 526 82,4 4,5 13,0 376 
Tunisia 30,9 59,1 10,0 259 47,4 26,3 26,3 19 
Uganda 25,8 21,2 53,0 66 15,8 44,7 39,5 38 
                  
        
(continued) 
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(Table 5.1, continued) 
       
 
 
Asia 
    
  
   
Afghanistan 63,7 6,6 29,7 91 60,0 0,0 40,0 30 
Bangladesh 70,7 17,2 12,1 116 73,5 11,8 14,7 34 
Sri Lanka 91,3 4,5 4,2 2033 92,3 5,7 2,1 775 
Phillippines  84,4 10,9 4,7 276 25,6 64,7 9,7 1080 
Hong Kong 32,1 5,7 62,1 140 42,2 24,4 33,3 45 
India 76,2 13,6 10,2 1050 72,9 14,5 12,6 371 
Iraq 59,8 16,9 23,3 769 88,3 3,3 8,5 213 
Iran 65,4 17,4 17,2 1562 76,5 13,4 10,1 701 
Israel 12,1 59,3 28,6 91 4,8 73,8 21,4 42 
China 78,5 5,7 15,8 368 47,4 28,9 23,7 308 
Lebanon 56,5 22,1 21,4 285 47,4 29,5 23,2 95 
Pakistan 90,9 4,4 4,7 2830 97,4 1,0 1,6 956 
Syria 55,4 15,2 29,3 92 42,9 10,2 46,9 49 
Thailand 56,3 29,2 14,6 48 3,9 83,7 12,4 669 
Turkey 79,3 15,9 4,8 1706 91,4 4,7 3,9 790 
Vietnam 94,4 2,8 2,8 2010 89,0 6,9 4,1 1330 
         
The Americas 
        
Dominican Republic 40,0 20,0 40,0 15 19,4 48,4 32,3 62 
Mexico 11,5 65,4 23,1 26 2,9 65,7 31,4 35 
Argentina 12,1 54,5 33,3 33 15,4 65,4 19,2 26 
Brazil 33,3 42,4 24,2 33 3,4 80,8 15,8 146 
Chile 54,7 32,1 13,3 739 57,5 28,1 14,4 583 
Colombia 39,4 42,4 18,2 33 22,2 55,6 22,2 54 
Peru 27,7 44,6 27,7 65 21,2 60,6 18,2 66 
Canada 10,6 76,6 12,8 94 6,1 85,4 8,5 82 
USA 12,9 70,5 16,6 529 7,7 80,3 12,1 614 
         
Oceania 
        
Australia 6,2 69,2 24,6 65 3,8 79,2 17,0 53 
New Zealand 5,6 55,6 38,9 18 0,0 89,5 10,5 19 
         
Mean Percentage / N 42,0 37,9 20,2 29024 36,4 44,7 18,9 20860 
Groups selected have n > 80, or represent low-n regions  (Central/South America and Oceania).   
 
Some groups (e.g. Sweden, USA, etc.) display very high rates of intermarriage with someone 
from the Norwegian majority. Other groups have very few members that marry outside of 
their national-origin group, with close to (Somalia, Iraqi and Vietnamese women) and above 
90% endogamy (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Vietnamese men, Turkish women). Although men are 
slightly more endogamous than women overall, differences between sexes vary greatly 
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between groups. While women from Thailand and the Philippines are unusually inclined to 
marry majority Norwegians, their male co-nationals are largely endogamous. Although no 
groups display considerable male and little female exogamy, at the other end of the spectrum 
are Iraq (3% of women and 17% of men are married to a majority Norwegian), Algeria and 
Tunisia (men are twice as exogamous).  
5.1.2 Descendants 
Table 5.2 presents intermarriage percentage distributions for descendants of thirteen 
national-origin groups, separately for men and women. The average percentages show that 
unlike immigrants, men are more majority exogamous (48%) than women (37%) among 
descendants. The minority exogamy rates are very similar, and thus women (51%) are 
significantly more endogamous than men (40%). Note that the sex ratio is reversed from that 
seen for immigrants; among descendants, women outnumber men three-to-two. 
Table 5.2 Intermarriage Percentages by Country of Origin, Descendants in Norway as of 31.12.2002.   
  
MEN 
  
  WOMEN 
  
Country of origin 
 
% Within 
Group 
 
% With 
Majority 
 
% With Other 
Group 
 
 
N 
 
% Within 
Group 
 
% With 
Majority 
 
% With Other 
Group 
 
 
N 
 
         
Denmark 6,8 78,8 14,4 264 5,6 85,7 8,7 287 
Sweden 2,7 82,2 15,1 73 1,9 81,0 17,1 105 
Serbia and Montenegro 20,0 52,0 28,0 25 35,1 38,6 26,3 57 
Netherlands 11,4 72,7 15,9 44 9,1 70,5 20,5 44 
Great Britain 4,7 81,3 14,1 64 5,8 75,4 18,8 69 
Turkey 91,7 4,5 3,8 157 92,3 4,2 3,5 259 
Germany 1,8 77,2 21,1 57 7,4 77,8 14,8 81 
Hungary 5,6 74,4 20,0 90 0,9 84,4 14,7 109 
Morocco 79,3 10,3 10,3 29 93,5 3,9 2,6 77 
India 89,2 6,8 4,1 74 63,7 21,2 15,0 113 
Pakistan 90,3 2,4 7,3 545 95,9 1,2 2,9 729 
Vietnam 95,1 0,0 4,9 41 75,6 12,8 11,5 78 
USA 15,2 81,8 3,0 33 8,3 85,0 6,7 60 
         
Mean Percentage / N 39,5 48,0 12,5 1496 51,4 36,8 11,8 2068 
Groups selected have n > 80.               
The visible variation in intermarriage percentages by descendants‟ national origin is 
stunning, as differences between groups are more tangible than that seen for immigrants. 
While some of the Nordic and Western European descendants display a sizable increase in 
intermarriage between the generations (around ten percentage points more majority 
exogamy), the Asian groups are generally at the same level or even showing less 
intermarriage (Turkey, Morocco, Indian men) than immigrants of the same national-origin 
group. The closest thing to a fairly balanced distribution on the three outcomes is represented 
by Serbia and Montenegro – the unusually high minority exogamy shares perhaps an 
inclusion of other post-Yugoslavian backgrounds into the “field of eligibles”. 
Among the most conspicuous differences between the sexes is the fact that no male 
Vietnamese descendant but 13% of women have found a spouse within the majority 
population. Men from Serbia and Montenegro are much more likely to marry out than 
women, but they are equally likely to intermarry with another of immigrant background. 
Indian male descendants are also much less exogamous than their female peers, while the 
opposite is true for Moroccans. 
5.2 Spouse import  
5.2.1 Immigrants 
Table 5.3 displays spouse import percentages for the endogamous, by thirty-three national-
origin groups. We see that on average, 57% of endogamous men and 29% of endogamous 
women in these groups import a spouse from their country of origin.
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 Again, the differences 
by national-origin and regional background are substantial, and we see that the pattern 
largely matches that seen in the intermarriage analyses. However, across all subpopulations, 
men are considerably more prone to import a spouse than women.  
 
                                                          
45 Percentages are not directly comparable to those shown in chapter two (from Daugstad 2008 and Henriksen 2010), 
because they report the shares of spouse import out of the total amount of marriages entered, not only those of the 
endogamous. 
Table 5.3 Import Percentages by Country of Origin, Endogamous Immigrants in Norway as of 31.12.2002. 
  
MEN 
 
  WOMEN 
 
Region and country of origin 
%  Norwegian 
Resident 
% Spouse Import N 
% With 
Norwegian 
Resident 
% Spouse Import N 
Western Europe  
   
  
  
Denmark 85,4 14,6 329 90,2 9,8 326 
Finland 77,1 22,9 118 84,2 15,8 114 
Iceland 85,2 14,8 155 80,4 19,6 163 
Sweden 85,7 14,3 301 93,0 7,0 286 
Great Britain 40,9 59,1 176 83,3 16,7 84 
Germany 64,6 35,4 113 81,3 18,8 96 
Netherlands 68,5 31,5 89 90,8 9,2 65 
       
Eastern Europe 
      
Poland 42,4 57,6 231 68,8 31,3 144 
Croatia 40,5 59,5 74 61,2 38,8 49 
Serbia and Montenegro 35,5 64,5 560 68,4 31,6 291 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 65,1 34,9 482 78,9 21,1 398 
Macedonia 13,7 86,3 161 33,8 66,2 65 
       Africa 
      
Algeria 18,2 81,8 88 88,9 11,1 18 
Eritrea 44,6 55,4 177 90,8 9,2 87 
Ethiopia 55,5 44,5 128 80,7 19,3 88 
Gambia 32,6 67,4 129 73,7 26,3 57 
Ghana 26,9 73,1 193 68,4 31,6 76 
Morocco 16,0 84,0 737 36,0 64,0 328 
Nigeria 22,4 77,6 67 71,4 28,6 21 
Somalia 58,6 41,4 466 88,1 11,9 310 
Tunisia 7,5 92,5 80 66,7 33,3 9 
       Asia 
      
Sri Lanka 30,1 69,9 1856 78,0 22,0 715 
Philippines 59,7 40,3 233 50,4 49,6 276 
India 15,8 84,2 784 38,2 61,8 297 
Iraq 30,0 70,0 460 73,4 26,6 188 
Iran 46,6 53,4 1022 88,8 11,2 536 
China 37,0 63,0 289 72,6 27,4 146 
Lebanon 22,4 77,6 161 80,0 20,0 45 
Pakistan 14,8 85,2 2577 27,2 72,8 961 
Turkey 17,8 82,2 1343 27,1 72,9 720 
Vietnam 55,8 44,2 1937 88,5 11,5 1221 
       Other 
      
USA 42,6 57,4 68 72,3 27,7 47 
Chile 64,1 35,9 404 77,3 22,7 335 
       
Mean Percentage / N 43,1 56,9 15988 71,3 28,7 8562 
Groups selected have n > 80, except USA.           
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The gradient pattern of spouse import matches the gradient decrease in intermarriage. While 
Western Europeans on average display low rates of spouse import, their internal variation is 
peculiar, with Great Britain as an outlier of almost 60% spouse import among endogamous 
men (a characteristic shared with men from the USA). However, compared to Western 
Europeans on average, Eastern Europeans are more than twice as likely to import a spouse to 
Norway, and close to three times as likely among women. Next, the average spouse import 
percentages of African and Asian men are similar at just beneath 70%, while Asian women 
are more likely to import than African women.  
Import percentages standing out among both sexes of the immigrant groups displayed here 
are those of Pakistan, Turkey, India, Morocco and Macedonia (a deviant case among the 
Eastern European group). As a group, the Philippines remarkably have ten percentage points 
more importers among the women than among the men. Given the skewed sex ratio of 
almost 4:1 female Filipinos in Norway, there is probably an opportunity-driven logic 
explaining that these women import relatively more than their peers from other national-
origin groups. 
5.2.2 Descendants 
Table 5.4 shows import percentages for descendants. Few of the national-origin groups have 
large enough stocks of endogamously married individuals to include them in the bivariate 
analyses. Reduced to five large “non-western” groups, we see that an overall variation no 
longer stands out. The top four groups share a pattern of large shares of the endogamous 
marriages (and because these groups are largely endogamous, all marriages) being covered 
by spouse import. Vietnam displays a different and a bit more complicated story. In fact, 
Vietnamese men actually display fair amounts of import at this point, quite similar to the 
mean of immigrant men seen above. However, Vietnamese female descendants who marry 
endogamously tend to find the spouse in Norway.   
Compared to their parental generation, these five groups of descendants are generally just as 
(or more) likely to import a spouse. The major difference between the generations is that the 
gap between men and women in their propensity to import is almost closed, except in the 
case of the Vietnamese, for whom the difference between men and women is at the level 
seen by immigrants. Given the reversal of the numerical balance between the sexes from 
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immigrants to descendants (probably generated by the fact that women marry earlier at 
average than men), we can interpret this as further support of the idea that the ratio of men to 
women among immigrants marrying in Norway can account for some of the general spouse 
selection variation between the sexes. In general, however, we see that the gender pattern is 
more balanced than for immigrants, which corroborates previous research (Daugstad 2008: 
51). 
Table 5.4 Import Percentages by Country of Origin, Endogamous Descendants in Norway as of 31.12.2002. 
  
MEN 
 
  WOMEN 
 
Country of origin 
 
% With 
Norwegian 
Resident 
 
 
 
% Spouse Import 
 
 
 
N 
 
% With 
Norwegian 
Resident 
 
 
 
% Spouse Import 
 
 
 
N 
    
  
  
Turkey 18,1 81,9 144 19,2 80,8 239 
Morocco 13,0 87,0 23 18,1 81,9 72 
India 9,1 90,9 66 20,8 79,2 72 
Pakistan 20,7 79,3 492 21,3 78,7 699 
Vietnam 48,7 51,3 39 81,4 18,6 59 
       
Mean Percentage / N 21,9 78,1 764 32,2 67,8 1141 
Groups selected have n > 80.           
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
We have seen the distributions of spouse selection rates according to national-origin group, 
generation and gender. Table 5.5 displays descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
utilized in the next two chapters, by gender and generation. Thus, both differences between 
men and women, and differences between immigrants and descendants are in focus. Table 
5.6 displays descriptive statistics on the same explanatory variables for the five large 
national-origin groups scrutinized separately in the analyses.  
There seems to be a cohort selection of descendants in my data. Close to 20% of both male 
and female descendants have only primary education at marriage, and almost 50% of them 
did not complete secondary education before marrying. Partly, this is mirrored by a relatively 
low mean marital age. However, the rate at which descendants (6%) are missing information 
of education is very low compared to that of immigrants (above 30%) – and there is reason to 
believe that the proportion of lowly educated among this group is relatively high.
 Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics by gender and generation. Percentages, means and dispersions.   
  Immigrants Descendants 
Variable Men Women Men  Women 
Educational level 
  
  
 
Primary education 9,6 9,7 17,8 18,3 
Lower-level secondary education 20,3 15,9 28,4 30,1 
Higher-level secondary education 16,3 15,7 30,0 26,3 
Lower-level tertiary education 13,6 15,8 12,5 14,8 
Higher-level tertiary education 4,8 4,2 4,2 1,8 
Missing 32,0 33,2 6,0 6,2 
Age at marriage 
 
 
  
 
Mean 31,6 29,3 26,1 24,1 
Standard Deviance 7,1 6,6 5,7 5,7 
Length of stay 
  
  
 
Mean 7,6 6,6   
 
Standard Deviance 5,6 5,3   
 
Residence 
  
  
 
Oslo 27,3 26,3 37,4 36,5 
Outside Oslo 42,6 47,7 43,2 41,9 
Missing 30,1 26,0 19,3 21,6 
N  29,680 21,292 1,825 2,496 
 
Both immigrant and descendant men marry about two years later than their female peers at 
average, and immigrants have married five years later on average than descendants. When it 
comes to residence before marriage, a larger proportion of married descendants at the end of 
2002 were living in Oslo, than the corresponding proportion of immigrants. However, again 
we see that immigrants display higher missing information rates of residential location as 
well – and it is not a far stretch to presume that more of these individuals live in Oslo than 
not.  
Looking to the descriptive statistics of my five selected national-origin groups (Table 5.6), 
we see that Indians have considerably higher levels of educational levels than all other 
groups, among both men and women. Morocco, Turkey and Pakistan all display low levels 
of education across the sexes, and high rates of missing information about education. 
Although few Vietnamese in my material have higher education, both men and women are 
clustered around the secondary levels – and have distinctly the lowest rates of missing 
information of these groups. 
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Moroccan men marry later than those from the other groups, while Indian women marry on 
average at the same age as Indian and Vietnamese women. Women from Pakistan and 
Turkey marry at a very young age, which is probably influenced by their relatively large 
stocks of descendants with disproportionately low marital age.  
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics of independent variables, 5 national-origin groups.*          
  Men Women 
Variable Pakistan Turkey India Morocco Vietnam Pakistan Turkey India Morocco Vietnam 
Educational level 
 
      
 
  
    
Primary education 18,5 22,9 8,8 15,9 10,6 22,9 28,5 11,0 24,9 16,5 
Lower-level secondary  24,7 21,2 27,9 21,0 40,3 27,0 24,8 21,7 18,8 27,9 
Higher-level secondary  12,3 12,3 15,5 12,3 24,5 16,0 9,0 21,1 10,3 23,5 
Lower-level tertiary education 6,7 5,6 18,4 12,8 8,8 4,9 3,1 19,8 4,2 8,0 
Higher-level tertiary education 1,0 1,7 4,3 1,9 2,8 0,6 1,4 3,1 0,0 1,7 
Missing 34,5 32,5 23,8 32,2 10,7 25,0 27,4 20,0 36,9 17,3 
Age at marriage 
 
 
   
  
 
   
Mean 27,3 27,1 29,9 32,1 30,6 23,5 22,8 26,9 26,8 27,2 
Standard Deviance 7,1 7,5 6,7 6,6 6,7 5,4 6,1 6,3 7,7 6,4 
Length of stay 
     
  
    
Mean 10,9 8,5 8,8 8,7 10,8 13,4 9,8 11,0 9,3 8,9 
Standard Deviance 7,2 6,1 6,5 5,6 5,2 7,3 6,4 7,7 6,6 5,7 
Residence 
     
  
    
Oslo 36,3 24,3 26,2 44,4 21,5 56,5 27,3 34,3 59,6 24,7 
Outside Oslo 12,9 38,2 26,4 24,6 53,9 18,4 44,4 32,0 15,3 49,9 
Missing 50,7 37,5 47,3 31,0 24,6 25,2 28,3 33,7 25,1 25,4 
N  3,375 1,863 1,124 1,223 2,051 1,705 1,049 484 426 1,372 
*All values pertain to the sum of immigrants and descendants, except length of stay (which is shown only for immigrants). 
Moroccans and Pakistanis live in Oslo to a larger extent than the other groups, while 
Pakistani and Indian men display very high rates of missing information on place of 
residence. Lastly, I would like to highlight again the skewed sex ratio here, ranging from 
Moroccans for which men outnumber women three-to-one, to Turks for which the ratio is 
closer to three-to-two.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter reports the distributions of national-origin groups in intermarriage, endogamy 
and spouse import. The intermarriage tables show that for immigrants, more women than 
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men intermarry with the majority population, while more men than women intermarry with 
others of minority background. The national-origin groups of Western Europe and North 
America are on average much more exogamous than those from other regions, and while 
Asian groups display the lowest mean intermarriage rate, this is particularly true for groups 
from the Middle Eastern and South Asia areas. For descendants, more men than women 
intermarry both with the majority population and with other minorities. With a few 
exceptions, within-group differences between men and women are smaller than among 
immigrants. However, differences between national-origin groups are larger than that seen 
for immigrants. Descendants from the Nordic and Western Europe are intermarrying at 
remarkably high rates, while those from South Asia and the Middle East are highly 
endogamous. 
The spouse import tables make it clear that above all, men import much more than women. 
This tendency holds across the generations, and matches the skewed sex ratio in my data 
(excluding all individuals married before having lived in Norway for one year). Among 
immigrants, those from African and Asian countries are most likely to import, while Western 
Europeans are most likely to find their national-origin match within Norway‟s borders. Four 
out of five national groups displaying large groups of endogamous descendants show high 
rates of spouse import, with Vietnam as an outlier displaying only a moderate degree. 
Overall, the patterns found in this chapter are roughly similar to those found in previous 
Norwegian research (Lie 2004; Daugstad 2008; Daugstad 2009; Henriksen 2010), although 
we have seen that my data selection strategy does change the degree to which some groups 
are deemed exogamous and endogamous. The next two chapters focus on describing these 
spouse selection patterns more accurately, by including other characteristics than national 
origin in the analyses. First, I scrutinize which factors influence the intermarriage rates. 
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6. Intermarriage and its correlates 
This chapter presents multivariate analyses of how education, generation, gender, place of 
residence, years since migration and marital age influences the chances of intermarriage. The 
inception is an analysis in which the whole population is investigated, with differences 
across national-origin groups of all other independent variables. Next, four sets of analyses 
demonstrate separately the effect of the other independent variables for immigrant and 
descendant men and women, controlling for national-origin group variation. Finally, separate 
analyses of the largest national-origin groups are presented.
46
   
6.1 Effects across all groups 
To establish the impact of all independent variables across all groups in the immigrant 
population, I first ran analyses of effects across all national-origin groups for both 
generations and both sexes. These analyses were modeled on a design followed by several 
researchers (e.g. Van Tubergen and Maas 2007; Celikaksoy et al. 2009; Kalmijn and Van 
Tubergen 2010), attempting to explain the intermarriage patterns of immigrants as one 
group. A table reporting the logit estimates of these analyses is included in Appendix A, and 
some of the results are shown in Figures 6.1 through 6.4.  
                                                          
46 All regressions have been run in several steps, with increased inclusion of possibly confounding factors. I have chosen to 
present the models including all my independent variables here. Models estimating effects excluding the impact of age at 
marriage are found in Appendix C.  
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Figure 6.1 shows graphs for the probability of intermarriage by education and gender, and 
illustrates both the mean differences between men and women across all groups, and the 
mean differences in the impact of educational level on their propensities to intermarry. The 
first thing to notice is the conspicuous influence of educational level. It is unequivocally 
gradient, and although most visibly affecting the probability of majority intermarriage and 
endogamy, it is statistically significant in all models at all levels of education.  
Figure 6.1  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by education and gender. Calculated for immigrants 
living in Oslo and 30 years old at marriage. Across-groups means. 
 
The graph tells us that that immigrant women‟s probability of majority intermarriage 
increases from 51% to 70% from the lowest to the highest educational level, while that of 
immigrant men is correspondingly changed from 32% to 47%. The rising slopes thus display 
that women are more affected by level of education than men, a relationship which was 
shown to be statistically significant at the two higher educational levels for majority 
intermarriage (see Table A6.1 in Appendix A). The strength of association between 
educational level and intermarriage in Figure 6.1 is considerably lower than that shown in 
Figure 6.2, showing the plot without control for age at marriage. Here, the change in 
probability of majority intermarriage is from 38% to 66% for women and from 26% to 43% 
for men, and we also see that the influence of educational level on minority exogamy is 
larger. 
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As shown in Chapter 5, men are thus overall less likely to be majority exogamous than 
women, an effect also partly confounded by marital age. Because men tend to marry a bit 
later in life than women, and age at marriage is positively associated with intermarriage of 
both types, holding marital age constant increases the differences between the sexes as to 
whether they marry outside of their group. Thus, the variance between men and women 
shown in Figure 6.1 is larger than that seen in Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.2  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by education and gender. Calculated for immigrants 
living in Oslo. Across-groups means. 
 
Figure 6.3 shows graphs for the probability of intermarriage by education and generation, 
and was generated from the same regression as Figure 6.1. Descendants are shown to be 
more prone to intermarriage with majority Norwegians than immigrants at all educational 
levels. This contrasts with the finding of Chapter 5, and tells us that descendants‟ low age at 
marriage seems to account for the perceived lower intermarriage rates shown there. We also 
see that for descendants, educational level is more important than for immigrants in 
increasing intermarriage rates, and the association is statistically significant at all four levels 
of education for majority exogamy, and at the three highest levels for minority exogamy.  
As was the case with gender, the magnitude of the differences both between immigrants and 
descendants and in the association between educational level and intermarriage for the two 
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groups are significantly reduced with control for marital age. As shown by Figure 6.4, all 
slopes are steeper, but the general differences between immigrants and descendants are 
smaller than that seen among 30-year olds only. The most conspicuous change from the 
model controlling for age is the enormous influence of higher educational levels on the 
probability of majority intermarriage for descendants.  
Figure 6.3  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by education and generation. Calculated for women 
living in Oslo and 30 years old at marriage. Across-groups mean. 
 
We have seen evidence that any account of educational level‟s impact on intermarriage 
should include control of age at marriage, which would indicate that this association has 
been misestimated in some previous research (Jacobs and Labov 2002; Gonzalez-Ferrer 
2006; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006). However, the across-group estimates seen here can 
be dissected further by controlling for the national-origin group variation in the utilized 
independent variables. Previous research relying on models of the type shown in this section 
(e.g. Van Tubergen and Maas 2007; Celikaksoy et al. 2009; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 
2010) seems to assume that the impact of individual-level variables are independent of 
national-origin group. To evaluate this assumption, the strength of estimates should be 
assessed both controlling for national-group variation in the independent variables, and the 
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influence of these independent variables should be evaluated for national-origin groups in 
separate analyses. This task is undertaken in this chapter, with a focus on educational level. 
Figure 6.4  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by education and generation. Calculated for women 
living in Oslo. Across-groups mean. 
 
Thus, the next task of my investigation is to decompose the patterns viewed here in two 
steps: first, I run models comprising all independent variables including national-origin 
group for immigrants and descendants separately, second, I fit the same independent 
variables used in the across-groups estimates of this section for separate national origin 
groups.
6.2 Immigrants 
Table 6.1 presents two sets of multinomial regression analyses of intermarriage, in separate 
models for immigrant men and women. The analyses include five sets of independent 
variables, estimating the impact of national/regional group, educational level, place of 
residence, years since migration and age at marriage. Both models are based on a high 
number of observations. The model fit (Nagelkerke R
2
) is fairly high, largely caused by the 
inclusion of national/regional origin.
47
 Functioning as intercept term are South Americans 
with primary education living outside of Oslo, with between one and two years stay before 
marrying. 
It is obvious that national-origin group accounts for much of the variation in intermarriage 
within the immigrant population. Although the scale of these logit differences between 
groups cannot be compared to the percentages in table 5.1, some remarks should be made. 
The least exogamous groups remain Pakistani women and Vietnamese men, followed by the 
other sexes of both origin groups and Turkish women. Most likely to marry exogamously (of 
both types) are those from North America and Oceania (both sexes). 
The influence of educational level is weakly gradient and positive, with the exception of a 
slight reduction from lower to higher tertiary education on the chances of marrying majority 
Norwegians for men. Obviously, the magnitude of the effects is visibly less pronounced then 
that seen in the previous section (logits ranging from 0.1 to 0.4). This is clearly linked to 
national-group variation in educational level. Comparing Figure 6.5 with Figure 6.1 
illustrates this: showing the average association between educational level and intermarriage 
among immigrants controlled for national-origin group variation in educational level (and 
other independent variables), Figure 6.5 demonstrates that the average within-group 
association between level of education and intermarriage is much lower than that indicated in 
the previous section.  
                                                          
47 Another model fitted in Appendix F (Table F6.4) excludes national-origin as variable, and displays a correspondingly 
low Nagelkerke R 2 of .106 and .139.  
Table 6.1 Multinomial logit estimates of majority and minority intermarriage vs. endogamy.  Immigrants.   
    Men       Women   
  
  Majority    Minority    Majority    Minority    
National/regional group 
        
South America (Ref.) 
        
Pakistan -2,469 *** -1,902 *** -4,576 *** -3,971 *** 
Turkey -1,125 *** -1,539 *** -2,563 *** -2,000 *** 
Vietnam -3,349 *** -2,450 *** -2,582 *** -2,231 *** 
India -1,393 *** -0,818 *** -1,850 *** -1,027 *** 
Other Asian -1,535 *** -0,421 *** -0,125 
ns 
-0,340 ** 
Morocco -0,262 ** -0,984 *** -1,512 *** -0,711 ** 
Other African -0,288 ** 0,032 
ns 
-0,853 *** -0,012 
ns 
Nordic countries 1,435 *** 0,709 *** 1,453 *** 0,740 *** 
Western Europe 1,832 *** 1,428 *** 1,586 *** 1,314 *** 
Eastern Europe -0,394 *** 0,024 
ns 
0,518 *** 0,490 *** 
North America and Oceania 2,034 *** 1,527 *** 2,376 *** 1,800 *** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower secondary 0,146 (*) 0,174 * -0,121 
ns 
-0,101 
ns 
Higher secondary 0,208 ** 0,142 (*) -0,036 
ns 
-0,059 
ns 
Lower tertiary (BA) 0,387 *** 0,266 *** 0,314 *** 0,152 (*) 
Higher tertiary (MA) 0,321 *** 0,440 *** 0,394 ** 0,346 ** 
Unknown -0,052 
ns 
0,164 * -0,130 (*) -0,033 
ns 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo -0,280 *** 0,078 (*) -0,513 *** 0,168 ** 
Unknown -0,555 *** -0,170 ** -0,043 
ns 
-0,048 
ns 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Length of stay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-2 years (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-5 years 0,010 
ns 
-0,092 
ns 
0,019 
ns 
0,067 
ns 
6-9 years -0,223 *** -0,146 * -0,029 
ns 
0,097 
ns 
10-15 years -0,172 ** -0,091 
ns 
0,187 ** 0,435 *** 
16-42 years 0,127 
ns 
0,323 *** 0,717 *** 0,891 *** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age at marriage 0,017 *** 0,010 * 0,051 *** 0,013 ** 
Age at marriage2 -0,006 *** 0,000 * -0,006 *** -0,001 ** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0,160 * -1,284 *** 0,273 ** -1,170 *** 
Chi-square (df) 10188,204 (46)*** 8705,799 (46)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 0,377 0,383 
N 29,680 21,292 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002. 
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The probability of intermarriage increases by 4% from the lowest to the highest educational 
level for women, and correspondingly by 6% for men. Educational level thus has slightly 
more impact on minority exogamy for men than for women, and the gap between those with 
higher and lower education regarding the chances of marrying a majority Norwegian is larger 
for women than for men. However, the big picture emanating from Figure 6.5 is that of 
unexpected continuity across educational levels. Another calculation of probabilities (not 
shown here) displays that the average association between educational level and 
intermarriage is not significantly confounded by age at marriage for immigrants of either sex 
(the difference remains 4% and 6%).    
Figure 6.5  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by educational level. Calculated for Turkish 
immigrants living in Oslo and 30 years old at marriage. 
 
Turning back to Table 6.1, the coefficient for age at marriage is positive and significant for 
all four outcomes, while slightly higher for women than for men in the case of majority 
exogamy. All effects of age at marriage except that for men‟s minority exogamy are 
curvilinear, meaning that the relationship is decreasing by age and eventually changes 
direction (making those marrying at old age less likely to intermarry).  
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A brief comment about the control variables is in order. Both male and female immigrants 
living in Oslo are less likely to intermarry with someone from the majority population than 
those living outside Oslo, but when it comes to minority mixing, living in Oslo slightly 
increases the chances of it occurring (and most clearly so for women). Men marrying after 
more than six years of residence in Norway are actually less likely to marry exogamously, 
but at sixteen years of residency majority exogamy and endogamy are equally likely, while 
minority exogamy has become more likely. For women, having stayed more than ten years 
before matrimony increases the chances of intermarriage, and this association is elevated 
strongly for the group residing at least 16 years before marriage.  
6.3 Descendants 
Table 6.2 fits two models identical with those of Table 6.1, except that the analyses are run 
for descendants only. Unlike the immigrant models, however, a relatively low number of 
observations characterize the descendant groups, making the threshold for statistical 
significance higher. The Nagelkerke R
2
 is comparably high in both models (around 70%). 
The national-origin differences in intermarriage are generally more at variance than those 
between immigrant groups, the most extreme example of which is Vietnamese men (zero 
majority exogamous spouse choices) and Pakistani women (only a handful of which are 
married to majority Norwegian men). For many groups, however, there are no significant 
differences from the reference group of South Americans. Among women, only the five 
particular national-origin groups singled out in this study – Pakistani, Turkish, Indian, 
Vietnamese and Moroccans (plus other Asians in the majority exogamy column) – display 
statistically different chances of intermarriage from that of South Americans.  
Although the magnitude of educational level effects is largely at or even sometimes above 
the strength of those reviewed in the immigrant analyses, few of them are statistically 
significant. Also, the direction and tendency of educational level is not clear cut. For female 
descendants, having a lower tertiary degree increases the chances of being majority 
exogamous, while higher secondary level increases the chances of mixing with other 
descendant groups.  
Table 6.2 Multinomial logit estimates of majority and minority intermarriage vs. endogamy.  Descendants.   
    Men       Women     
  Majority    Minority    Majority    Minority    
National/regional group 
        
South America (Ref.) 
        
Pakistan -3,016 
*** 
-0,229 
ns 
-5,273 
*** 
-3,705 
*** 
Turkey -2,513 
*** 
-0,756 
ns 
-3,899 
*** 
-3,176 
*** 
Vietnam -22,155 
ns 
-0,853 
ns 
-3,155 
*** 
-2,253 
** 
India -2,666 
*** 
-1,068 
ns 
-2,692 
*** 
-1,948 
** 
Other Asian 0,373 
ns 
2,120 
(*) 
-1,295 
* 
-0,419 
ns 
Morocco -1,216 
ns 
0,215 
ns 
-3,684 
*** 
-3,636 
*** 
Other African -0,032 
ns 
2,204 
(*) 
0,224 
ns 
1,221 
ns 
Nordic countries 2,018 
** 
2,534 
* 
0,951 
ns 
0,570 
ns 
Western Europe 2,338 
** 
2,830 
* 
-0,102 
ns 
0,096 
ns 
Eastern Europe 1,008 
ns 
1,998 
(*) 
-0,694 
ns 
-0,182 
ns 
North America and Oceania 1,264 
ns 
-0,003 
ns 
0,835 
ns 
-0,082 
ns 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower secondary -0,331 
ns 
-0,016 
ns 
0,494 
(*) 
0,154 
ns 
Higher secondary 0,283 
ns 
0,191 
ns 
0,443 
(*) 
0,518 
(*) 
Lower tertiary (BA) 0,323 
ns 
0,382 
ns 
0,724 
* 
0,484 
ns 
Higher tertiary (MA) 0,015 
ns 
0,661 
ns 
0,254 
ns 
0,173 
ns 
Unknown -0,814 
(*) 
0,077 
ns 
-0,748 
(*) 
-0,227 
ns 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo -0,968 
*** 
0,028 
ns 
-0,744 
*** 
0,173 
ns 
Unknown 0,675 
** 
0,341 
ns 
1,316 
*** 
0,728 
** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age at marriage 0,176 
*** 
0,131 
*** 
0,207 
*** 
0,109 
*** 
Age at marriage2 -0,007 
** 
-0,005 
(*) 
-0,006 
** 
-0,002 
ns 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0,420 
ns 
-1,977 
(*) 
1,360 
* 
0,116 
ns 
Chi-square (df) 1593,341 (40)*** 2277,451 (40)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 0,684 0,712 
N 1825 2496 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002. 
 Figure 6.6  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by educational level. Calculated for Turkish 
descendants living in Oslo and 27 years old at marriage. 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the average association between educational attainment and intermarriage 
probabilities for descendants, illustrated by the Turkish national-origin group. First, 
comparing Figures 6.5 and 6.6 shows that the differences in intermarriage probabilities 
between the generations of Turkish origin are small at all educational levels, with the highest 
difference at lower tertiary level for women (7% chance of majority intermarriage for 
immigrants, 15% chance for descendants).  
Although endogamy is highly probable at all levels of education, there is a slight positive 
association with majority intermarriage shown until lower tertiary education (from 8 to 15% 
probability). Again, however, the overall interpretation of the pillars above is one of relative 
continuity: there is much less variation between the educational levels in terms of 
intermarriage probability than that expected from the results of the first section in this 
chapter. Opposed to the case of immigrants, this seems to be related to age at marriage. In the 
model run without this control, the probability of majority intermarriage increases from 3% 
at primary education to 13% at the highest educational level for Turkish female descendants 
(calculations based on Table A6.4 in Appendix A).  
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Although most coefficients for educational level (except BA degree for women‟s majority 
exogamy) are non-significant for descendants in the full model, the magnitude of this factor 
is thus slightly larger for descendants than immigrants, and particularly so in both the model 
without national-group control and that without age at marriage (see Appendix B). At the 
same time, we see that age at marriage has multiple times the effect on intermarriage for 
descendants compared to immigrants. All coefficients display a higher chance of 
intermarriage (and particularly majority exogamy) for those older than the mean at marriage, 
with the curvilinear term suggesting that there is a tipping point at which age at marriage 
promotes endogamy. One reason for this could be selection. As motioned above, the 
demographic selection of descendants in Norway as of 2002 is highly specific: a low 
percentage of this group has married, and those who have married are naturally younger and 
less educated than the expected mean of this generation. 
Table 6.2 also tells us that the negative impact on the probability of majority intermarriage of 
Oslo-residency is higher for descendants than for immigrants. For both men and women the 
effect of residency on minority exogamy is negligible (as with immigrants), and statistically 
non-significant. 
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6.4 Six national-origin groups 
So far, the analyses have displayed estimates assuming that the differences in intermarriage 
probability according to all independent variables are constant across national-origin groups. 
To disclose some of the between-group variation in the influence of these variables, Table 
6.3 exhibits results from six separate models of intermarriage influences for individuals from 
Pakistan, Vietnam, Turkey, India and Morocco and Denmark.
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48 The statistical significance of differences in the influence of educational level between both men and women, and 
descendants and immigrants, has been checked with interaction terms in a model not shown here (i.e. a model similar to 
that in A6.1 but controlling for national-origin group variation). The results show that estimates at all educational levels are 
significantly different at p>0.05 level or lower. However, among descendants, the impact of educational level differences on 
the probability of intermarriage was only significantly different between men and women at lower secondary level (p>0.05) 
and lower tertiary level (p>0.1) for majority intermarriage. Also, differences between generations when it comes to the 
probability of intermarriage were non-significant. SPSS outputs can be retrieved at request. 
49 As is seen in the table (next page), educational level is operationalized on three levels (plus missing) only, because of 
troubles with non-significance for some of the groups at the five-level definition. This points to the vulnerability of logistic 
regressions (and particularly multinomial versions) towards low-N samples. 
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Below, Figure 6.7 displays differences in the impact of educational level on the probability 
of intermarriage, illustrated by female immigrants. This confirms the suspicion that 
independent variables not only are heterogeneously distributed across national-origin groups, 
but their relative importance for intermarriage differs significantly as well. 
Figure 6.7  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by educational level for 6 national-origin groups. 
Calculated for female immigrants living in Oslo, at the group specific mean age of marriage. 
 
Increase in educational attainment is associated with the likelihood of majority exogamy for 
female immigrants of all groups except Denmark. The relationship is, however, varying in 
strength between the groups: Vietnamese raise their predicted probability form 9 to 15%, the 
Turkish from 8 to 17%, and the Indians from 22 to 28% - while Pakistanis and Moroccans 
display only a slight increase from primary to higher educational level.
Table 6.3 Multinomial logit models of majority and minority intermarriage vs. endogamy. 5 national groups.               
        
Model   Pakistan 
   
Vietnam 
   
Turkey 
   
India 
   
Morocco 
   
Denmark 
 
  
  Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   
Educational level 
  
  
  
 
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Primary 
  
 
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Secondary 0,694 
* 
0,049 
ns 
0,731 
* 
0,194 
ns 
0,665 
** 
0,322 
ns 
0,794 
* 
0,320 
ns 
0,577 
** 
-0,015 
ns 
0,193 
ns 
0,632 
* 
Higher 0,813 
* 
0,424 
ns 
1,273 
*** 
0,199 
ns 
1,677 
*** 
1,585 
*** 
1,089 
** 
0,359 
ns 
0,847 
*** 
0,377 
ns 
-0,072 
ns 
0,391 
ns 
Unknown 0,032 
ns 
-0,274 
ns 
0,552 
ns 
-0,093 
ns 
0,985 
*** 
-0,027 
ns 
0,587 
ns 
0,334 
ns 
0,394 
* 
-0,066 
ns 
-0,836 
*** 
-0,128 
ns 
  
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   Place of residence 
 
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Outside Oslo  
 
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Oslo -0,974 
*** 
-0,477 
* 
-0,359 
ns 
0,352 
ns 
-0,416 
* 
0,280 
ns 
-0,396 
* 
0,738 
** 
-1,035 
*** 
-0,783 
*** 
0,237 
ns 
0,753 
*** 
Unknown -0,996 
*** 
-1,117 
*** 
0,397 
(*) 
0,239 
ns 
-0,411 
* 
-0,028 
ns 
-0,840 
*** 
0,457 
(*) 
-1,850 
*** 
-1,388 
*** 
-0,493 
*** 
0,076 
ns 
  
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Male 1,239 
*** 
1,315 
*** 
-1,273 
*** 
-0,577 
** 
0,778 
*** 
-0,070 
ns 
-0,013 
ns 
-0,205 
ns 
0,975 
*** 
-0,625 
** 
-0,087 
ns 
0,033 
ns 
  
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Descendant -0,384 
ns 
0,358 
(*) 
1,019 
** 
1,341 
** 
0,023 
ns 
0,152 
ns 
-0,291 
ns 
-0,017 
ns 
-1,236 
** 
-0,615 
ns 
0,772 
*** 
0,797 
*** 
  
                            
Age at marriage 0,143 
*** 
0,015 
ns 
0,084 
*** 
0,044 
* 
0,239 
*** 
0,112 
*** 
-0,026 
ns 
-0,012 
ns 
-0,018 
ns 
0,032 
* 
-0,043 
*** 
-0,001 
ns 
Age at marriage
2
 -0,011 
*** 
0,000 
ns 
-0,006 
** 
-0,002 
ns 
-0,013 
*** 
-0,003 
* 
-0,002 
ns 
0,002 
** 
-0,010 
*** 
-0,007 
*** 
-0,001 
ns 
0,004 
*** 
  
 
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
Intercept -3,728 
*** 
-3.751 
*** 
-2,935 
*** 
-3,290 
*** 
-3,026 
*** 
-3,253 
*** 
-1,918 
*** 
-2,695 
*** 
-0,711 
* 
-0,492 
*** 
1,995 
*** 
-0,907 
*** 
Chi-square (df) 241,641 (18) 102,699 (18) 495,216 (18) 65,641 (18) 355,284 (18) 348,555 (18) 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0,107 0,063 0,248 0,053 0,247 0,11 
N 5080 3423 2912 1608 1649 3953 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.                           
Further, all descendant groups except India and Denmark display significant differences 
between the sexes regarding the chances of intermarriage, and for Turks there is only 
dissimilarity when it comes to majority exogamy. While men from Pakistan, Turkey and 
Morocco are more likely to intermarry with a majority Norwegian than their female co-
nationals, Vietnam displays the contrary pattern. Remarkably, Moroccan women are more 
likely to mix with other minority groups than men. 
Differences between generations within these groups are also at variance. While Vietnamese 
and Danish descendants show significantly higher probability of out-group marriage with 
majority Norwegians, the only other significant difference is that Moroccan descendants are 
less likely to intermarry than their parental generation. Figure 6.8 shows the probability 
differences between descendants and immigrants of all six groups. Vietnamese female 
descendants at primary educational level have a 11% probability of majority intermarriage, 
against 4% chance among Vietnamese female immigrants at the same educational level. 
Figure 6.8  
Predicted probability of intermarriage by generation for 6 national-origin groups. Calculated 
for women living in Oslo with primary education, at the group specific mean age of marriage. 
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Moroccan female descendants with primary education display the probability of 9% for 
majority intermarriage, but female immigrants from Morocco with the same educational 
attainment are much more likely to intermarry with majority Norwegians, showing a 23% 
chance. 
Lastly, Table 6.3 illustrates that living in Oslo before marrying contributes negatively to the 
probability of majority intermarriage for all groups – with the exception of Danes.  Its impact 
on minority mixing is diverse: For Indians and Danes, living in Oslo significantly increases 
the chances of wedding an immigrant or descendant (and non-significantly so for Turks and 
Vietnamese) of another national-origin group, while the exact opposite holds for Pakistanis 
and Moroccans.  
6.5 Summary 
How does educational level, gender, generation and age at marriage influence the probability 
of intermarriage? This chapter presents results from several different models and analyses 
showing the significance of several individual-level influences of intermarriage.  
First, it was shown that there is a strong association between educational level and 
intermarriage across national-origin groups. While higher educational attainment before 
marriage increases the probability of intermarriage for both male and female immigrants, its 
importance is greater for women, and particularly if analyzed at all ages of marriage. 
Similarly, differences between the educational levels are larger for descendants than for 
immigrants – but smaller when controlling for marital age. It was shown that descendants‟ 
probability of intermarriage is higher than that of immigrants, controlling for age and 
educational level at marriage. 
Second, it was revealed that the average increase in intermarriage from the lowest to the 
highest educational level, controlling for variation between national-origin groups, is much 
lower than that indicated by the first models. For descendants, age at marriage was shown to 
influence the probability estimates of education and intermarriage, such that the increased 
chance of majority exogamy from lower to higher level of education was suppressed by 
holding age constant. The analyses also confirmed that for descendants, educational level 
increases women‟s probability of intermarriage more than that of men – while for 
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immigrants, men‟s increase is slightly higher than that of women. Higher age at marriage 
was shown to increase the chances of marrying both a majority Norwegian and another 
minority for both immigrants and descendants, although there is a weak reduction of this 
association with increased age. 
Third, the chapter reported results from separate models of six national-origin groups. While 
education has a clear positive bearing on the intermarriage rates of individuals from 
Vietnam, Turkey and India, and a minimal increase for Pakistanis and Moroccans, the same 
relationship is negative for Danes. Similarly, while descendants from Vietnam are more 
prone to marry a majority Norwegian than Vietnamese immigrants, the opposite is seen in 
the case of Moroccans and Indians. 
The probability of intermarrying with majority Norwegians has been shown to differ between 
educational levels, genders and generations – but a crucial lesson of this chapter is the 
importance of accounting for national-origin group variation and age at marriage when 
assessing the importance of the former factors. The next chapter follows a similar design, 
and seeks to establish what influence these same individual-level variables have on the 
probability of importing a spouse. 
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7. Spouse import and its correlates 
This chapter presents analyses of the relationship between educational level, generation, sex, 
place of residence, years since migration, age at marriage – and the probability of importing a 
spouse for those who marry endogamously, following a structural pattern akin to that of 
Chapter 6.  
7.1 Effects across all groups 
As in Chapter 6, the first analyses of spouse import estimate effects across all national-origin 
groups for both generations and both sexes. A table reporting the logit estimates of these 
analyses is included in Appendix B (Table B7.1), but some of the results are shown in 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The estimates presented by both these figures are controlled for all my 
independent variables except national-origin group.  
Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between educational level and the probability of spouse 
import among endogamous immigrants living in Oslo, for men and women. The estimates 
are specified for those at the mean age of marriage for endogamous immigrants, 29 years. 
There is a clear negative relationship between educational attainment before marriage and the 
probability of importing a spouse. For both men and women, the likelihood of spouse import 
is reduced by 15% points from the lowest to the highest educational level. However, because 
female immigrants are much less likely to import than men overall, their probability is 
almost halved by the gap in educational attainment, from 33% at the lowest level to 18% at 
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the highest level. There is deviance from the gradient trend in that for both men and women, 
going from higher secondary to lower tertiary education slightly increases the probability of 
import – and for women, there is no difference between having primary and uncompleted 
secondary education.  
Figure 7.1           Figure 7.2 
Predicted probability of spouse import by educational level, for endogamous immigrants living 
in Oslo (Left: 28 years at marriage, Right: across all marital ages.) Across-groups means. 
  
The overall impact of educational level is the same for men and women, but the descent in 
probability from lower to higher tertiary level is higher for women than for men. As seen in 
the corresponding analyses of intermarriage, the strength of both gender differences, 
educational attainment differences and educational impact differences between men and 
women depend on whether age at marriage is controlled for. The models on which all figures 
in this section are based (Appendix Table B7.1) shows that age at marriage is negatively 
related to spouse import, and that controlling for age increases gender differences but 
decreases educational level differences. 
Figure 7.2 displays the probability of spouse import for all endogamous immigrants living in 
Oslo, by educational level and gender, and illustrates that the influence of educational level 
is stronger across ages than that seen at the mean age of marriage. For men, the probability of 
spouse import descends from 71 to 48% at the highest educational attainment. In this 
analysis, the influence of higher educational level is significantly lower for men than for 
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women – and the probability of spouse import for female immigrants falls from 25 to 14% 
from lower tertiary to higher tertiary education. 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the association between educational level and spouse import for female 
immigrants and descendants separately. We see that female descendants are much more 
likely to import spouses than female immigrants at the lower educational levels, with a 33% 
chance for immigrants and a 53% chance for descendants at primary educational attainment. 
However, these differences are reduced almost to the extent of elimination at the higher 
educational levels: at higher tertiary education, female immigrants have 18% probability of 
spouse import, while that of female descendants is 21%.  
Figure 7.3           Figure 7.4 
Predicted probability of spouse import by educational level, for endogamous women living in 
Oslo (Left: 28 years at marriage, Right: across all marital ages.) Across-groups means. 
  
In Figure 7.4 the same relationships are depicted for women across all ages at marriage. Both 
the estimates of educational level and generational differences are bigger than that seen at the 
mean age of marriage – and particularly so for descendants. The probability of spouse import 
for female descendants at all ages plunges from 73% at primary education to 24% at higher 
tertiary education. We know that the married descendants by 2002 have a lower mean age at 
marriage than immigrants. Compared to immigrants marrying at the same age, the gap 
between the two generations is therefore smaller (7.3) than that seen across ages (7.4). 
7.2 Immigrants 
7.2.1 Men 
I start by scrutinizing men‟s spouse import variations (Table 7.1). First off, we see by the 
Nagelkerke R
2 
that the increase in model fit is steady (albeit only 5% in total). National-
origin accounts for 19% of variation in model 1,  and we see that its estimates vary greatly – 
from those who are most prone to spouse import (Pakistan) to those least inclined to it (those 
from the Nordic countries). Remarkably, immigrants from all regions except the Nordic 
countries are more inclined towards spouse import than domestic endogamy. The stepwise 
introduction of other regressors involves a change of some (but far from all) national-origin 
estimates, most visibly in the full model. 
Figure 7.5           
Probability of spouse import by educational level. Calculated for endogamous male 
immigrants from Turkey living in Oslo.  
The influence of educational level is 
significantly lower than in the model 
without national-origin group variation 
held constant. Also, both the strength of 
estimates is reduced when age at marriage 
is held constant. Figure 7.5 illustrates this 
for male Turkish immigrants, and shows 
that the confounding effects of age at 
marriage on educational level differences 
are smaller than at the across-group level. 
Table 7.1 Binomial logit models of spouse import among endogamous immigrants. Men.     
              
  
Model 1   2   3   4   
         National/regional group 
        South America (Ref.) 
        Pakistan 2,407 *** 2,255 *** 2,320 *** 2,123 *** 
Turkey 2,060 *** 1,954 *** 1,979 *** 1,745 *** 
Vietnam 0,295 *** 0,298 ** 0,312 *** 0,135 ** 
India 2,173 *** 2,088 *** 2,139 *** 2,020 *** 
Other Asian 1,151 *** 1,274 *** 1,258 *** 1,206 *** 
Morocco 2,190 *** 2,206 *** 2,236 *** 2,200 *** 
Other African 0,939 *** 1,048 *** 1,071 *** 1,073 *** 
Nordic countries -1,158 *** -1,380 *** -1,326 *** -1,365 *** 
Western Europe 0,508 *** 0,279 * 0,352 ns 0,332 ns 
Eastern Europe 0,722 *** 0,806 *** 0,826 *** 0,763 *** 
North America and Oceania 0,903 ** 0,681 ** 0,722 ns 0,675 ns 
 
 
 
   
 
  Educational level 
     
 
  Primary (Ref.) 
     
 
  Lower secondary 
 
0,029 ns -0,013 ns -0,024 ns 
Higher secondary 
 
 -0,167 * -0,205 ** -0,204 ** 
Lower tertiary (BA) 
 
 -0,271 *** -0,278 *** -0,201 ** 
Higher tertiary (MA) 
 
 -0,378 *** -0,350 ** -0,232 * 
Unknown 
 
 -0,068 ns -0,024 ns 0,015 ns 
         Place of residence 
        Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
        Oslo 
 
-0,199 *** -0,204 *** -0,207 *** 
Unknown 
 
 0,635 *** 0,659 *** 0,601 *** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Length of stay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1-2 years (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3-5 years 
   
 -0,066 *** -0,015 ns 
6-9 years 
   
 0,347 * 0,449 *** 
10-15 years 
 
 
  
0,303 *** 0,508 *** 
16-42 years 
    
-0,393 *** 0,040 ns 
 
      
 
          Age at marriage 
   
-0,038 *** 
Age at marriage2 
 
 
 
 
 
 0,000 ns 
  
 
 
 
   
 Intercept -0,530 *** -0,572 *** -0,715 *** -0,748 *** 
−2LL (df ) 19383,558 (11) 
 
18381,610 (18) 
 
18210,048 (22) 
 
18047,175 (24) 
 Nagelkerke R2 0,197 
 
0,226 
 
0,237 
 
0,249 
 N 16,803   16,803   16,803   16,803   
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.   
 Table 7.2 Binomial logit models of spouse import among endogamous immigrants. Women.     
              
  
Model 1   2   3   4   
         National/regional group 
        South America (Ref.) 
        Pakistan 2,089 *** 2,092 *** 2,159 *** 1,719 *** 
Turkey 2,157 *** 2,146 *** 2,192 *** 1,631 *** 
Vietnam -0,802 *** -0,923 *** -0,886 *** -1,201 *** 
India 1,646 *** 1,635 *** 1,701 *** 1,582 *** 
Other Asian 0,155 ns 0,264 ** 0,361 ** 0,218 ns 
Morocco 1,698 *** 1,694 *** 1,788 *** 1,501 *** 
Other African -0,274 (*) -0,225 ns -0,115 ns -0,165 ns 
Nordic countries -0,806 *** -0,932 *** -0,789 *** -0,775 *** 
Western Europe -0,629 * -0,576 ns -0,431 ns -0,423 ns 
Eastern Europe 0,243 (*) 0,390 *** 0,509 *** 0,251 ns 
North America and Oceania 0,599 * 0,596 * 0,603 * 0,588 (*) 
         Educational level 
        Primary (Ref.) 
        Lower secondary 
 
0,057 ns 0,020 ns 0,052 ns 
Higher secondary 
 
 -0,353 *** -0,381 *** -0,187 (*) 
Lower tertiary (BA) 
 
 -0,343 *** -0,327 ** 0,082 ns 
Higher tertiary (MA) 
 
 -1,001 *** -0,920 *** -0,291 ns 
Unknown 
 
 -0,584 *** -0,423 *** -0,198 (*) 
         Place of residence 
        Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
        Oslo 
 
0,017 ns -0,019 ns 0,061 ns 
Unknown 
 
 0,531 *** 0,659 *** 0,481 *** 
  
 
 
     Length of stay 
 
 
 
     1-2 years (Ref.) 
 
 
 
     3-5 years 
   
 
0,074 ns 0,201 (*) 
6-9 years 
   
 
0,571 *** 0,764 *** 
10-15 years 
 
 
  
0,711 *** 1,034 *** 
16-42 years 
    
-0,180 ns 0,492 ** 
 
        Age at marriage 
   
-0,101 *** 
Age at marriage2 
 
 
 
 
 
 0,005 *** 
  
 
 
 
    
Intercept -1,270 *** -1,122 *** -1,590 *** -1,947 *** 
−2LL (df ) 9031,433 (11) 
 
8282,575 (18) 
 
8170,097 (21) 
 
7814,140 (24) 
 Nagelkerke R2 0,272 
 
0,308 
 
0,322 
 
0,369 
 N 8737   8737   8737   8737   
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002. 
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Endogamous male immigrants from Turkey with higher tertiary education living in Oslo are 
69% likely to import a spouse (compared to their peers with only primary education at 77%).  
However, at the mean age of male endogamous immigrants, members of the same group 
have a 63% chance of spouse import, against the 69% chance of those at primary education 
level.  
7.2.2 Women 
In the spouse import analyses of female immigrants (Table 7.2), there is a non-trivial 
increase in model fit shown by the Nagelkerke R
2
 measure. Both the magnitude and increase 
is higher than for men, indicating that national-origin accounts for 27% of the 37% total 
variation accounted for in the full model (4). As seen in Chapter 5, between-group variation 
for women is much more noticeable than that of men. Here, several groups display 
inclination towards domestic endogamy rather than spouse import. The stepwise introduction 
of other regressors involves a visible reduction of national-origin estimates in the full model. 
Pakistani and Turkish immigrants are much more prone to spouse import than Moroccans 
and Indians before entering age at marriage in the model, but holding this characteristic 
constant makes the differences between these national-origin groups much smaller, clearly 
caused by the very young average age at marriage among immigrant women from Pakistan 
and Turkey (as seen in the descriptive statistics of Table 5.6).  
Figure 7.6           
Predicted probability of spouse import by educational level. Calculated for endogamous 
female immigrants from Turkey living in Oslo.  
The effect of educational level is negative 
and largely gradient in models 2 and 3 
(where the effect of an MA degree is 
significantly higher than for men), but 
most coefficients are rendered non-
significant in the full model. Figure 7.6 
illustrates the differences in spouse import 
probability associated with educational 
attainment, comparing this relationship at 
constant age at marriage (the mean for 
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endogamous female immigrants) and across all ages for Turkish women. Comparing this 
figure with Figure 7.5 confirms that among immigrants, educational differences mean more 
to women than to men when it comes to spouse import probability. However, the relationship 
is highly intertwined with age at marriage, and more so here than for men. While the chances 
of spouse import drops from 71% to 50% from the lowest to the highest educational level 
across all ages, the corresponding difference between those marrying at 27 years is 41% to 
36%. Albeit this is still a reduction, the magnitude of the age control here compared to in the 
analysis of men speaks to the systematically lower ages at which women marry than men. 
A brief comment on the control variables of Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is pertinent. Living in Oslo is 
negatively associated with spouse import for men, but has no impact on spouse import for 
female immigrants. Estimates for length of stay display a curvilinear relationship for both 
genders: the least likely to import a spouse among immigrants of both genders are those who 
have stayed only briefly (under 5 years) and those who have stayed more than 16 years. The 
effects of 6-15 years of stay seems to be slightly suppressed by the fact that those who stay 
long before marrying also get older before marrying, and the latter is negatively associated 
with spouse import. However, this also reduces the effect of the 16+ years since migration 
coefficients, as members of this category belong to the upper echelons of age at marriage.  
7.3 Descendants 
7.3.1 Men 
Table 7.3 shows analyses of spouse import among male descendants. This is the smallest 
subgroup for which separate analyses are performed in this thesis (N = 880). The model fit 
improvement is higher than for both male and female immigrants (Nagelkerke R
2
 from 6% to 
18%). However, due to the low number of observations and rising standard errors, few of the 
estimates in the final model are statistically significant (even at the 10 percent level). 
The variation among national-origin groups is condensed visibly in the full model (model 3). 
In particular, it should be noted that the coefficients for Pakistan and Turkey are much 
reduced in the last model, signalling that these groups have low average ages at marriage. 
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Without controlling for age at marriage, educational level has a forceful and gradient 
negative impact on the chance of spouse import. In the model with age at marriage, however, 
all education level estimates are rendered statistically non-significant. Place of residence has 
negligible and non-significant effects (except that unknown residence without control for 
marital age increases the chance of importing a spouse). Age at marriage, on the other hand, 
has a prominent negative effect, with a significant curvilinear term. Thus, age at marriage 
decreases the chances of spouse import among the endogamous male descendants, but this 
relationship turns with age.  
Figure 7.7           
Predicted probability of spouse import by educational level. Calculated for endogamous male 
Turkish descendants living in Oslo.  
Figure 7.7 plots the relationship between 
education and spouse import for male 
Turkish descendants. It tells us that there is a 
drop from 83% chance of spouse import at 
primary education to 51% chance at higher 
tertiary education across all ages of marriage. 
The corresponding difference at the mean age 
of marriage is that of 78% against 48%, 
which indicates that controlling for age at 
marriage does not significantly reduce the 
effect of educational level on spouse import 
probability for male descendants.  
This should be compared, first, with the tendency viewed among male immigrants – for 
which educational level had little influence on the probability of spouse import, but who also 
saw little influence of age at marriage on this relationship. Second, we saw in the first section 
that both with and without control for age at marriage, educational level influenced spouse 
import propensities among descendants much more than among immigrants (illustrated by 
women, but this also holds for men). 
 
 
Table 7.3 Binomial logit models of spouse import among endogamous descendants. Men.   
              
Model 1   2   3   
       National/regional group 
      All other (Ref). 
      Pakistan 0,755 ** 0,828 *** 0,391 ns 
Turkey 1,043 *** 1,118 *** 0,544 ns 
Vietnam -0,633 ** -0,476 ns -0,889 * 
India 1,653 *** 1,878 *** 1,560 ** 
Morocco 1,080 (*) 1,083 (*) 0,834 ns 
       
       Educational level 
      Primary (Ref.) 
      Lower secondary 
 
-0,081 ns 0,087 ns 
Higher secondary 
 
 -0,210 ns 0,169 ns 
Lower tertiary (BA) 
 
 -0,963 ** -0,168 ns 
Higher tertiary (MA) 
 
 -1,594 * -0,661 ns 
Unknown 
 
 -0,052 ns -0,005 ns 
       Place of residence 
      Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
      Oslo 
 
-0,066 ns -0,090 ns 
Unknown 
 
 0,667 (*) 0,203 ns 
       Age at marriage 
 
 
 
-0,213 *** 
Age at marriage2 
 
 
 
 0,006 * 
  
 
 
 
  
Intercept 0,478 * 0,598 * 0,808 * 
−2LL (df ) 934,530 (5) 
 
900,618 (12) 
 
851,048 (14) 
 Nagelkerke R2 0,065 
 
0,100 
 
0,178 
 N 880   880   880   
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.   
 
7.3.2 Women 
Table 7.5 shows analyses of spouse import among female descendants. As with immigrants, 
the Nagelkerke R
2
 is generally higher than that of men, but the increase in model fit from 
model 1 to 3 is lower than in table 7.4. As in the former analysis, however, only national-
origin group estimates and age at marriage are statistically significant in the final model.  
Educational level and place of residence actually slightly enlarge the estimates of national-
origin group, indicating that while these groups (except Vietnam) are generally more prone 
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to import than others, comparing their spouse import rates with the population mean at the 
same educational level and residential area further accentuates their inclinations towards 
finding a spouse in the country of origin. Opposed to this, age at marriage significantly 
lowers the national-origin estimates, suggesting that these groups are younger than average at 
marriage (which in itself is an indicator of higher spouse import probability).  
We observe a gradient negative effect in the coefficients for educational level for model 2, a 
tendency largely nullified and made non-significant by age at marriage in model 3. As 
signalled, age at marriage is negatively related to the chances of importing a spouse, with a 
Table 7.4 Binomial logit models of spouse import among endogamous descendants. Women.   
              
Model 1   2   3   
       National/regional group 
        All other (Ref). 
      Pakistan  0,846 *** 1,031 ** 0,751 ** 
Turkey 0,936 
*** 
1,017 
* 
0,592 
* 
Vietnam  -1,867 *** -1,668 ** -2,013 *** 
India 0,513 
(*) 
0,797 
*** 
0,577 
ns 
Morocco 0,781 
* 
0,922 
* 
0,598 
(*) 
       Educational level 
      
Primary (Ref.) 
      Lower secondary 
 
-0,057 ns 0,021 ns 
Higher secondary 
 
 
-0,361 
(*) 
-0,111 
ns 
Lower tertiary (BA) 
 
 -0,926 *** -0,211 ns 
Higher tertiary (MA) 
 
 -1,241 * -0,004 ns 
Unknown 
 
 -0,342 ns -0,323 ns 
       Place of residence 
      Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
      Oslo 
 
-0,193 ns -0,188 ns 
Unknown 
 
 
0,289 
ns 
0,192 
ns 
       Age at marriage 
 
 
 
-0,135 *** 
Age at marriage2 
 
 
 
 
-0,008 
ns 
       
Intercept 0,393 
* 
0,552 
* 
0,796 
** 
−2LL (df ) 1400,338 (5) 
 
1312,449 (12) 
 
1262,510 (14) 
 Nagelkerke R2 0,108 
 
0,144 
 
0,196 
 N 1281   1281   1281   
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.   
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statistically non-significant negative curvilinear term. 
Figure 7.8           
Predicted probability of spouse import by educational level. Calculated for endogamous 
female Turkish descendants living in Oslo.  
Figure 7.8 shows the magnitude of 
educational level‟s impact on probabilities 
of spouse import for female Turkish 
descendants, with and without control for 
marital age. As was the case for female 
immigrants, the confounding effect of age 
at marriage is more forceful than for their 
male peers. Turkish female descendants 
across marital ages reduce their probability 
of importing a spouse from 80% at the 
lowest educational level to 53% at the 
highest educational level – but at the marital age of 28 years, the only non-negligible 
difference according to educational attainment is a 4% decrease from primary to lower 
tertiary level.
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7.4 Five national-origin groups 
All binomial models in this chapter so far have bracketed potential between-group 
differences in the role that education, gender, generation and other regressors play in 
choosing to import a spouse. To disclose some of the group variation for these variables, 
                                                          
50 As in Chapter 6, the statistical significance of differences in the influence of educational level between both men and 
women, and descendants and immigrants, has been checked with interaction terms in a model not shown here (i.e. a model 
similar to that in A7.1 but controlling for national-origin group variation). The results show that gender differences in the 
impact of educational level are non-significant, but that the differences related to educational level between immigrants and 
descendants are significantly different at lower tertiary educational attainment (p>0.05). Among descendants, gender 
differences in the impact of educational level differences on the probability of spouse import were non-significant, which is 
probably due to the low number of observations (as the difference is rather large controlling for age at marriage). However, 
differences between generations when it comes to spouse import were all statistically significant (p>0.05 or lower). Again, 
SPSS outputs can be retrieved at request. 
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Table 7.5 exhibits results from five separate analyses of spouse import influences for 
individuals from Pakistan, Vietnam, Turkey, India, and Morocco.
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Figure 7.9  
Predicted probability of spouse import by educational level. Calculated for female descendants 
from 5 national-origin groups, living in Oslo and at the group specific mean age of marriage.  
 
The last section of Chapter 6 demonstrated that educational level negatively influenced the 
intermarriage rates of Moroccans, while it positively influenced the intermarriage rates of 
Vietnamese and Turks. Figure 7.5 shows that the role of educational differences also impacts 
differently on the spouse import propensities of different national-origin groups, controlling 
for age at marriage. Female endogamous Moroccan descendants with primary education have 
a 70% chance of being spouse importers, while those with higher educational attainment are 
56% likely to import a spouse. The corresponding drop among the Vietnamese is 19% to 6%. 
For the three other groups, educational level has negligible influence on the propensity to 
import a spouse.  
 
 
                                                          
51 The reason I have not included a “western” reference group here (like Denmark in the intermarriage analyses) is that no 
such group exists where the size of both generations is adequate for analysis with this many degrees of freedom. 
Table 7.5 Binomial logit estimates of spouse import. Five national-origin groups.           
  Vietnam   Pakistan   Turkey   India   Morocco   
Educational level 
          Primary (Ref.) 
          Secondary -0,008 ns 0,153 ns -0,080 ns -0,259 ns -0,122 ns 
Higher  -1,281 *** 0,110 ns -0,043 ns -0,046 ns -0,570 (*) 
Unknown -0,090 ns -0,080 ns -0,327 * -0,392 ns -0,366 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo 0,054 ns -0,405 *** -0,145 ns -0,622 ** -0,815 *** 
Unknown -0,592 *** 1,103 *** 0,373 * 0,329 ns 0,395 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male 1,826 *** 0,842 *** 1,049 *** 1,436 *** 1,392 *** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descendant 0,326 ns -0,308 ** -0,296 * -0,009 ns 0,603 (*) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age at marriage 0,017 (*) -0,114 *** -0,169 *** -0,097 *** -0,036 * 
Age at marriage2 0,001 ns 0,002 *** 0,005 *** 0,002 * -0,001 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -1,842 *** 0,917 *** 0,798 ns 0,593 * 1,042 *** 
−2LL (df ) 3297,761 (9) 
 
4011,433 (9) 
 
2084,942 (9) 
 
1094,060 
(9)  
936,835 
(9)  
Nagelkerke R2 0,219 
 
0,145 
 
0,195 
 
0,192 
 
0,189 
 
N 3158   4729   2436   1205   1065   
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.     
 
Table 7.5 includes a couple of variables not illustrated in figures. It indicates that living in 
Oslo is associated with less probability of importing a spouse for Pakistanis, Indians and 
Moroccans, but has no statistically significant effect on either Turks or Vietnamese. In all 
five groups, men are significantly more likely to import than women, but the difference is 
most pronounced for Vietnamese and least palpable among the Pakistanis. Finally, age at 
marriage impacts negatively on the chances of spouse import for all groups except the 
Vietnamese, who actually tend to import more as they get older. For Pakistanis, Turks and 
Indians the effect is positively curvilinear, implying that older age at one point stops 
decreasing the chances of spouse import for these groups. 
The across-group tendency seen in previous sections was that endogamous descendants tend 
to be more prone to spouse import than endogamous immigrants. Figure 7.10 indicates that 
this also depends on the national-origin group. While Moroccan and Vietnamese female 
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descendants are more likely to be spouse importers than immigrant women from the same 
groups, the opposite is true of those from Turkey and Pakistan (both 7% points lower 
probability than immigrants).  
Figure 7.10  
Predicted probability of spouse import by generation. Calculated for women from 5 national-
origin groups, living in Oslo and at the group specific mean age of marriage.  
 
7.5 Summary 
Are there differences among the endogamous that may help explain why some of them have 
chosen to import a spouse, while others have not? This chapter presents results from 
different models and analyses showing the significance of several individual-level influences 
of spouse import.  
First, it was shown that the average trend across groups is that descendants are more likely to 
import spouses if endogamous, controlled for educational level and age at marriage. There is 
also a clear negative association between educational level and spouse import for men and 
women among both immigrants and descendants. My analyses indicated that higher 
educational attainment before marriage decreases the probability of spouse import for 
descendants more than for immigrants, and slightly more for women than for men. Similarly, 
age at marriage confounds the relationship between educational level and spouse import 
probability more for women than for men – and particularly among female descendants, 
whose average age at marriage is very low. 
Second, I introduced control for national-origin group variation in the regressors. It was 
revealed that for male immigrants, much of the across-group relationship between 
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educational level and spouse import is probably due to between-group variation in 
educational attainment. However, the average controlled association between level of 
education and spouse import for female immigrants was shown to be clearly negative, 
although this relationship is clearly confounded by age at marriage. Further, we saw that for 
male descendants, educational level has a large negative association with the probability of 
spouse import, largely unrelated to age at marriage. For female descendants, controlling for 
age at marriage eliminates sizeable differences between educational levels across all ages. 
Third, the results from separate models of five national-origin groups again displayed 
diversity in the importance of regressors. It was revealed that Moroccans and Vietnamese are 
less likely to import the higher their educational level, while the other three national groups 
displayed no significant differences according to educational attainment. However, while 
female descendants from Vietnam and Morocco are more likely to import than female 
immigrants from the same countries, those with Turkish and Pakistani background display 
less propensity of finding a spouse in their country of origin than women from their parental 
generation. 
In Chapter 6, I assessed the influence of national-origin group, educational level, generation, 
gender and age at marriage on the probability of intermarriage. In this chapter we have seen a 
similar implementation of models on the probability of spouse import among the 
endogamous. The result is a series of statistical relationships between factors that convey 
information about individuals from before they got married, and the outcome of their spouse 
selection. Are these findings in line with the empirical expectations generated in the 
theoretical section? What mechanisms are more likely to be at work here? The next chapter 
seeks to integrate the empirical discoveries in the last three chapters with previous research 
and theory, in a conclusion about the influences of intermarriage and spouse import in 
Norway.
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8. Summary and discussion 
This study offers the first multivariate analyses of the spouse selection of the immigrant 
population in Norway. Chapter 5 presented contingency tables of national-origin group and 
spouse selection outcome, describing the patterns of intermarriage and spouse import. 
Through modeling the impact of several regressors, Chapters 6 and 7 gave a more accurate 
description of who among the immigrant population selects to marry outside of their 
national-origin group, and who chooses to import a spouse from their country of origin. The 
present chapter seeks to link these findings to theory and previous research. First, it discusses 
the most important results of my empirical analyses, in light of the mechanisms and 
hypotheses forwarded in Chapter 3. Second, it proposes pathways for further research on the 
intermarriage and spouse import of the immigrant population in Norway.   
8.1 Evaluating the hypotheses and mechanisms 
This section assesses each hypothesis generated in Chapter 3, and discusses whether the 
empirical findings have corroborated or undermined the explanatory mechanisms. To 
summarize the match between theory and results, Tables 8.1 through 8.4 give a schematic 
outline of the validity of hypotheses and their corresponding mechanisms.  
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8.1.1 Persisting boundaries of intimacy 
This thesis does not seek to give a full-blown account of why national-origin groups differ in 
their spouse selection patterns. However, as the theme is spouse selection by national-origin 
group, and because there are fundamental mechanisms of such spouse selection related to 
factors proxied by national-origin group in this study, the impact of national-origin group is a 
crucial part of my analyses. 
Hypothesis 1a suggested that because there is great variation between national-origin (and 
regional) groups in their similarity to majority Norwegians (both in terms of socioeconomic, 
religious and cultural measures), their propensity to intermarriage with the majority 
population varies accordingly. More specifically, the hypothesis first proposed that Asian and 
African groups are most endogamous, and that Northern Europeans and Northern Americans 
are most exogamous. The bivariate analyses of Chapter 5 largely confirm this pattern, and as 
indicated by Table 8.1, hypothesized differences between national and regional groups 
largely remain statistically significant in the multivariate analyses (more on this below). 
Although there are deviant countries within most regional groups, Asian immigrants are 
unambiguously the most endogamous group, followed by Africans, Eastern Europeans, 
South Americans, Western Europe, and North Americans. The polarization is enhanced for 
descendants, in that individuals from the largest European groups are highly unlikely to 
marry endogamously, while the large Asian and African groups are as endogamous as or 
even more endogamous than their parents.  
The principal mechanisms generating hypothesis 1a were the likeness-leads-to-liking and 
dissimilarity-breeds-dislike patterns, predicting that perceived “sociocultural” differences 
(Epstein and Guttman 1984: 273) and perceived differences through physical visibility as 
minority (Rogstad 2000) (i.e. “racial features”) would make intermarriage unlikely. 
Following the logic and rough grouping of culturally dissimilar countries and racially 
dissimilar countries proposed by Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2006), one could argue that my 
findings seem to indicate that skin color matters less than perceived cultural distance for the 
probability of intermarriage in Norway (akin to findings from the Netherlands). However, I 
want to stress a problem with this interpretation. Fundamentally, it seems to suppose, first, 
that there is a “racial hierarchy” in which Africans are at the bottom, second, that certain 
Asian groups are “culturally” than “racially” different. In reality, I think that these factors are 
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hard to disentangle: as I suggested when depicting the likeness-leads-to-liking and 
dissimilarity-breeds-dislike mechanisms, physically visible differences often work as 
indicators of cultural differences – which from the perspective of these mechanisms is 
probably more important as a direct influence on intermarriage patterns.  
Table 8.1 Summary of results, intermarriage   
Variable Expected finding Confirmed?* Intermarriage mechanisms 
National-origin group 
÷ Asian and African groups  
+North European and North 
American groups  
Yes 
Likeness 
/Dissimilarity/Reference 
Group 
xEducational level  + "Non-Western" groups Yes Status Exchange 
Educational level  +  Yes 
Status Exchange, Tolerance, 
Composition 
Gender  + Men 
Descendants: Yes / 
Immigrants: No 
Status Exchange, Patriarchy 
xEducational level  + Women 
Descendants: (Yes) / 
Immigrants: No 
Divergence in Freedom 
Generation  + Descendants Yes Convergence, Identity 
xEducational level  + Descendants Yes 
Tipping Point, Universities 
as Marriage Markets 
Age at marriage  +  Yes 
Parental Influence + 
Likeness-breeds-liking 
*Answers in bold signify clear and statistically significant evidence, answers in brackets signal that control for age at marriage makes the 
relationship non-significant. 
As indicated by Daugstad (2009), religiosity might have more of an explanatory power here. 
Being deeply religious often carries strong preferences of finding a spouse of the same faith. 
Muslims make up contemporary Norway‟s biggest minority-religious group (Statistics 
Norway 2009). As is well known, several of the large national-origin groups of the 
immigrant population in Norway, such as Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Somalia and Morocco, are 
predominantly Muslim. These groups have been shown to intermarry to a lesser degree than 
most other groups – and several of them (Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco) are importing spouses 
at very high rates. However, what is not clear is the reason why members of these groups do 
not intermarry with each other to larger extent: this signals that religious likeness is far from 
a sufficient condition to enable a mutual preference of each other as a potential spouse. 
The reference group mechanism suggested that the role of both direct influence from third 
parties and the indirect influence of others‟ spouse selection within the group will be of great 
importance. Partly, I think this may explain why some of the groups who have stayed in 
Norway the longest (e.g. Pakistanis, Turks, Moroccans and Vietnamese) remain highly 
endogamous. Many of the original immigrants from these groups had spouses in their home 
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country with which they soon reunified, others fled with their families. Partly because of 
relative group size, and partly because of the incipient situation of not having meant to stay 
and incorporate in Norwegian society (Brochmann and Kjelstadli 2008: 201), selecting a 
spouse from within the group would have appeared the only viable option. The reference 
group/third party mechanism thus suggests that when there is such an established pattern 
within the national-origin group, there is a significant normative barrier against 
intermarriage.
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Hypothesis 1a also submits that there will be a similar continuum with regards to spouse 
import. Again, the prediction is largely correct; among immigrant groups, the regional 
differences are large, disregarding a few deviant cases (e.g. men from Great Britain and 
Macedonia). Because of too few endogamous descendants of different groups, meaningful 
analyses of the magnitude of between-group differences in spouse import could not be 
performed for them.  
The Keeping the Homeland Connection mechanism suggested that if differences between a 
national-origin group and the majority are large, it is not only reasonable that individuals will 
seek “input” from the homeland because they prefer them as spouses, but the third parties 
around the spouse-to-be might see an opportunity of an in-law with the right values, taste and 
knowledge and strengthen the relationship to the “homeland”. Obviously, following the logic 
of numbers, spouse import will appear even more desirable for those belonging to a small 
national-origin group than those with many residing co-nationals to choose between. 
The results concerning national-origin group and spouse import do not fit well with the idea 
of a demographic gravity pulling people to their country of origin to find a spouse. Several of 
the large groups in the immigrant population of Norway as of 2002 (Lie 2004: 18) (Pakistan, 
Turkey, India) display much spouse import, and there are groups whose relative size would 
indicate much more spouse import than that displayed here (Netherlands, Germany, Iceland) 
which indicates that the logic of numbers at the very least does not frame a necessary or 
                                                          
52 Tuastad (2008: 43) suggests that endogamy is idiosyncratic of many Middle-Eastern countries, partly derived from Arab 
kinship culture and partly as a derivation of the importance of territoriality as a space that is communally controlled. As the 
state is more withdrawn in some parts of the world, the need to “keep to oneself” may have developed as a subsistence 
strategy. This might be the inception of consanguineous marriages and marriages within the group more generally. 
 
122 
sufficient premise for this choice. This unexpected result matches that of Gonzalez-Ferrer 
(2006), who finds that size of resident community increases chances of spouse import. 
Again, I think that the reference group/third party mechanism is more promising. Owing to 
the pattern depicted above, immigrants and descendants from old, “non-western” groups 
would find the option of importing a spouse perfectly natural: after all, this practice has been 
part of the collective behavior of some of these groups since their inception in Norway. 
The “full” regression models of Chapters 6 and 7 largely confirm hypothesis 1b, that the 
multivariate analyses display roughly the same tendency regarding differences of both 
intermarriage and spouse import between national-origin and regional groups. This indicates 
two things: First, the relative importance of mechanisms suggesting that certain national 
backgrounds are particularly associated with endogamy and spouse import. Second, it 
demonstrates that the differences between these groups in spouse selection patterns are to a 
small extent attributable to the variation in the other explanatory variables included in these 
analyses. Clearly, the approach of segmented assimilation (Bean and Stevens 2003: 99), 
arguing that different types of immigrants also differ greatly when it comes to type and 
degree of integration, also holds for the intermarriage variations between groups regardless 
of their variation according to the independent variables included in these analyses.
53
  
8.1.2 Education – an asset in the intergroup marriage market?  
Perhaps the key theme of this thesis is the degree to which educational level influences 
intermarriage and spouse import. In Chapter 3, hypothesis 2a predicted that level of 
education is positively associated with the probability of intermarriage, and negatively 
associated with the probability of spouse import. Although the strength of these relationships 
vary between models (and sexes and generations, see below), the general tendency across all 
analyses is a (weak) confirmation of this hypothesis. The across-group association of 
education with intermarriage was greatly reduced by controlling for national-origin variation, 
which suggests that the relationship is confounded. Given the strong tendency of national-
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 However, as suggested in the future research section, control variables such as sex ratio, group size and other group 
characteristics (both cultural and demographic [Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010]) are likely to reduce the differences 
between national-origin groups to a larger extent than that seen in this study.  
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origin group variation in intermarriage while controlling for education, there is no reason to 
believe that overlapping variation in education and intermarriage can be explained by the fact 
that educational level influences intermarriage level. This indicates that some previous 
studies (e.g. Van Tubergen and Maas 2007; Celikaksoy et al. 2009; Kalmijn and Van 
Tubergen 2010) enmesh the explanatory value of education with its uneven distribution on 
the very heterogeneous immigrant population.  
Table 8.2 Summary of results, spouse import   
Variable Expected finding Confirmed?* Spouse import mechanisms 
National-origin group 
+Asian and African 
groups  
Yes 
Keeping the Homeland 
Connection/Reference 
Group 
Educational level   ÷ Yes 
Universities as Marriage 
Markets 
Gender  + Men 
Descendants: Yes / 
Immigrants: Yes 
Sex Ratio 
xEducational level  + Women 
Descendants: (No) / 
Immigrants: Yes 
Divergence in Freedom 
Generation  + Immigrants No Convergence, Identity 
xEducational level  + Descendants Men: Yes / Women: (No) 
Universities as Marriage 
Markets 
Age at marriage   ÷ Yes 
Parental Influence + 
Likeness-breeds-liking 
*Answers in bold signify clear and statistically significant evidence, answers in brackets signal that control for age at marriage makes the 
relationship non-significant. 
Built on a proposal made in previous research (Hwang et al. 1995; Kalmijn 1998: 401), the 
tolerance mechanism suggests that higher education weakens the bonds people have to their 
social and cultural roots. The possibility of these mechanisms being at work is not 
disconfirmed by the empirical findings: for both men and women of both generations, higher 
educational level increases the chances of intermarriage on average – controlling for the 
educational level variation between national-origin groups. However, this average 
association is not very strong, as illustrated in Chapter 6. 
Controlling for age at marriage also reduces the effect of educational level on spouse 
selection. The most evident interpretation of this comes from the obvious fact that finishing 
higher education before marriage logically implies that the agent in question did not marry 
early. Thus, those registered with higher education will have much higher age at marriage 
than the population mean, and if the association of educational level to various spouse 
selection outcomes is estimated without controlling for age at marriage, the fact that early 
age in itself increases the chances of endogamy and spouse import will confound the results. 
However, the causal relationship may be more intricate than that. Early marriage is more 
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frequent among those with low socioeconomic background (Wiik 2009), and this group is 
less likely to achieve higher education than those of higher socioeconomic background. It 
may be the case that having parents of low education influences both your probability of 
achieving higher educational levels, your probability of marrying early and your probability 
of marrying endogamously (or importing a spouse). Regardless of what ultimately generates 
this pattern, however, these results indicate that previous research not including age at 
marriage as control (e.g. Jacobs and Labov 2002; Gonzalez-Ferrer 2006; Kalmijn and Van 
Tubergen 2006) may have misestimated the magnitude of educational differences in 
intermarriage probability. Although those marrying at young age do lack the assets suggested 
that higher education might present at the marriage market, as we shall see below, they are 
also more likely to marry endogamously than those older without higher educational 
attainment. 
The status exchange mechanism involved the claim that individuals of low-status minority 
groups with higher education may use their socioeconomic position as an asset on the 
marriage market, and exchange it against the higher-status majority background of their 
partner. This generated hypothesis 2b, which submits that the association between 
educational level and intermarriage varies according to the status of the national-origin 
group. The evidence of this hypothesis is mixed and inconclusive. As is displayed in Table 
8.3, while all “non-western” groups do display more effect of educational level than the only 
“western” group analyzed (Denmark), Pakistanis and Moroccans have a negligible increase 
in the probability of marrying with majority Norwegians at higher educational attainment. 
The pattern is not strictly what we would expect on the basis of the exchange mechanism, 
because the “ethnic status” of the latter groups is arguably different from that of the majority 
population. As suggested below, however, there are much better ways of assessing the status 
exchange mechanism in future research. 
8.1.3 Bridal import, groom’s selection  
Spouse selection patterns are probably deeply intertwined with gender differences along 
many dimensions. Hypothesis 3a posited that men are generally more likely to intermarry 
and import spouses, except for some Eastern Asian groups (where women are more likely to 
intermarry). Although men have been shown to be much more prone to spouse import than 
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women, the intermarriage proposition was partly disconfirmed by the empirical analyses, 
showing that the average female of the immigrant population in Norway is more likely to 
intermarry than the average male. The finding contrasts both with a lot of earlier research and 
with the expectations of the explanatory mechanisms suggested. What can account for this? 
To a considerable degree, this is a result of my exclusion of all those imported to Norway as 
a spouse, a group for which the sex ratio was very skewed towards women. Previous 
analyses (Kulczycki and Lobo 2002; Gonzalez-Ferrer 2006) have found that men‟s relatively 
higher probability of intermarriage is significantly reduced and even disappears when 
controlling for sex ratio. What I have found is that among those immigrants marrying while 
living in Norway, there are more men than women – and thus not only do men to a larger 
degree than women choose to marry endogamously – but among those selecting a spouse 
from within the same national-origin group, men tend to import spouses to a larger degree 
than do women. 
Although this general reversal of the expected gender pattern is seen, there is some evidence 
that the patriarchal mechanism may be at work. First, some groups display more endogamy 
for women despite the fact that they are outnumbered many to one by men of the same 
national group: Iraq (3% of women and 17% of men are married to a majority Norwegian), 
Algeria and Tunisia (men are twice as exogamous). Second, some of the highly endogamous 
countries around which Norwegian debate about “traditional” gender norms has been most 
intense (Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Morocco) present us with a clear tendency for women to be 
more endogamous than men (see Table 8.3). Owing to the logic of the patriarchal 
mechanism, individuals adhering to a more traditional view of gender roles and norms will 
frequently disapprove of women finding a spouse outside of the group, and specifically 
outside of her religious faith (Van Tubergen and Maas 2007: 1071). As seen in Chapter 3, 
this is often assumed to be a factor prohibiting Muslim women from intermarriage (Vogt 
2005: 115; Kulczycki and Lobo 2002: 209). Table 8.3 shows that the gender pattern of the 
largely non-Muslim groups is very different: Indian and Danish women and men are equally 
likely to intermarry with majority Norwegians, while Vietnamese women are distinctively 
more prone to find a majority spouse than Vietnamese men. 
Just as with educational level, age at marriage affects the difference between genders in 
intermarriage and spouse import rates. Chapter 6 reported that holding age at marriage 
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constant increases the differences between the sexes as to whether they marry outside of their 
group. Chapter 7 showed that holding age at marriage constant increases the differences 
between the sexes as to whether they import a spouse or not. Both of these tendencies follow 
the same fundamental principle: women marry systematically earlier than men (around two 
years of difference for most groups, see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Because age at marriage is 
positively associated with intermarriage, and negatively associated with spouse import – this 
strengthens both the lower probability of male exogamy and the higher probability of male 
spouse import. However, again the mechanism is not clear: women may tend to marry early 
and intermarry less regardless of each other – possibly because of gender norms and possibly 
because of the endogenous preferences of women themselves. 
Table 8.3 Summary of results, 5 national-origin groups: intermarriage*   
Variable Vietnam Pakistan India Turkey Morocco Denmark 
Educational level  +  + +   +   +   ÷ 
Gender  + Women  + Men  =  + Men  + Men = 
Generation 
 + 
Descendants 
 (+ 
Immigrants) 
(+ 
Immigrants) 
(+ 
Descendants) 
 + 
Immigrants 
 + 
Descendants 
Age at marriage   +   + =   +   =  ÷ 
*Answers in bold signify a relatively strong relationship, answers in brackets signal that the relationship is non-significant. 
Hypothesis 3b proposed that the effect of educational level on the probability of 
intermarriage is more forceful for women than for men, in particular for descendants. This 
hypothesis was largely confirmed by the analyses of Chapter 6. Although the most vivid 
example of this is illustrated in Figure A6.1, the tendency is also found (although to a lesser 
extent) in the separate analyses of descendants (Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3) – but not for 
immigrants. In fact, for the latter group, educational level is more important for men than for 
women. This thus only partly confirms the expectations of the divergence in freedom 
mechanism. Based on the premise that women from the immigrant population have much 
lower activity rates both in sports and other organized leisure, (Løwe 2008; Vestel 2007: 
151), as well as participation in civil society (Hagelund and Loga 2009: 81), this mechanism 
posits that there are gender differences in the opportunities to meet members of the majority 
population among young immigrants and descendants. Thus, educational institutions may be 
more important for women of minority background than for men. The fact that the expected 
gender difference appears in particular so for descendants is predicted by the universities as 
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marriage market mechanism – because of the fact that they are more likely than immigrants 
to have attended Norwegian universities to reach their educational level.
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In sum, the gender differences in spouse selection found here are not subject to swift 
generalizations. However, sex ratio seems to be an important explanation of gender 
differences in spouse selection, while the lower age at marriage and higher importance of 
educational level for the intermarriage of women might indicate less freedom to intermarry 
with men from the majority population. This may in turn account for the fact that some 
national-origin groups display significantly more intermarriage among men than women.  
8.1.4 Straight lines and curved lines 
The classical assimilation theory of Gordon (1964) suggested that the incorporation of 
minority groups in society was conceivable as a straight temporal line – and that each 
generation would thus intermarry more than their parents. Hypothesis 4a predicts that 
descendants will intermarry more and import spouses less than immigrants. Chapter 6 shows 
that the first claim is confirmed in some of my analyses and disconfirmed in others. 
Likewise, Chapter 7 displays a tendency that being an endogamous descendant actually raises 
the probability of having imported a spouse – but some groups displaying the opposite 
pattern. How do these findings match with the mechanisms proposed for this relationship? 
Both the convergence mechanism and the identity mechanism are partly confirmed by the 
findings of chapter 6. The fact that descendants are on average more similar to majority 
Norwegians than immigrants across several measures increases their chance of intermarrying 
tout court. Many descendants have attended kindergartens, schools and tertiary education in 
the receiving society, with peers of majority background. They thus have more opportunities 
for contact with the majority population than immigrants. They are (although to varying 
degrees) socialized in the culture of the host society, watching the same television shows, 
doing sports and participating in many other leisure activities with majority Norwegians (Øia 
and Vestel 2007: 172). We have seen evidence that although many descendants still identify 
as “foreigner” or “immigrant”, there is reason to believe that the fact that they feel more 
                                                          
54 As noted in Chapter 6, although the magnitude of this difference is larger than that seen for immigrants, it is not 
statistically significant at all educational levels. It is likely that a larger number of observations would vindicate this. 
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Norwegian than their parents can result in higher rates of intermarriage with the population 
of majority background. Thus, despite the fact that the descendants in my sample have lower 
levels of education (and lower marital age) at average than immigrants, their relative likeness 
may breed more liking towards and from members of the majority population.  
However, the convergence and identity mechanisms also involved the assumption that 
descendants are less committed to traditional norms and expectations originating in their 
country of origin. Because spouse import is considered a traditional choice of spouse, the 
empirical expectations were that descendants would import less than immigrants at average. 
What is the explanation of this divergence between expectations and results? 
Table 8.4 Summary of results, 5 national-origin groups: spouse import* 
Variable Vietnam Pakistan India Turkey Morocco 
Educational level    ÷   (+) (÷)   (÷)    ÷ 
Gender  + Men  + Men  + Men  + Men  + Men 
Generation 
 (+ 
Descendants) 
 + Immigrants  =  + Immigrants  + Descendants 
Age at marriage +   -   -   -   - 
*Answers in bold signify a relatively strong relationship, answers in brackets signal that the relationship is non-significant. 
Again, age at marriage plays a role. The analyses of Chapter 6 displayed that if you compare 
immigrants and descendants at the same age, descendants are much more exogamous – and 
their higher probability of importing a spouse is reduced (albeit not by far eliminated). 
Because age is positively associated with intermarriage and negatively associated with 
spouse import, the estimates of differences between generations will be biased without 
control for age at marriage. In the extension of this finding, what probably accounts for some 
of the patterns of descendants‟ spouse selection uncovered is the fact that the demographic 
cross-section of descendants included in these analyses is heavily skewed in favour of the 
early married – because large proportions of descendants have not yet married as of 2002. 
Thus, there is a problem of cohort-selection. As suggested by Daugstad (2009), there is 
reason to suspect more intermarriage among the coming cohorts of marriages among 
descendants – because they will have higher levels of education and higher average age at 
marriage.  
My findings also suggest that the importance of higher education (bracketing age at 
marriage) may signal that as more descendants marry (i.e. those whose educational careers 
are not over yet), the degree of exogamy will increase, and there will be less spouse import. 
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However, whether this will generate spouse import rates that are lower than those of 
immigrants cannot be concluded on the basis of my analyses: although the higher probability 
of importing a spouse for descendants is reduced by control for age at marriage, it is not by 
any means eliminated – and educational level is held constant in the analyses. 
Hypothesis 4b proposes that educational level is more strongly associated with intermarriage 
for descendants than for immigrants. This is confirmed by the empirical results. The 
hypothesis was generated principally by the tipping point mechanism and the universities as 
marriage market mechanism. The logic of the tipping point mechanism is based on the same 
fact as the convergence mechanism: that there is less difference towards the majority for 
descendants while holding educational level constant. Thus, descendants and their peers in 
the majority population are more similar along some of the crucial variables predicting 
attraction (e.g. similarity of taste, language and values) – and their probability of within the 
field of “eligibles” among majority Norwegians is comparably high. The tipping point is 
reached when educational level also matches – making the likeness between the descendant 
and the majority Norwegian high enough to enable coupling. 
Further, we have seen that the fact that institutions of higher education can function as local 
marriage markets is probably part of the explanation why educational level often influences 
intermarriage rates. The power of this explanation, however, is strengthened by the empirical 
finding that education impacts more forcefully on the intermarriage probability of 
descendants than that of immigrants. Because descendants following higher education tracks 
are more likely to do this in Norway than immigrants, the universities as marriage markets 
mechanism is more likely to operate for descendants than for immigrants. Paradoxically, this 
might also be part of the explanation why having achieved higher education reduces the 
spouse import probability of descendants more than that of immigrants: the likelihood of 
them having already met a spouse in connection with being a university or college student is 
higher than that of immigrants – whose spouse in turn actually may be someone met at an 
educational institution in their country of origin (this is speculation unrelated to the analyses, 
which show that educational level lowers the probability of spouse import for immigrants as 
well as descendants). 
Given that low educational attainment of both oneself and ones parents are correlated with 
endogamy, import and early marriage (Daugstad 2009), we can expect that descendants 
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marrying later will display more exogamy and less import. There is some evidence that the 
rates of transnational marriages are decreasing for some groups, e.g. Turkish and Pakistani 
descendants (Daugstad 2008). Importantly, the rates at which these groups have married at 
all are very different: while many of Pakistani background have entered matrimony, few with 
Vietnamese parents have. Overall, many descendants postpone marriage these days 
(Daugstad 2008: 55). Thus, the final assessment of Gordon‟s (1964) “straight-line” 
hypothesis concerning generation and intermarriage must wait. 
8.1.5 Marital age and independence 
We have seen that age at marriage is a confounding element in the relationship between 
several of the other independent variables and spouse selection, and its influence on 
intermarriage and spouse import patterns is already discussed to the extent that there is little 
left to be said here. By itself, age at marriage has been shown to have a positive association 
with intermarriage, and a negative association with spouse import – amounting to a clear-cut 
confirmation of hypothesis 5. Figuring as the principal explanatory mechanism for these 
relationships is the parental influence mechanism, which suggests that parents have more 
influence on the decision of a spouse if their children get married at young age, and parents‟ 
preferences will tend to be endogamous (Kalmijn 1998). The last section of Chapters 6 and 7 
showed that age at marriage has most forceful influence on both the intermarriage propensity 
and the spouse import inclinations of Pakistanis and Turks. Thus, for these national-origin 
groups, their high probability of marrying endogamously and importing a spouse is 
significantly related to their relatively earlier marital age. This corroborates previous research 
(Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010: 467) which argues that those coming from a country with 
tradition of early marriages are more likely to marry within their group.  
8.2 Further research 
The closing moments of work with this thesis are fraught with the experience of having 
opened a field of discovery rather than nailed down abiding knowledge about spouse 
selection in Norway. Clearly, there are vast amounts of research waiting to be done on 
intermarriage and spouse import among immigrants and descendants. This section points out 
some of the puzzles raised in this study which requires further investigation.  
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First, future research should distinguish between more national-origin groups. The analyses 
of what influences intermarriage and spouse import for separate groups have shown that the 
importance of factors varies greatly. Some of my regional collections of national-origin 
groups conceal manifest differences in spouse selection rates, and there is reason to expect 
the importance of influencing factors to vary as well. 
Second, there is the status exchange hypothesis. My analyses have presented evidence that 
status exchange may be at work in the intermarriages of Norway. However, to draw 
conclusions about this phenomenon, the educational level of the majority spouse should be 
accounted for (as noted in Chapter 3), as the hypothesis strictly speaking involves the 
assumption that the majority spouse has only her “ethnic status” to exchange (for the 
educational status of the minority spouse). To test this, log-linear models should be utilized 
cross-checking the educational status of all “mixed” couples in which one partner is of “non-
western” origin (cf. Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2006). 
Third, there is the role of demographic and cultural group characteristics in the national-
group variation of intermarriage and spouse import. This study has demonstrated that there 
remains a vast amount of disparity between national-origin groups, controlling for my 
individual-level variables. However, as shown by Kalmijn and Van Tubergen (2010), group 
characteristics can be decomposed and assessed across different origins, and have impressive 
predictive value when it comes to the spouse selection of different groups. A multi-level 
design modeled after their study would enable an assessment of the relative importance of 
different types of group characteristics, and could help dissect the “black box” of national-
origin group.  
Fourth, and related to this, there should be a closer inspection of the role of residential 
segregation. My analyses have shown that living in Oslo impacts negatively on 
intermarriage, which indicates that there is more opportunity for meeting other immigrants in 
this metropolitan area than elsewhere in Norway. Living in Oslo is also associated with less 
spouse import for Pakistanis, Indians and Moroccans – but not for Vietnamese and Turks. Is 
this enlightened by the residential patterns of these groups? Residential segregation has been 
showed to be a fertile ground for a “local marriage market” elsewhere (Kalmijn, 1998: 403; 
Heaton and Jacobson 2000). This relationship should be scrutinized further, in particular by 
decomposing the different areas of Oslo. 
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Fifth, actually explaining the spouse selections reviewed in this thesis should be pursued 
further. The theoretical strategy of this study was inspired by the idea of mechanism-based 
explanations, programmatic of analytical sociology. As noted by Manzo (2010), through 
simulating the social processes believed to generate the statistical patterns discovered, we 
may come closer to an understanding of the mechanisms that can explain these outcomes. 
Thus, an agent-based model simulating the spouse selection of immigrants and descendants 
should bring us closer to actually evaluating the validity of mechanisms proposed in this 
thesis. 
Finally, I suggest that we should take the essentially two-sided aspect of spouse selection 
more seriously. In research on intermarriage, this would involve scrutinizing the group of 
majority Norwegians engaged in a relationship with someone from the immigrant 
population. What makes them prone to engage in intermarriage? How do they end up 
choosing a minority Norwegian as a spouse? As I have suggested above, through being the 
most direct measure of the opportunity of intermarriage from the perspective of immigrants 
and descendants, the spouse preferences of the majority population may be more important in 
the explanation of intermarriage than that assumed in most of the literature to this date.  
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Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Multinomial logit models of intermarriage. All immigrants and descendants                   
Model   1 
   
2 
   
3 
   
4     
  Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   Majority   Minority   
Educational level   
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
   Primary (Ref.)   
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
   Lower secondary 0,151 ** 0,162 *** 0,042 ns 0,150 ** 0,100 *** 0,154 *** 0,031 ns 0,154 ** 
Higher secondary 0,546 *** 0,430 *** 0,329 *** 0,357 *** 0,499 *** 0,451 *** 0,301 *** 0,372 *** 
Lower tertiary (BA) 1,160 *** 0,823 *** 0,811 *** 0,646 *** 1,380 *** 0,979 *** 1,007 *** 0,784 *** 
Higher tertiary (MA) 1,294 *** 1,159 *** 0,891 *** 0,910 *** 1,517 *** 1,227 *** 1,025 *** 0,944 *** 
Unknown 0,625 *** 0,500 *** 0,480 *** 0,503 *** 0,570 *** 0,467 *** 0,450 *** 0,477 *** 
 
  
  
  
   
  
   
  
    Place of residence   
  
  
   
  
   
  
    Outside Oslo (Ref.)   
  
  
   
  
   
  
    Oslo -0,709 *** -0,111 ** -0,715 *** -0,103 ** -0,709 *** -0,108 *** -0,714 *** -0,101 ** 
Unknown -0,299 *** -0,356 *** -0,090 ns -0,118 ns -0,303 *** -0,360 *** -0,097 ** -0,125 ** 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
    Descendant 0,129 *** -0,019 ns 0,605 *** 0,334 *** -0,281 ** -0,282 * 0,357 *** 0,106 *** 
 
  
  
  
   
  
   
  
    Age at marriage   
  
  0,072 *** 0,052 *** 
   
  0,072 *** 0,052 *** 
Age at marriage2   
  
  -0,008 *** -0,001 *** 
   
  -0,007 *** -0,001 *** 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
    
Male -0,690 *** -0,265 *** -0,870 *** -0,430 *** -0,575 *** -0,197 *** -0,779 *** -0,368 *** 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
    
Male*Lower secondary    
 
  
 
 
 
  -0,011 ns -0,006 ns -0,047 ns -0,009 ns 
Male*Higher secondary    
 
  
 
 
 
  -0,080 ns -0,152 * -0,045 ns -0,120 ns 
Male*Lower tertiary (BA)    
 
  
 
 
 
  -0,530 *** -0,337 *** -0,397 *** -0,283 *** 
Male*Higher tertiary (MA)    
 
  
 
 
 
  -0,521 *** -0,207 ns -0,298 *** -0,136 ns 
Descendant*Lower secondary    
 
  
 
 
 
  0,350 *** -0,003 ns 0,254 * -0,046 ns 
Descendant*Higher secondary    
 
  
 
 
 
  0,651 *** 0,516 *** 0,424 *** 0,442 *** 
Descendant*Lower tertiary (BA)    
 
  
 
 
 
  0,659 *** 0,602 *** 0,237 * 0,463 ** 
Descendant*Higher tertiary (MA)    
 
  
 
 
 
  1,437 *** 1,357 *** 0,840 *** 1,165 *** 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
    
Intercept -0,225 *** -1,491 *** 0,287 *** -1,404 *** -0,264 *** -1,494 *** 0,267 *** -1,415 *** 
Chi-square (df) 3738,476 (18) 6680,763 (22) 4120,036 (34) 6881,291 (38) 
Nagelkerke R2 0,084 0,138 0,088 0,142 
N 55,293 55,293 55,293 55,293 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.               
 
B: Binomial logit models of spouse import. All immigrants and descendants. 
 
 
 
Table B7.1 Binomial logit models of spouse import. All immigrants and descendants.       
Model 1 2 3 4 
Educational level   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Primary (Ref.)   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Lower secondary -0,210 *** -0,147 ** -0,028 ns 0,014 ** 
Higher secondary -0,581 *** -0,416 *** -0,571 *** -0,373 *** 
Lower tertiary (BA) -0,707 *** -0,394 *** -0,699 ** -0,311 *** 
Higher tertiary (MA) -1,046 *** -0,659 *** -1,349 *** -0,811 *** 
Unknown -0,504 *** -0,410 *** -0,509 *** -0,422 *** 
   
 
    
 
  
  Place of residence   
 
    
 
  
  Outside Oslo (Ref.)   
 
    
 
  
  Oslo 0,242 *** 0,274 *** 0,240 *** 0,272 *** 
Unknown 0,862 *** 0,645 *** 0,862 *** 0,644 *** 
 
       
 
  
  Descendant 1,356 *** 0,827 *** 1,419 *** 0,822 *** 
   
 
    
 
  
  Age at marriage   
 
-0,069 *** 
 
  -0,069 *** 
Age at marriage2   
 
0,002 *** 
 
  0,002 *** 
 
       
 
  
  
Male 1,251 *** 1,530 *** 1,318 *** 1,619 *** 
 
       
 
  
 
 
Male*Lower secondary        -0,292 *** -0,270 *** 
Male*Higher secondary        -0,033 ns -0,099 ns 
Male*Lower tertiary (BA)        0,013 ns -0,111 ns 
Male*Higher tertiary (MA)        0,367 (*) 0,162 ns 
Descendant*Lower secondary        -0,016 ns 0,030 ns 
Descendant*Higher secondary        0,032 ns 0,097 ns 
Descendant*Lower tertiary (BA)        -0,539 ** -0,403 * 
Descendant*Higher tertiary (MA)        -0,810 ns -0,603 ns 
 
       
 
  
  
Intercept -0,594 *** -0,969 *** -0,633 *** -0,969 *** 
−2LL (df ) 33059,095 (9) 32182,124 (11) 33042,326 (17) 32174,380 (19) 
Nagelkerke R2 0,166 0,204 0,168 0,206 
N 27,701 27,701 27,701 27,701 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.     
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C: Multinomial logit models of intermarriage, without controls for age at marriage. 
Table C6.3 Multinomial logit estimates of exogamy for immigrants.  Contrast: Endogamy   
  
  
Men 
      
Women 
    
  Majority    Minority    Majority    Minority    
National/regional group 
        
South America (Ref.) 
        
Pakistan -2,417 
*** -1,968 *** -4,779 *** -4,033 *** 
Turkey -1,152 
*** -1,607 *** -2,896 *** -2,094 *** 
Vietnam -3,141 
*** -2,549 *** -2,649 *** -2,258 *** 
India -1,295 
*** -0,864 *** -1,905 *** -1,051 *** 
Other Asian -1,435 
*** -0,447 *** -0,124 ns -0,342 (*) 
Morocco -0,165 
* -1,011 *** -1,615 *** -0,748 ** 
Other African -0,233 
* 0,026 ns -0,813 *** -0,005 ns 
Nordic countries 1,472 
*** 0,713 *** 1,482 *** 0,742 *** 
Western Europe 1,854 
*** 1,440 *** 1,609 *** 1,319 *** 
Eastern Europe -0,374 
*** 0,008 ns 0,435 *** 0,461 *** 
North America and Oceania 2,058 
*** 1,519 *** 2,354 *** 1,787 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary (Ref.)    
 
 
 
 
 
Lower secondary 0,215 
** 0,152 * -0,090 ns -0,095 ns 
Higher secondary 0,299 
*** 0,121 ns 0,071 ns -0,024 ns 
Lower tertiary (BA) 0,463 
*** 0,271 *** 0,527 *** 0,226 * 
Higher tertiary (MA) 0,358 
*** 0,471 *** 0,693 *** 0,450 ** 
Unknown 0,013 
ns 0,160 * 0,001 ns 0,009 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo -0,253 
*** 0,065 ns -0,488 *** 0,173 ** 
Unknown -0,500 
*** -0,226 * -0,162 ** -0,084 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Length of stay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-2 years (Ref.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-5 years 0,024 
ns -0,070 ns 0,105 * 0,091 ns 
6-9 years -0,149 
ns -1,239 *** -0,097 ns -1,269 *** 
10-15 years -0,302 
*** 0,010 ns 0,322 *** 0,474 *** 
16-42 years -0,417 
*** 0,580 *** 0,808 *** 0,960 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -0,149 
ns -1,239 *** -0,097 ns -1,269 *** 
Chi-square (df) 10399,720 (44)*** 7608,343 (44)*** 
Nagelkerke 0,356 0,370 
N 31505 23788 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.   
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Table C6.5 Multinomial logit estimates of exogamy for descendants.  Contrast: Endogamy   
  
  
Men 
      
Women 
    
  Majority    Minority    Majority    Minority    
National/regional group 
        
South America (Ref.) 
        
Pakistan -3,243 
*** -0,372 ns -5,325 *** -3,702 *** 
Turkey -2,815 
*** -0,985 ns -4,191 *** -3,279 *** 
Vietnam -22,355 
*** -0,980 ns -3,228 *** -2,265 ** 
India -2,673 
*** -1,120 ns -2,586 *** -1,905 ** 
Other Asian 0,437 
ns 2,210 (*) -1,407 * -0,526 ns 
Morocco -1,185 
ns 0,196 ns -3,824 *** -3,667 *** 
Other African 0,080 
ns 2,288 (*) 0,500 ns 1,380 ns 
Nordic countries 0,177 
*** 2,921 ** 1,628 ** 0,065 ns 
Western Europe 2,798 
*** 3,184 ** 0,754 ns 0,582 ns 
Eastern Europe 1,394 
* 2,274 * -0,158 ns 0,072 ns 
North America and Oceania 1,833 
* 0,468 ns 1,543 * 0,333 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Educational level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary (Ref.)    
 
 
 
 
 
Lower secondary -0,143 
ns 0,110 ns 0,587 * 0,185 ns 
Higher secondary 0,544 
* 0,450 ns 0,812 ** 0,753 ** 
Lower tertiary (BA) 0,981 
** 0,929 ** 1,524 *** 1,002 ** 
Higher tertiary (MA) 0,844 
(*) 1,361 ** 1,481 * 0,944 ns 
Unknown -0,864 
* 0,080 ns -0,555 ns -0,157 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo -1,065 
*** -0,048 ns -0,804 *** 0,146 ns 
Unknown 0,086 
ns -0,141 ns 0,717 ** 0,426 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -0,028 
ns -2,358 * 0,779 ns -0,261 ns 
Chi-square (df) 1534,460 (36)*** 2189,175 (36)*** 
Nagelkerke 0,668 0,695 
N 1825 2496 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002.   
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D: Logistic models of intermarriage and spouse import, excluding marriages occuring 
within two years. 
Table D6.2 Multinomial logit estimates of exogamy for immigrants.  Contrast: Endogamy   
  
  
Men 
      
Women 
    
  Majority    Minority    Majority    Minority    
National/regional group 
        
South America (Ref.) 
        
Pakistan -2,521 *** -2,015 *** -4,391 *** -3,798 *** 
Turkey -1,121 *** -1,692 *** -2,327 *** -1,919 *** 
Vietnam -3,351 *** -2,437 *** -2,396 *** -2,052 *** 
India -1,481 *** -0,943 *** -1,734 *** -1,058 *** 
Other Asian -1,677 *** -0,512 *** 0,030 
ns -0,217 (*) 
Morocco -0,348 ** -1,130 *** -1,381 *** -0,682 ** 
Other African -0,287 ** 0,045 
ns -0,726 *** -0,011 ns 
Nordic countries 0,122 *** 0,069 *** 0,135 *** 0,073 *** 
Western Europe 2,175 *** 1,721 *** 1,704 *** 1,465 *** 
Eastern Europe -0,489 *** 0,040 
ns 0,613 *** 0,481 *** 
North America and Oceania 2,175 *** 1,761 *** 2,336 *** 1,800 *** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary (Ref.)    
 
 
 
 
 
Lower secondary 0,135 (*) 0,205 * -0,148 (*) -0,008 
ns 
Higher secondary 0,212 ** 0,165 (*) -0,089 
ns 0,023 ns 
Lower tertiary (BA) 0,431 *** 0,346 *** 0,245 ** 0,189 (*) 
Higher tertiary (MA) 0,426 *** 0,513 *** 0,533 *** 0,549 ** 
Unknown -0,060 
ns 0,189 * -0,217 ** 0,000 ns 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo -0,281 *** 0,095 (*) -0,613 *** 0,148 * 
Unknown -0,530 *** -0,070 
ns -0,045 ns 0,028 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Length of stay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-6 years (Ref.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7-10 years -0,258 *** 0,037 
ns -0,040 ns 0,125 (*) 
11-15 years -0,168 ** 0,042 
ns 0,246 *** 0,442 *** 
16+ years 0,106 
ns 0,445 *** 0,680 *** 0,854 *** 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Age at marriage -0,004 
ns 0,010 * 0,063 *** 0,022 ns 
Age at marriage2 -0,008 *** 0,000 (*) -0,007 *** -0,001 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0,214 * -1,429 *** 0,356 ** -1,236 *** 
Chi-square (df) 10188,2042541292 (46)*** 6971,79946269501 (46)*** 
Nagelkerke 0,412 0,423 
N 24139,000 15138,000 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002. 
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Table D6.4 Multinomial logit estimates of exogamy for descendants.  Contrast: Endogamy   
  
  
Men 
      
Women 
    
  Majority    Minority    Majority    Minority    
National/regional group 
        
South America (Ref.) 
        
Pakistan -3,016 
*** -0,238 ns -5,285 *** -3,705 *** 
Turkey -2,484 
*** -0,747 ns -3,907 *** -3,176 *** 
Vietnam -22,155 
ns -0,863 ns -3,155 *** -2,253 ** 
India -2,666 
*** -1,079 ns -2,667 *** -1,948 ** 
Other Asian 0,373 
ns 2,120 (*) -1,295 * -0,419 ns 
Morocco -1,216 
ns 0,215 ns -3,684 *** -3,636 *** 
Other African -0,034 
ns 2,194 (*) 0,214 ns 1,221 ns 
Nordic countries 0,144 
** 0,179 * 0,065 ns 0,038 ns 
Western Europe 2,335 
** 2,830 * -0,102 ns 0,096 ns 
Eastern Europe 1,011 
ns 1,998 (*) -0,694 ns -0,182 ns 
North America and Oceania 1,264 
ns -0,017 ns 0,835 ns -0,082 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary (Ref.)    
 
 
 
 
 
Lower secondary -0,331 
ns -0,016 ns 0,494 (*) 0,154 ns 
Higher secondary 0,283 
ns 0,191 ns 0,438 (*) 0,519 (*) 
Lower tertiary (BA) 0,339 
ns 0,382 ns 0,740 * 0,510 ns 
Higher tertiary (MA) 0,021 
ns 0,672 ns 0,254 ns 0,176 ns 
Unknown -0,807 
(*) 0,077 ns -0,748 (*) -0,227 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place of residence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside Oslo (Ref.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo -0,971 
*** 0,028 ns -0,745 *** 0,173 ns 
Unknown 0,675 
** 0,341 ns 1,353 *** 0,728 ** 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Age at marriage 0,176 
*** 0,131 *** 0,210 *** 0,108 *** 
Age at marriage2 -0,007 
** -0,005 (*) -0,006 ** -0,002 ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0,414 
ns -1,977 (*) 1,360 * 0,116 ns 
Chi-square (df) 1593,341 (40)*** 2277,451 (50)*** 
Nagelkerke 0,684 0,712 
N 1496 2068 
Note: ns p >0.10, (*) p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. Prevalence data as of 31.12.2002. 
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E: Contingency tables of couples’ composition before and 
after selection 
Table E1: Couples by the basic immigrant category and gender, count  
 
Women 
Total A B C E F G 
Men A 0 24512 552 0 0 0 25064 
B 16145 47668 741 340 979 271 66144 
C 448 435 55 4 31 13 986 
E 0 376 3 0 0 0 379 
F 0 1292 36 0 0 0 1328 
G 0 326 19 0 0 0 345 
Total 16593 74609 1406 344 1010 284 94246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A No immigrant background 
B Immigrant 
C Born in Norway by two immigrant parents 
D Adopted (excluded) 
E Foreign-born with one Norwegian parent 
F Norwegian-born with one foreign parent 
G Foreign-born with Norwegian parents 
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Table E2: Couples by immigrant category and gender, count 
 Women Total 
 Majority Immigrant Descendant 0 
Men Majority 0 26101 1015 27116 
 Immigrant 17440 46421 1426 65287 
 Descendant 791 936 131 1858 
Total 18231 73441 2572 94261 
 
Table E3: Couples with marital date, count 
 Women Total 
 Majority Immigrant Descendant 0 
Men Majority 0 25607 1015 26622 
 Immigrant 17174 28842 1370 47386 
 Descendant 791 906 131 1828 
Total 17965 55355 2516 75836 
 
 
 
 
